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Director: Dr. Adrian V. Gheorghe
The historical roots of the Emergency Management concept in the U.S. date back 
to 19th century. As disasters occurred, policies relating to disaster response have been 
developed, and many statuary provisions, including several Federal Disaster Relief Acts, 
conceptually established the framework of Emergency Management. In 1979, with the 
foundation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), disaster relief 
efforts were finally institutionalized, and the federal government acknowledged that 
Emergency Management included mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery 
activities as abbreviated 'MPRR.'
However, after 2000, the U.S. experienced two milestone events - the September 
11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Following the foundation of 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002, the definitional context of 
Emergency Management and its phases/components, simply its essence, evolved and was 
incorporated into many official documents differently, creating contextual 
inconsistencies. Recent key official documents embody epistemological problems that 
have the potential to traumatize the coherence of the Homeland Security contextual 
framework as well as to impose challenges theoretically to the education and training of 
Homeland Security/Emergency Management stakeholders. Furthermore, the conceptual
design of the Emergency Support Functions (ESF) which have been defined within the 
context of the National Response Framework (NRF) displays similar problematic 
symptoms, and existing urban area Public Safety and Security planning processes have 
also not been supported by methodologies that are aligned with the post-disaster security 
requirements.
To that end, the conceptual framework of Emergency Management and its 
incorporation in the Homeland Security global architecture should be revised and 
redefined to enhance coherence and reliability. Coherence in the contextual structure 
directly links to the system's organizational structure and its viability functions. Also, 
holistic multi-dimensional system representations/abstractions, which would support 
appreciation of the system's complex context, should be incorporated in policy 
documents to be utilized to educate the relevant stakeholders (individuals, teams, etc.) 
during the training/orientation programs.
In addition, the NRF and its ESFs should be reviewed through a post-disaster 
security centric focus, since the post-disaster environment has unique characteristics that 
should be addressed by different approaches. In that sense, this dissertation develops a 
Post-Disaster Security Index (PDSI) Model that provides valuable insights for security 
agents and other Emergency Management and Homeland Security stakeholders.
Keywords: Emergency Management, Homeland Security, National Response Framework, 
Public Safety and Security, Post-Disaster Urban Security, Law Enforcement, Hurricane 
Katrina, Systems Thinking, Multi-Criteria Decision Making.
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Emergent threats, like natural and man-made disasters (including acts of 
terrorism), have the potential to bring uncertainty and complexity to the security o f urban 
environments, while the requirement for resiliency and emergency preparedness is 
increasing in the context of Homeland Security. As Little (2004) has discussed “we find 
ourselves in a time where former contexts o f threat, vulnerability, and target have all 
changed and continue to do so” (p. 57).
Against this threat spectrum, which is getting more challenging every day, 
Emergency Management has been the focal point of local and federal authorities for 
framing disaster response activities in the U.S. Since the 1800s, exhaustive efforts have 
been rendered to cope with the hard times of post-disaster periods while many disaster 
policies and statuary provisions have been promulgated to coordinate the decentralized 
initiatives scattered around the country. During the time represented in Figure 1, the 
disaster response framework at federal level was institutionalized with the foundation of 
FEMA in 1979, and the federal government acknowledged the four major components - 
mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery (MPRR) - o f Emergency Management.
1800$ 1979(FEMA) 2002 (DHS)
1 < s •
Disaster Response Emergency Homeland
: Management Security
Figure 1 Origination of the Emergency Management Concept
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Since 1979, studies to enhance preparedness and resiliency against different types 
o f disasters have increased. In the last decade, after the terrorist acts o f 9/11, parallel with 
the increase in the vulnerability o f urban areas, myriad efforts, including public, state or 
private initiatives (policy/strategy development, legislation, academic research and 
activities, administrative regulations, exercises, etc.) have been put in place to enhance 
the national preparedness. These studies which are mostly under the oversight of the 
Homeland Security enterprise have incorporated the essence of the Emergency 
Management concept differently, and it is assumed that all those efforts performed in 
some partially decentralized networked groups have ended with some epistemological 
inconsistencies regarding the Homeland Security contextual domain, which comprises 
diverse contextual, structural and functional complex systems and sub-systems. Due to 
overwhelming complexity and epistemological problems, the outstanding initiatives in 
different scales and scopes which aimed to sustain a high level of resiliency against all 
types of threats, have consequently created some more contextual inconsistency.
However, the initiatives were supposed to be controlled, coordinated and unified with a 
common terminology as it required by the recent Presidential Policy Directive o f  
National Preparedness (2011).
The official capstone documents that identify the boundaries o f the Homeland 
Security enterprise are depicted in Figure 2. The concept o f Emergency Management, 
which can be traced back to the 19th century with the beginning of disaster response 
activities, was incorporated in these documents after 2000, following the establishment of 
the DHS, and Emergency Management continued to evolve during this time in line with 
the development of Homeland Security context.
3
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Figure 2 DHS Capstone Documents
To some extent, the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and NRF, 
which are the core mandates o f the Homeland Security response/recovery architecture, 
have adapted the essence of Emergency Management. NIMS “works hand in hand with 
NRF and provides the template for the management of incidents, while the NRF provides 
the structure and mechanisms for national-level policy for incident management” 
(National Incident Management System, 2008, p. 1). NRF “specifies incident manage­
ment roles and responsibilities, including emergency support functions designed to 
expedite the flow of resources and program support to the incident area” (National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2009, p. 78).
However, when all the documents illustrated in Figure 2 are reviewed from a 
holistic perspective (as they are specified in the next chapters), serious contextual
4
inconsistencies are revealed regarding the theoretical mission areas, functions and 
definitions of Emergency Management, Homeland Security, and their major components.
In a similar vein, two of the fifteen support functions within the NRF, Emergency 
Management Support Function (ESF-5) and Public Safety and Security Support Function 
(ESF-13) have links to the problem domain identified in this dissertation. Their design in 
the existing framework requires further analysis to minimize the collateral deficiencies.
1.2 Problem Domain
In the U.S., before DHS, disaster response activities were coordinated within the 
context o f Emergency Management. During the period theoretically starting from 
September 11, DHS has been the single authority for the coordination o f all response 
missions. Following its establishment in 2002, DHS has overseen the development and 
evolution of Emergency Management in line with the development o f the Homeland 
Security contextual framework. However, the incorporation o f the definitional context of 
Emergency Management and its phases/components within the official documents 
(contextual structure) o f Homeland Security indicates serious epistemological problems.
In addition, the official documents addressing both the Homeland Security 
enterprise and Emergency Management (which should be a process or function within 
Homeland Security) lack of figurative top-down holistic, multi-dimensional system 
representations/abstractions. These should have depicted the contextual structure (of all 
levels) o f the system holistically for the situational awareness and training of 
individuals/leaders and other system stakeholders.
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The aforementioned epistemological problems have also negatively affected the 
conceptual design of the ESFs defined within the context of NRF. Although Emergency 
Management Support Function (ESF-5) should be an overarching function or process to 
lead, coordinate and synchronize the other functions that use the Public Safety and 
Security Support Function (ESF-13) as a base platform, all the support functions are 
depicted as independent. In addition, the interaction and interdependency among them 
have not been delineated clearly throughout the texts.
Furthermore, regarding Public Safety and Security of an urban environment in a 
post-disaster state, new criticality and vulnerability assessment tools/models should be 
developed to better support the security planning process, since security and public order 
in a post-disaster urban environment play a significant role for the execution of other 
follow-up response and recovery missions as it was evidenced during Hurricane Katrina. 
The lack of law enforcement and public security during the first week after Hurricane 
Katrina seriously hurt the execution of other Emergency Management missions in 
coherence, completely halting some of the response efforts in some places.
1.3 Purpose and Anticipated Significance of the Dissertation
The dissertation includes two separate major components, which theoretically stay 
in the contextual framework of U.S. Homeland Security, and have an inextricable link to 
each other, as depicted in Figure 3. The focal discussions o f these components follow:
• An epistemological inquiry (questioning the contextual consistency) o f the 
incorporation of Emergency Management concept within the Homeland 
Security contextual structure.
6
• Discussion that highlights the requirement for post-disaster security centric 
planning approach within the NRF.
In line with these topics, the purpose of the dissertation is to contribute to existing 
literature providing some factual inferences (articulated as Conclusions and 
Recommendations in Chapter 5) by achieving the following goals;
•  Analyze the U.S. Homeland Security contextual structure underlining the 
significance of:
Contextual coherence in a complex system,
- Utilization of common terms, taxonomies and figurative top-down 
holistic multi-dimensional system representations/abstractions,
Analysis of Homeland Security 
Contextual Structure
Development of PDSI 
Model
Em ergency Support FunctionsNIM S
Public Safety  and Security
Figure 3 Major Components o f the Dissertation
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Public Safety and Security within the National Response Framework.
• Develop a vulnerability assessment model which can be utilized to address 
tactical level post-disaster urban area security requirements, promoting the 
post-disaster security centric planning perspective as well as providing 
generalizable indices for the high level (operational or strategic) security 
planning purposes.
Pursuant to significance of the dissertation, Chapter 3 clarifies and underlines the 
potential implications of contextual inconsistency upon the organizational and functional 
structures of the systems, and upon Public Safety and Security. This chapter includes a 
contextual analysis supported by an extensive literature review through a unique 
methodology culminating with critical conclusions specified in Chapter 5.
Chapter 4 introduces a unique prescriptive vulnerability assessment model - Post- 
Disaster Security Index (PDSI) Model, which would support post-disaster security 
planning of urban areas. The concept design of the PDSI Model is a combination of the 
epistemological perspective o f modeling, Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM), and 
relevant aspects of the military literature, including Military Decision Making Process 
(MDMP). The variables used in the model have been developed to specifically address 
the post-disaster security requirements.
The vulnerability index (PDSI), to be obtained through the use o f the PDSI 
Model, not only provides a prioritization index for the criticality and vulnerability 
assessment but also gives valuable insights for post-disaster force tailoring, unit 
positioning and the determination of the possible security operations techniques to be
8
implemented in a jurisdiction. If the PDSI Model is implemented in a broad area of 
responsibility at state or federal level by the lead o f a central authority, it would also be 
possible to derive operational and strategic level inferences o f the higher level decision 
making processes, as specified in Chapter 5.
Furthermore, this dissertation explores today's security environment and the 
philosophical paradigms from the perspective o f modeling, and promotes the systems 
thinking and top-down multi-dimensional holistic system representation.
1.4 Research Methodology
While the research methodology principally relies on literature review, the phases 
adopted in the continuum of the research - which are facilitated in a non-linear approach - 
have been depicted in Figure 4. Generally mixed methods have been utilized during the 
research. The dissertation content, which has been addressed by both quantitative and 
qualitative research characteristics, includes two major components. One of the 
components (Chapter 3) analyzes the problem domain with a descriptive methodology, 
while the other (Chapter 4) focuses on the PDSI Model development with a prescriptive 
approach. Both deductive logic and inductive reasoning methods have been applied 
during the analysis.
9
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Figure 4 Research Methodology
1.5 Hypotheses
A research hypothesis is a proposed statement, which includes predictions or 
explanations that should be proven through various methods. In that sense, the following 
hypotheses would be proven through the analysis and model development to achieve the 
dissertation goals outlined in Chapter 1.3;
•  The complex system's contextual structure (which utilizes common terms 
and taxonomies, as well as content knowledge that epistemologically 
complies with the historical development of the conceptual framework) 
requires coherence to optimize the system's organizational structure and let 
its viability functions run properly.
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• Figurative top-down multi-dimensional system representations or 
abstractions that delineate the system architecture holistically at all levels 
play a key role in maintaining the situational awareness o f relevant 
stakeholders.
•  Redefining the ESF-5 as overarching and the ESF-13 in a backdrop role 
(since maintaining public safety and security, including law enforcement, 
seriously affects the other response/recovery missions to be executed in 
harmony) would enhance the resiliency of the NRF.
1.6 Limitations and Delimitations of the Study
1.6.1 Limitations
• The fuzzy matrix conceptual design in the PDSI Model provides a unique 
approach for vulnerability assessments of key assets; however, the measurement 
matrixes and variables are subject to change/modification in the future based on 
the feedback to be provided through extensive empirical studies.
•  In the dissertation, post-disaster urban environment security requirements 
have been exemplified only with the Hurricane Katrina case.
1.6.2 Delimitations
• The research analysis scope is limited to the U.S. Emergency Management 
context.
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• Contextual analysis primarily addresses the incorporation of the Emergency 
Management definition and its phases/components in the official capstone DHS 
references. Full context analysis is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
• Chapter 4 delineates the conceptual design and step-wise algorithm of the 
PDSI Model. However, a software program supported by Geographic Information 




As discussed in Chapter 1, major components of the dissertation focus on the 
analysis o f the Homeland Security contextual structure (theoretical content created by 
referential documents) regarding the incorporation of the Emergency Management 
concept - its definition, phases/components, etc., and the development o f a vulnerability 
assessment model to support Public Safety and Security planning with a post-disaster 
security centric focus.
The literature review is organized under six main titles. The conceptual design of 
the literature review has been depicted in Figure 5.
AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL INQUIRY INTO THE INCORPORATION OF 
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT CONCEPT IN THE HOMELAND 
SECURITY WITH A POST-DISASTER SECURITY CENTRIC FOCUS
Research Goals
Analysis of Hom eland 
Security Contextual 
Structure
D evelopm ent of PDSI 
M odel
Literature Review Areas
Today's Security  ̂
Environment .J
i
/  Homeland Security 





\N . Epistemologyand X  ,X ' Multi-Criteria \  
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Figure 5 Conceptual Design of the Literature Review
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After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, following the foundation o f DHS, all internal 
security, including Emergency Management activities, came to be overseen by DHS. 
During this time, DHS evolved into a complex system with numerous entities and a broad 
context, mainly comprised of the key mandates promulgated by the government. To 
explore the aforementioned discussions, Chapter 2.1 and Chapter 2.2 review 'Today's 
Security Environment' and 'Homeland Security and Key Mandates', respectively.
This research adopts a post-disaster security centric focus for both the analysis of 
the Homeland Security contextual structure and PDSI Model development with the aim 
of promoting the significance of the Public Safety and Security function (including 
security, public order, law enforcement, etc.) within the NRF. Since the Hurricane 
Katrina case embodies many lessons learned regarding post-disaster security and law 
enforcement failures, its forensic history is included in Chapter 2.3 to materialize the 
assumptions.
Since the contextual analysis is addressing a complex system with numerous 
functions and entities, Chapter 2.4 reviews 'Systems Thinking and Complexity' 
discussions to highlight the scholarly aspects o f existing knowledge.
Finally, to support the conceptual framework of the PDSI Model delineated in 
Chapter 4, 'Epistemology and Philosophical Perspective o f Modeling' and 'Multi-Criteria 
Decision Making (MCDM)' topics have been explored in Chapter 2.5 and Chapter 2.6.
2.1 Today's Security Environment
Human beings have been exposed to a vast number o f natural and man-made 
disasters or threats since the creation of the earth in the universe. The foremost types of
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disasters humanity has suffered include: hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, tsunamis, 
wildfires, radiological or hazardous material releases, acts of terrorism, and wars.
However, “the threats to the people and the people's interests have shifted 
dramatically in the last 20 years” (National Security Strategy, 2010, p. 17), and now “we 
find ourselves in a time where former contexts of threat, vulnerability, and target have all 
changed and continue to do so” (Little, 2004, p. 57). Today, threats resulting from the 
catastrophic impacts of natural and man-made disasters, especially from asymmetric 
terrorist acts, continue to impose great challenges to people who live in urban areas.
2.1.1 Urban Environment
Manning (2012) discusses “for the first time in history, the majority o f the human 
race lives in cities” (p. 12). “The world is undergoing a massive urbanization” (Urban 
Operations, 2006, p.1-1). “An overall trend of migration from rural to urban areas is 
occurring throughout the globe” which is creating “massive urban areas that hold the 
centers o f population, government, and economics in their respective regions” (Urban 
operations, 2006, p.1-1).
Hidek (2010) contends the revolution of security affairs today makes the analysis 
of urban security policy a complex endeavor, stating that “it is a story of a machine with 
countless moving parts, only some of which operate in public view” (p. 43). As Kiefer 
(2001) has discussed, it is extremely challenging to strengthen the potential targets in 
urban areas, although we have more capabilities in terms of effective physical security 
and technological countermeasures today.
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Desch (2001) notes the problems that urbanization poses for political leaders 
which include “untrammeled growth, overcrowding, pressures on urban services, the 
growth of slums and other poor areas, transportation bottle-necks, atomization of society, 
unemployment, racial and/or ethnic conflict, pollution, loss o f agricultural areas, and 
increased adverse consequences of natural or man-made disasters” (p. 5).
The urban environment “is made up of adaptive systems with a wide range of 
structures, processes, and functions that have evolved to sustain concentrated human 
societies in confined space” (Joint Urban Operations, 2009, p. II-2). “Each system has a 
critical role in the smooth functioning of the urban area; whether they are simple or 
complex, all systems fit into six broad categories” as it is depicted in Figure 6 (Urban 
operations, 2006, p. 2-19).













Figure 6 Urban Area Systems (Urban Operations, 2006, p. 2-19)
Urban areas “present an extraordinary blend of horizontal, vertical, interior, 
exterior, and subterranean forms superimposed on the natural relief, drainage, and 
vegetation” (Urban operations, 2006. p. 2-2). “They present the most complex
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environment for military operations. This complexity is derived from numerous factors 
such as location, history, economic development, climate, available building materials, 
the natural terrain, the cultures o f their inhabitants, and many other factors” (Joint Urban 
Operations, 2009, p. VII).
Regarding the development of a successful strategy for urban security, Little 
(2004) discusses that the interactions between all involved stakeholders should be 
understood and enabled. He further contends that “robust and effective security will 
require that dialogues be initiated and sustained between and among the various 
stakeholders using terms of reference that all can relate to and act upon” (p. 56).
2.1.2 Risk and Vulnerability
Risk is the “potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, event, 
or occurrence, as determined by its likelihood and the associated consequences”
(National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2009, p. 27). It is the “expected magnitude of 
loss due to a terrorist attack, natural disaster, or other incident, along with the likelihood 
of such an event occurring and causing that loss” (National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 
2006, p. 104).
In the context of Homeland Security, the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
(NIPP) Framework assesses the risk as a function o f consequence, vulnerability, and
threat (National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2006). In a similar way, Bridging the Gap
(2010) defines the risk assessment as a comprehensive process:
Risk assessment is the comprehensive process for the identification and 
characterization of threat, consequences, and vulnerabilities. While each 
element is important for capabilities based planning and national
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preparedness, determinations of vulnerability are important because they 
include an assessment o f exposure, sensitivity, and resilience, (p.l 11)
Johansson (2010) defines the vulnerability as “the consequences that arise when a
system is exposed to a strain o f a given type and magnitude” (p. 19). Vulnerability is a
“weakness in the design, implementation, or operation of an asset, system, or network
that can be exploited by an adversary, or disrupted by a natural hazard or technological
failure” (National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2006, p. 105). It is “a state inherent in
the manifestation of physical, organizational, and cultural properties o f a system that can
result in damage if  attacked by an adversary or subjected to a natural disaster or some
other form of threat” (Bridging the Gap, 2010, p.l 12).
Vulnerabilities are “gaps in the assets’ protection; they are identified by
considering the tactics associated with the threat and the levels of protection that are
associated with those tactics” (Physical Security, 2001, p. 2-4). National Infrastructure
Protection Plan (2006) provides a further definition for vulnerabilities:
Vulnerabilities are the characteristics of an asset, system, or network’s 
design, location, security posture, process, or operation that render it 
susceptible to destruction, incapacitation, or exploitation by mechanical 
failures, natural hazards, terrorist attacks, or other malicious acts. They 
identify areas o f weakness that could result in consequences o f concern; 
taking into account intrinsic structural weaknesses, protective measures, 
resiliency, and redundancies, (p.38)
Vulnerability assessment is a “process to identify physical, organizational, or 
cultural characteristics or procedures that render populations, assets, areas, or special 
events susceptible to a specific hazard or set o f hazards” (Bridging the Gap, 2010, p. 112). 
Vulnerability articulates the relationship between the set o f initiating events and the set of 
outcomes as shown in Figure 7.
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Vulnerability is the mapping 
between initiating event (cause) Bad
















Figure 7 Vulnerability Mapping (McGill, 2008, p. 9)
2.1.3 Threat Spectrum
The National Security Strategy (2010) underlines the change in the threat 
spectrum, which has shifted dramatically in the last 20 years, as “the post-9/11 era has 
yielded to a low level, but persistent terrorist threat, more focused to date on U.S. 
interests abroad than on the homeland, which is likely to persist to 2030” (Manning,
2012, p.l 1).
Threat is an “indication of possible violence, harm, or danger dividing it into three 
different types: Natural, Technological and Human-caused threats” (Fundamentals o f 
Emergency Management, 2011, p.2-13). The threats are “unpredictable and the full range 
o f threats probably unknowable” (Little, 2004, p.57), and “geopolitical uncertainty will
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be a feature of the coming two decades” (Manning, 2012, p.l 1). Figure 8 depicts a visual 
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2.2 Homeland Security and Key Mandates
2.2.1 Homeland Security
Homeland Security “describes the intersection of evolving threats and hazards 
with traditional governmental and civic responsibilities for civil defense, emergency 
response, law enforcement, customs, border control, and immigration” (Quadrennial 
Report, 2010, p. viii). Homeland Security is a “complex challenge that demands 
significant investment; collaboration among local, state, and federal governments; and 
integration with the private sector” (A Governor’s Guide, 2002, p.6). Homeland Security 
is a “concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce
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America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks 
that do occur” (National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2007, p.3).
After the September 11 terrorist attacks, the federal government passed the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, “which called for the development o f a consistent 
infrastructure protection methodology that would be applied to guide the federal 
government’s efforts and established Department of Homeland Security (DHS)” (Hidek, 
2010, p. 109).
The DHS “has been developed to pull together many agencies that already existed
in the government and to coordinate with local and state authorities for the protection of
the nation” (Oscar, 2006, p. 12); and in January 2003, FEMA was subsumed under the
DHS. McEntire (n. d.) further discusses the emergence of DHS:
DHS is the result o f the most sweeping governmental reform since World 
War II and it performs many functions such as intelligence and warning, 
border and transportation security, domestic counter-terrorism, critical 
infrastructure and key asset protection, defense against catastrophic threat, 
and emergency preparedness and response, (p. 15)
The Quadrennial Report (2010) contends “although the integrated concept of 
Homeland Security arose at the turn of the 21st century, Homeland Security traces its 
roots to concepts that originated with the founding of the Republic” (p. 14). While 
'Disaster Response' and 'Emergency Management' have been the principal terms to 
define the disaster response activities since the 1800s until September 11, after the 
foundation of DHS, the 'Homeland Security' enterprise has assumed an overarching role 
to oversee all security missions, including the one against terrorist attacks. National 
Strategy for Homeland Security (2007) points out the evolution of Homeland Security 
concept:
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The understanding of homeland security continued to evolve after 
September 11, adapting to new realities and threats. The human suffering 
and staggering physical destruction caused by Hurricane Katrina was a 
reminder that threats come not only from terrorism, but also from nature, (p.
3)
Considering the National Strategy for Homeland Security (2002) - the first 
Homeland Security Strategy - as the starting point, the historical evolution of the 
Homeland Security concept could be theoretically divided into three subsequent periods:
• 2002-2007, the period which is defined by the National Strategy for
Homeland Security o f 2002.
•  2007-2010, the period which is defined by the National Strategy for
Homeland Security o f 2007.
• Post 2010, the period which is defined by the Quadrennial Homeland 
Security Review Report (QHSR) o f  2010.
Although the Quadrennial Report (2010) states “the documents such as NIPP and 
NRF, as well as documents produced by the National Counterterrorism Center, spell out 
roles and responsibilities for various aspects o f Homeland Security” (p. A -l), it is 
difficult to frame the contextual boundaries o f Homeland Security within existing content 
knowledge incorporated in the official documents.
2.2.2 National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)
As one of the critical Homeland Security mandates, the NIPP (2009) “provides 
the unifying structure for the integration of existing and future Critical Infrastructure and 
Key Resources (CIKR) protection efforts and resiliency strategies into a single national
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program to achieve the overarching goal of the NIPP” (p. 1). It “sets forth a
comprehensive risk management framework and clearly defined roles and responsibilities
for the Department o f Homeland Security; Federal Sector-Specific Agencies; and other
Federal, State, regional, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners implementing
the NIPP” (p. i). It further discusses the framework:
The NIPP framework supports the prioritization o f protection and resiliency 
initiatives and investments across sectors to ensure that government and 
private sector resources are applied where they offer the most benefit for 
mitigating risk by lessening vulnerabilities, deterring threats, and 
minimizing the consequences of terrorist attacks and other manmade and 
natural disasters. (National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2009, p. 1)
The CIKR Support Annex (2008) states “the NIPP and its associated CIKR 
Sector-Specific Plans (SSPs) work in conjunction with the NRF and its supporting 
annexes to provide a foundation for CIKR preparedness, protection, response, and 
recovery efforts in an all-hazards context” (p. 3). The CIKR Sectors and responsible 
sector-specific agencies are included in Table 1. The list o f CIKR which was first 
developed with the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), has 
established a framework for the security stakeholders to identify, prioritize, and protect 
the critical assets in their jurisdictions.
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Table 1 Sector-Specific Agencies and CIKR Sectors (National Infrastructure
Protection Plan, 2009)
Sector-Specific Agency No Critical Infrastructure and Key 
Resources Sector
Department of Agriculture 
Department o f Health and Human 
Services
1 Agriculture and Food
Department of Defense 2 Defense Industrial Base
Department of Energy 3 Energy
Department o f Health and Human 
Services
4 Healthcare and Public Health
Department of Interior 5 National Monuments and Icons
Department of Treasury 6 Banking and Finance
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2.2.3 National Incident Management System (NIMS)
Origination of NIMS dates back to 2003. In 2003, “Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) - Management o f Domestic Incidents directed the 
Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and administer a National Incident 
Management System” (Fundamentals of Emergency Management, 2011, p. 2-6). The 
NIMS document was originally published in 2004 and revised in 2008 to reflect 
contributions from stakeholders and lessons learned during recent incidents. The NIMS 
framework “sets forth the comprehensive national approach” (National Incident 
Management System, 2008, p.5).
NIMS “is not an operational incident management or resource allocation plan; 
NIMS represents a core set of doctrines, concepts, principles, terminology, and 
organizational processes that enables effective, efficient, and collaborative incident 
management” (National Incident Management System, 2008, p. 3). “The incident 
management systems described in the NIMS is the foundation for the additional response 
procedures described in the NRF” (Civil Support Operations, 2010, p.2-1). Fundamentals 
o f  Emergency Management (2011) underlines the significance of NIMS as a common 
template:
NIMS provides a consistent nationwide template to enable Federal, State,
Tribal, and local governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
and the private sector to work together to prevent, protect against, respond 
to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents, regardless of cause, 
size, location, or complexity, (p. 2-6)
The Incident Command System (ICS), Multiagency Coordination System 
(MACS), and Public Information were introduced in NIMS (2008) as the fundamental 
elements o f incident management. NIMS (2008) states “these elements provide
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standardization through consistent terminology and established organizational structures” 
(p.45). ICS is “normally structured to facilitate activities in five major functional areas: 
command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration; in some 
circumstances, intelligence and investigations may be added as a sixth functional area”
(p. 48).
As stated in NIMS (2008), Incident Command (see Figure 9) is “responsible for 
overall management of the incident” (p. 49). “In an incident command organization, the 
Command Staff typically includes a Public Information Officer, a Safety Officer, and a 
Liaison Officer, who report directly to the IC/UC and may have assistants as necessary” 
(p. 51). “The incident Command and Management organization is located at the Incident 
Command Post (ICP); Incident Command directs the operations from the ICP which is 




















Figure 9 Incident Command System (National Incident Management System, 2008,
p. 53)
2 6
The National Response Framework (2008) points out the requirement for the
Area Command, which is “an organization to oversee the management o f multiple
incidents handled individually by separate ICS organizations or to oversee the
management of a very large or evolving incident engaging multiple Incident Management
Teams (IMTs)” (National Incident Management System, 2008, p. 61):
If necessary, an Area Command (Figure 10) may be established to assist the 
agency administrator/executive in providing oversight for the management 
of multiple incidents being handled by separate Incident Command Posts or 
to oversee management of a complex incident dispersed over a larger area 
and broker critical resources, (p. 50)
A rea
C o m m a n d
Incident Incident
Command Post Command Post
Figure 10 Area Command Structure (National Response Framework, 2008, p. 50)
2.2.4 National Response Framework (NRF)
NRF fulfills a significant role within the Homeland Security architecture. FEMA 
Pub 1 (2010) states “in 2008, FEMA led the development of the NRF which replaced 
both the National Response Plan developed by DHS in 2004” (p. 12).
The National Response Framework (2008) is “a guide to how the Nation conducts 
all-hazards response” (p.l). It “establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards 
approach to domestic incident response, it provides disaster response principles to guide
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and encourage all response partners to prepare for and provide a unified national response 
to major disasters and emergencies” (FEMA Pub 1, 2010, p. 12). It “elaborates the 
principles in the NIMS, focusing on prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. It 
provides the structure and mechanisms for coordinating federal support to state and local 
incident managers and for exercising federal authorities and responsibilities based on the 
NIMS” (Civil Support Operations, 2010, p.2-8).
The National Response Framework (2008) “builds upon the NIMS which 
provides a consistent template for managing incidents”(p. 1). It includes “the core 
document, the Emergency Support Functions (ESF), Support, and Incident Annexes, and 
the Partner Guides” (p.3). “The NRF core document and annexes, including the CIKR 
Support Annex, describe processes for coordination among various Federal departments 
and agencies; State, local, and tribal governments; and private sector partners, both for 
pre-incident preparedness, and post-incident response and short-term recovery” {National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2009, p.78).
The NRF “specifies incident management roles and responsibilities, including 
emergency support functions designed to expedite the flow of resources and program 
support to the incident area” {National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2009, p. 78). 
“FEMA coordinates response support from across the Federal Government and certain 
NGOs by calling up, as needed, one or more of the 15 ESFs” {National Response 
Framework, 2008, p. 57) (Table 2).
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Table 2 Emergency Support Functions (National Response Framework, 2008)
ESF-1 Transportation
ESF-2 Communications
ESF-3 Public Works and Engineering
ESF-4 Firefighting
ESF-5 Emergency M anagem ent
ESF-6 Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, 
and Human Services
ESF-7 Logistics M anagem ent and Resource Support
ESF-8 Public Health and Medical Services
ESF-9 Search and Rescue
ESF-10 Oil and Hazardous Materials Response
ESF-11 Agriculture and Natural Resources
ESF-12 Energy
ESF-13 Public Safety and Security
ESF-14 Long-Term Community Recovery
ESF-15 External Affairs
The National Response Framework (2008) delineates the missions of
Emergency Support Functions:
ESFs support access to Federal department and agency resources. They 
align categories of resources and provide strategic objectives for their use, 
and utilize standardized resource management concepts such as typing, 
inventorying, and tracking to facilitate the dispatch, deployment, and 
recovery of resources before, during, and after an incident, (p. 29)
Within the National Response Framework (2008), the Joint Field Office (JFO) “is 
a temporary Federal facility that provides a central location for the coordination of 
Federal, State, tribal, and local governments, and private-sector and nongovernmental 
organizations with primary responsibility for response and recovery” (p. 62). It “provides 
the organizing structure to integrate diverse Federal authorities and capabilities and
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coordinate Federal response and recovery operations; the JFO is internally organized and 
operated using the concepts and principles o f the NIMS” (p.63). Figure 11 represents the 
overview of the JFO and its key components.
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Figure 11 Joint Field Office (National Response Framework, 2008, p. 63)
2.2.5 Public Safety and Security (ESF-13)
Stability Operations (2011) introduces the elements o f a stable state as human 
security, economic and infrastructure development, governance, and the rule of law. 
Within the context of this broad spectrum, Public Safety and Security, the physical 
protection of people and critical assets in urban areas has always been the primary focus 
for leading authorities and security agents during both ordinary/peacetime or 
crisis/wartime. The requirement summarized by Little (2004) has been assumed as an
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important; “Security needs to be flexible and agile, and capable of addressing new threats 
as they emerge” (p. 57).
Emergency Support Functions (ESF) within the NRF are “a critical mechanism to 
coordinate functional capabilities and resources provided by Federal departments and 
agencies, along with certain private-sector and nongovernmental organizations”
(National Response Framework, 2008, 57). Among these ESFs, the Emergency Support 
Function-13 (ESF-13) (Public Safety and Security) provides “a mechanism for 
coordination and support consisting of law enforcement, public safety, and security 
capabilities and resources during potential or actual incidents which require a coordinated 
Federal response” (Emergency Support Function-13, 2008, p. 1).
ESF-13 ensures “the conduit for utilizing and incorporating the extensive network 
of public safety and security coordination established for steady-state prevention efforts 
through a variety of interagency plans. Prevention and security plans include, but are not 
limited to, the following” (Emergency Support Function-13, 2008, p. 2):
• National Infrastructure Protection Plan
• Sector-Specific Plans
• The National Strategy for Maritime Transportation Security
• Area Maritime Security Plans
• Vessel and Facility Security Plans
However, the ESF-13 activities “should not be confused with the activities 
described in the Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex o f the 
NRF or other criminal investigative law enforcement activities” (Emergency Support
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Function-13, 2008, p. 2). “The law enforcement and investigative response to a terrorist 
threat or incident within the United States is a highly coordinated, multiagency State, 
local, tribal, and Federal responsibility” (Terrorism Incident, 2004, p.l). During any 
terrorist threat or incident, “ESF-13 coordinates and contributes support to DOJ/FBI 
operations, if requested” (Emergency Support Function-13, 2008, p. 2)
2.3 Hurricane Katrina
The U.S. Senate noted that the response to Hurricane Katrina showed a “failure to 
act on the lessons of past catastrophes, both man-made and natural, that demonstrated the 
need for a large, well-equipped, and coordinated law enforcement response to maintain or 
restore civil order after catastrophic events” {Law Enforcement Deployment Teams, 2007, 
p. 1). Having discussed 'post-disaster security' as one of the focal points in this 
dissertation, the forensic history of Hurricane Katrina has been included in the literature 
review considering the dramatic background information it provided for the post-disaster 
security and law enforcement requirement.
Hurricane Katrina was “one of the most powerful and devastating storms during 
the worst hurricane season in recorded history” (Oscar, 2006, p. 1). It was “the deadliest 
natural disaster in the United States since Hurricane San Felipe in 1928” (The Federal 
Response, 2006, p. 6). “As of early August 2006, the death toll exceeded 1800” 
(Graumann, Houston, Lawrimore, Levinson, Lott, McCown, Stephens and Wuertz, 2005, 
p.l).
Hurricane Katrina was also “the most costly natural disaster ever to strike the 
United States, and the deadliest since the Lake Okeechobee disaster o f September, 1928”
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(Graumann et al., 2005, p. 1) and it resulted in “approximately $200 billion in property 
damage along the Gulf Coast area” (Wigginton, 2007, p. 6) .
In the Select Bipartisan Committee (2006) report, it was reported “during 
the first four days, no single organization or agency was in charge of providing a 
coordinated effort for rescue operations” (p. 230), “following the Hurricane 
Katrina, general unrest and violence occurred in crowded areas” (p. 244), and 
“the fluctuation in centralized command created many collateral problems for law 
enforcement, and the breakdown of authority led to an inability to efficiently 
request aid from State authorities” (Farber, 2006, p. 8).
2.3.1 Climatological Summary
Hurricane Katrina “was one of the strongest storms to impact the coast of the 
United States during the last 100 years” (Graumann et al., 2005, p.l). Figure 12 depicts 
the cone of uncertainty prior to Katrina’s landfall in southeast Louisiana which has been 
issued by National Hurricane Center. “At landfall, sustained winds were 127 mph and the 
minimum central pressure was the third lowest on record (920 mb)” (Graumann et al., 
2005, p. 1). “It first made landfall as a Category 1 hurricane just north o f Miami, Florida 
on August 25, 2005, then again on August 29 as a Category 4 along the Central Gulf 
Coast near New Orleans, Louisiana” (Oscar, 2006, p. 1). “The flooding o f New Orleans 
resulted in the displacement of more than 250,000 people, a higher number than during 
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2.3.2 Forensic Continuum of the Crisis
This chapter aims to delineate the causes o f disorder and lawlessness in the post­
disaster urban environment where the execution of security and law enforcement 
missions failed.
The word ‘forensic’ “applies to the use o f scientific methods and techniques to 
investigate a crime and help resolve legal issues in a court o f law” (Forensic, Forensic 
Science, (n.d.)). Forensic is “relating to or dealing with the application of scientific 
knowledge to legal problems” (Merriam-Webster, Forensic, 2011). “Forensic scientists 
are instrumental in identifying and convicting criminals, and their analysis o f forensic
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evidence often confirms the guilt or innocence of possible suspects in a crime” (Forensic, 
Forensic Science, (n.d.)).
Law and Order Operations (2011) defines ‘forensics’ as it is “the deliberate 
collection and methodical analysis o f evidence to establish facts that can be used to 
establish connections between persons, objects, or data” (p. 3-17). In similar way, NATO 
CBRN (2012) discusses that “forensics is the comprehensive scientific analysis o f 
physical, biological, behavioral, and documentary evidence in support o f an investigation, 
and the goal of forensics is to determine whether associations exist among people, places, 
things, and events” (p. 4).
The following paragraphs, which excerpt information from different sources 
provide valuable insights for interpreting the forensic continuum of the Hurricane Katrina 
disaster and evidence of the public safety and law enforcement failures.
Public Safety and Security Failures
“First the levees were breached, and then law and order” {Select Bipartisan 
Committee, 2006, p. 260). “In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, local and state 
authorities were unclear of the procedures necessary to receive assistance from federal 
authorities; while FEMA was on site, it alone did not have the authority to bring in active 
duty troops” (Oscar, 2006, p. 10). “Much of the military support was also uncoordinated. 
The Louisiana National Guard and Department o f Defense active duty forces, under Joint 
Task Force Katrina, were under separate commands” {Select Bipartisan Committee,
2006, p. 195).
Following Hurricane Katrina, in support of local police and other security agents, 
thousands of troops from National Guard Units, Active Military Units and other federal
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units were deployed to the disaster area. “As of 7 September the National Guard forces
operating in the recovery area are over 41,000 and there were more than 17,000 Active
duty Soldiers, Airman and Marines hard at work in the effort” (Oscar, 2006, p. 10). This
great surge of forces did not make the expected impact on the scene at the initial phases
of the response/recovery activities:
Due to lack of coordination and inefficient plans, although while the 
military clearly provided vital support, no one had the total picture o f the 
situation on the ground, the capabilities that were on the way, the missions 
that had been resourced, and the missions that still needed to be completed. 
(Pickup, 2006, p. 3)
From the law enforcement perspective, many security failures were experienced 
particularly in the first 1 -3 days o f the response/recovery phase of the disaster. During 
this period, many crimes were committed: stores were looted, many people were 
murdered, and gangs terrorized the public in some part of the cities. Eventually, the 
shortfalls in security management deteriorated other emergency management 
response/recovery missions as it was reported by Select Bipartisan Committee (2006) 
report; “ 1,000 FEMA employees set to arrive in New Orleans on Wednesday, August 31, 
turned back due to security concerns” (p. 249). Wigginton (2007) described the situation 
dramatically:
Once Hurricane Katrina hit the disaster area; the local agents were unable to 
act as first responders because o f the flooding. During the waning days 
following the storm, there was complete chaos. New Orleans was on the 
verge of anarchy and the police department was literally paralyzed by the 
storm. Especially, as the NOPD focused on rescue operations, civil disorder 
began to spread throughout the city. Gangs roamed the streets, robbed, 
looted and committed acts of arson on businesses and residences. Various 
news agencies reported that New Orleans area Wal-Mart stores had been 
looted and all the weapons and ammunition had been reported stolen.
NOPD district stations were often victimized by random sniper fire. (p. 5)
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The Select Bipartisan Committee (2006) contended “in some areas, the collapse or
absence o f law enforcement exacerbated the level o f lawlessness and violence” (p.244).
“Citizens described not just a lack of a show of force but the widespread perception that
the police themselves were engaged in criminal behavior” (Farber, 2006, p.6).
However, “the Louisiana State Police provided relatively quick assistance;
although the New Orleans Police Department had lost its command and control
capabilities, the Louisiana State Police operated under its own broad law enforcement
statutory mandate” (Select Bipartisan Committee, 2006, p. 246). “Approximately four
days following the storm, federal troops began to arriving in New Orleans” (Wigginton,
2007, p.49), and eventually a more stable security environment was established:
Law and order were eventually restored as local law enforcement officers 
were removed from search and rescue, reassigned to law enforcement 
missions, and supplemented first by state National Guard troops, then by 
other state and local police through the Emergency Management Assistance 
Compact (EMAC1) process. (Select Bipartisan Committee, 2006, p. 242)
The National Guard “was activated to help maintain law and order in the city as 
well as to assist with rescue efforts” (Mener, 2007, p. 45). “These forces participated in 
every aspect of emergency response, from medical care to law enforcement and debris 
removal, and were considered invaluable by Louisiana and Mississippi officials” 
(Committee, 2006, p. 10).
1 The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) offers state to state assistance during governor-declared 
states o f emergency. Ratified by Congress in 1996, 49 states and the District o f  Columbia have enacted legislation to 
become members o f EMAC. EMAC is administered by the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) 
(Select Bipartisan Committee, 2006, p. 249). Through EMAC or other mutual aid or assistance agreements, a State can 
request and receive assistance from other member States. Such State-to-State assistance may include (National 
Response Framework, 2008, p. 40):
•  Invoking and administering a Statewide Mutual Aid Agreement as well as coordinating the allocation o f resources 
under that agreement.
•  Invoking and administering EMAC and/or other compacts and agreements, and coordinating the allocation o f 
resources that are made available to and ffom other States.
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Mener (2007) claimed “by the end o f the relief efforts, 40,000 National Guard
troops were deployed under state control and an additional 30,000 military personnel
were deployed under federal control” (p. 45), while Select Bipartisan Committee (2006)
underlined the contribution of the active military units:
While not immediately deployed, Department of Defense (DoD) active duty 
forces also played a role in restoring and maintaining law and order.
Precautions were taken to prevent DoD active duty forces from direct law 
enforcement missions, thereby avoiding Posse Comitatus2 issues, (p. 242)
In summary, while the severity of the disaster deteriorated the overall situation in
terms of emergency management, the contingency plans and relevant response/recovery
missions did not sufficiently meet the requirements o f coordination and security during
the post-disaster period. There was a lack of central coordination, and preparedness
regarding the positioning of the support troops as well as determining the actions that
should be executed by those troops in the disaster hit areas o f the operation. Following
quote highlights this assumption:
Although the process successfully deployed a large number o f National 
Guard troops, it did not proceed efficiently, or according to any pre-existing 
plan or process. There was, in fact, no established process for the large- 
scale, nation-wide deployment of National Guard troops for civil support. In 
addition, the deployments of National Guard troops were not coordinated 
with the federal Northern Command. (Committee, 2006, p. 10)
2 The federal Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 prohibits the use of the Army and the Air Force (originally part o f the 
Army) to execute the laws o f the United States except where authorized by the Constitution or Acts o f  Congress 
(Committee, 2006, p. 470). The Posse Comitatus Act is inappropriate for modem times and needs to be replaced by a 
completely new law. The old law is widely misunderstood and unclear. It leaves plenty o f room for people to do unwise 
and perhaps unlawful things while trying to comply with their particular interpretation (Oscar, 2006).
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2.4 Systems Thinking and Complexity
DHS has an organizational structure that presents complex system of systems 
(meta-system comprised of multiple complex systems, further defined on page 40) 
characteristics with numerous entities and too many interagency missions/functions that 
all require a tremendous amount of oversight, coordination and synchronization effort.
The literature review addressing the ‘Challenges o f Complex Systems' and 
Systems Philosophy and Thinking' is included in the next chapters since the analysis and 
model development processes of this dissertation were mostly inspired from these 
theories.
2.4.1 Challenges of Complex Systems
Week, Roos and Magee (2011) noted “heightened awareness has been fueled by 
the explosion in the information available to people on nearly any topic and technology 
continued to progress and systems became even more complex and capable o f making 
modem life simultaneously easier and more challenging” (p. 12). Secilmis (2012) 
discussed “while already having many mysterious3 and complex universal systems which 
are still waiting to be explored, we've found ourselves in dealing with the manmade 
systems which have even turned into challenging complex paradigms”, while Week et al.
(2011) claimed “systems that had once been clearly separate began to interact more than 
anyone could have imagined, scale and complexity increased inexorably and we ended up 
with systems of systems” (p. 12).
3 Since we realize that even at the beginning o f 219 century, we don't have a clear understanding of dark matter and
dark energy which are claimed to make over 95 % o f the universe (N ASA-science). Furthermore, cosmologist talk
about multiverses that we don't know yet (Oren and Yilmaz, 2013, p. 158).
Secilmis (2012) further contended “organizational systems as well as the normal 
life routines are becoming increasingly complicated due to the involvement of more 
sophisticated information and communication technologies” as Bar-Yam (2004) 
supported Secilmis's discussion “the amount o f the information that is flowing and the 
rate of exchange are both aspects of the growing complexity of our existence” (p. 13). 
“Today, boundaries between large-scale technology-based systems are becoming 
increasingly blurry. This increasing degree of complexity and interconnectedness poses 
formidable challenges for the new generation o f engineers, scientists, and managers in the 
twenty-first century” (Week et al., 2011, p. XII).
In this challenging environment, the individuals' involvement is now more 
important for organizational success than it was in the past because the existing high 
information flow and rate o f exchange empower the individual easy access to what he or 
she needs; however it is likely that “exceedingly large number of entities, dynamic 
interactions, continuous unforeseen emergent conditions and high degree of uncertainty 
in a complex system would continue to make the individuals confused to define their 
roles and contribute/involve in the system appropriately” (Secilmis, 2012).
Secilmis (2012) claimed “the increase in the numbers of different system 
elements would eventually dictate complexity to the system”, while Szabo and Teo 
(2013) noted complex systems characteristics “complex systems often exhibit properties 
that are not easily predictable by analyzing the behavior o f their individual, interacting 
components” (p. 319). “Since all the elements in a complex system are rarely in the same 
shape, mode, structure or character; every specific system state would have a different 
pattern of relations” (Secilmis, 2012).
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Calvano and John (2004) state that “a number of workers in Complexity Science, 
seeking to characterize complexity, have developed a list o f features, o f which at least 
some would be possessed by a complex system, which are: elements, interactions, 
formation/operation diversity and variability, environment, and activities” (p. 30). In a 
similar way, Secilmis (2012) has introduced three important characteristics o f the 
complex systems: the number o f elements/entities, the number and type of interactions, 
and the dynamic nature o f the system.
The definitions of Complex Systems and System o f Systems (Table 3) studied by 
Keating, Sousa-Posa and Mun (2003) provide a deeper insight on the terminology which 
is required for the appreciation of complexity and complex systems discussions.
Table 3 Definitions of Complex Systems and System of Systems
COM PLEX SYSTEMS SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS
A bounded set o f richly interrelated 
elements for which the characteristic 
structural and behavioral patterns that 
produce system performance emerge 
over time and through interaction 
between the elements and the system 
interaction with the environment (p. 3).
A meta—system comprised o f multiple 
embedded and interrelated autonomous 
complex subsystems that can be diverse in 
technology, context, operation, geography, 
and conceptual frame. These complex 
subsystems must function as an integrated 
meta-system to produce desirable results in 
performance to achieve a higher-level 
mission subject to constraints (p. 4).
2.4.2 Systems Philosophy and Thinking
Since the systems field is divided into three main components o f ‘general systems 
theory, systems science, and systems philosophy’ in a study o f the literature (M’Pherson,
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1974), the definitions of philosophy, philosophy of science, system(s), and systems 
philosophy should be revisited before eliciting the relationship between systems 
philosophy and systems thinking.
Philosophy is “the academic discipline concerned with making explicit the nature 
and significance of ordinary and scientific beliefs and investigating the intelligibility of 
concepts by means of rational argument concerning their presuppositions, implications, 
and interrelationships” (Philosophy, The Free Dictionary, (n.d.)). Philosophy is “the 
rational investigation of the truths and principles o f being, knowledge, or conduct” 
(Philosophy, Dictionary, (n.d.)).
Philosophy of science is “concerned with the methods that scientists use in 
discovery, and to elaborate and confirm theories” (Machamer, 1998). Philosophy of 
science is “the formulation of worldviews that are consistent with, and in some sense 
based on, important scientific theories” (Losee, 2001). “Epistemologically, it asks what 
the nature and essential characteristics o f scientific knowledge are, how this knowledge is 
obtained, how it is codified and presented, how it is subjected to scrutiny, and how it is 
warranted or validated” (Machamer, 1998).
With regard to system(s), Secilmis (2012) states that a basic system phenomenon 
should at least consist of elements/entities, interactions and borders, while Laszlo (1998) 
defines the system as it is a “structured set which elements interact among them and that 
has characteristics of the whole no present in the characteristics of its elements or their 
relationships” (p. 2). Further, Edson (2008) contends that “a system is a set o f two or 
more elements that satisfies the following three conditions” (p. 6):
•  The behavior of each element has an effect on the behavior o f the whole.
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• The behavior o f the elements and their effects on the whole are 
interdependent.
• Elements of a system are so connected that independent subgroups of them 
cannot be formed.
Notwithstanding that systems philosophy and systems thinking might be used 
interchangeably, Laszlo (1998) tells us “systems philosophy sets forth a reorganization of 
ways of perceiving and thinking while systems thinking is systems philosophy as a 
process,” while Edson (2008) contends “systems thinking is both a world view and a 
process, it can be used for both the development and understanding o f a system and for 
the approach used to solve a problem.”
Systems philosophy is “a perspective philosophy, seeking the connections 
between different theories, and probing the ultimate implications of the systems 
paradigm; it provides links to such traditional philosophical studies as epistemology and 
ontology” (M'Pherson, 1974, p.228). Systems philosophy is “about using systems 
concepts and systems methods to construct a realistic ‘philosophy’ and putting it to 
practical use” (About Systems Philosophy, 2012).
Laszlo (1998) discusses that systems thinking is a cognitive process which uses 
both analysis and synthesis to capture a comprehensive understanding o f the whole. It 
helps to understand the whole and its parts, the relations between those, and further the 
relation of the whole with its context and environment. In a similar vein, Week et al.
(2011) contend:
System thinking includes holism, an ability to think about the system as a 
whole; focus, an ability to address the important system level issues,
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emergence, and recognition that there are latent properties in systems; and 
trade-offs, judgment, and balance, which enable one to judge all the 
various considerations and make a proper choice, (p. 190)
In systems thinking, as a matter of holism, framing the system problem at the very 
beginning is crucial for the subsequent phases o f the analysis. To frame the system 
problem, Secilmis (2012) proposes a vantage point and viewing angle far enough from 
the area o f system interest in line with the level of their involvement in the system 
process, as illustrated in Figure 13. He contends that doing so enables analysts to 
appreciate the system structure, layers and functions in both scale and scope.
Viewing angle
a b s t ra c te d  view
Level of A bs trac tion
d eta iled  v iew  *,
•  •
SYSTEM OF INTEREST
Figure 13 Systems (Re)Visioning Perspective at Various Levels o f Abstraction and
Viewing Angles (Week et al., 2011, p. 47)
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In conclusion, consistent with the systems philosophy, systems thinking looks for
an understanding of a system considering the linkages and interactions between the
elements that compose the entire system (Hake, 2009). As Edson (2008) has pointed out,
systems thinking could be utilized in different areas:
In today's world o f interconnectivity, interdependence and globalization, the 
traditional and reductionist approaches to problem solving might be 
inadequate; while systems thinking, which adopts the holism, provides the 
tools to understand and solve the tough problems through the combination of 
synthesis, analysis and inquiry. In this sense, systems thinking can be utilized 
in all areas including national security, homeland security, energy, 
environment, healthcare, and business, (p. 47)
2.5 Epistemology and Philosophical Perspective of Modeling
Tolk (2013) contends “a formal approach to ontology, epistemology, and 
teleology o f Modeling and Simulation (M&S) will provide a framework to address many 
fundamental questions systemically and holistically” (p. 12).
The appreciation of systems philosophy is required for “systems architects” to 
conduct complex systems analyses and develop optimal representations and models. The 
rationale is that philosophy of science issues (ontology and epistemology) affect the 
utilization and interpretation of results obtained from applications o f systems 
methodologies (Systems Analysis, 2010). For this reason, the exploration of 
Epistemology and Philosophical Perspective o f Modeling has been included in this 
chapter to support the key focus areas o f this dissertation theoretically.
2.5.1 Epistemology
Epistemology is “the study of how we come to know, how we define knowledge, 
represent it, and communicate it with others” (Hofmann, 2013, p.82). It “focuses on the
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way we define knowledge, especially how we come to know new knowledge” (Wang, 
Wang, Li, and Yang, 2013, p. 336). Bozkurt (2009) contends that “the Epistemological 
paradigm is related to how the individual tends to seek knowledge about reality; the 
questions put forward by epistemology include: What are the sources o f knowledge?
What is nature o f knowledge? Is our knowledge is valid?” (p. 34).
Epistemology “deals with the question of what can be known. It is also closely 
associated with the psychology of cognition, with the premise that one cannot give the 
best advice about intellectual operations without detailed information about mental 
processes” (Bozkurt, 2009, p. 30).
Bozkurt (2009) further discusses empiricism and rationalism as they are the main 
two currents o f epistemology paradigm. She defines empiricism as “a theory o f 
knowledge which emphasizes the aspects o f scientific knowledge that are closely related 
to experience through deliberate experimental arrangements” (p. 35), while “Rationalism 
is the philosophical belief that asserts the truth can best be discovered by reason and 
factual analysis” (p. 37).
Since a quick overview o f the philosophical paradigms would catalyze the 
appreciation of epistemology and its critical aspects from a holistic perspective, a 
synopsis o f the philosophical paradigms has been included in the following paragraph.
Synopsis of the Philosophical Paradigms: Bozkurt (2009) contends that 
“Denzin and Lincoln (1994) consider Ontology, Epistemology and Axiology as the main 
philosophical paradigms” (p. 29), while Wang et al. (2013) posit “Ontology, 
Epistemology, and Teleology build philosophical foundation of a discipline” (p. 336). 
Further; “Ruona and Lynham (2004) include Methodology within Axiology” (Bozkurt,
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2009, p. 29), whereas Bozkurt adds Teleology to the philosophical categories to explore 
the philosophical profile of the individual. To that end, “together these branches of 
philosophy are indispensable to answer the crucial question: why and when can we rely 
on the recommendations generated via M&S” (Hofmann, 2013, p.82). In the context of 
model development, a holistic interpretation of the relationship of these philosophical 











Figure 14 Relationships between Philosophical Paradigms in the Context o f Model
Development
47
Table 4 Definitions o f Philosophical Paradigms
Ontology
Ontology is “the study o f what exists” (Hofmann, 2013, p.60); it is “our picture o f how 
the world looks” (Solem, 2003, p.439); it “includes everything that is accepted” 
(Bozkurt, Padilla and Souza-Poza, 2007).
Epistemology
Epistemology is “the study of how we come to know, how we define knowledge, 
represent it, and communicate it with others” (Hofmann, 2013, p.82). It “focuses on the 
way we define knowledge, especially how we come to know new knowledge” (Wang et 
al., 2013, p. 336).
Axiology
Axiology is ‘the study of the nature, types, and criteria o f values and of value judgments 
especially in ethics” (Merriam-Webster, Axiology, 2012). Axiology is “the philosophical 
study of goodness, or value, in the widest sense of these terms” (Bozkurt, 2009, p. 40).
Teleology
Teleology is “the study o f purpose and purpose-driven actions that result in methods” 
(Wang et al., 2013, p. 349). Teleology is “an area o f philosophy which explains the future 
in terms of the past and the present based upon the study of purpose, ends, goals and 
final causes “(Bozkurt, 2009, p. 39).
Methodology
Methodology is “the epistemology within an implemented and more pragmatic level, it 
can be assumed to be one level more specific than epistemology. Whereas epistemology 
is the theory of acquiring knowledge, methodology is the detailed explanation and 
description of 'how' and through which means this knowledge is obtained” (Bozkurt, 
2009, p. 30). “The desired methodology will provide guidance for methods relating 
ontology to epistemology, consistent with axiology. Consequently, the methodology will 
be composed of conclusions derived from the associated principles” (Brewer, 2010, p. 
81).
48
2.5.2 System Representation and Modeling
Modeling is “a science when we attempt to organize what has been created and 
discovered in the field in an attempt to create a working and valuable abstraction of that 
field” (Smith, 2013, p. 253). It is “always centered on a specific problem; whether the 
right level o f abstraction was chosen can only be properly assessed with respect to the 
problem one wants to solve” (Pyka and Deichsel, 2013, p. 151).
In decision problems as well as in analysis problems, a model is a “representation 
of reality, and simulation provides a very powerful and flexible opportunity for goal- 
directed experimentation with a model reality (Oren and Yilmaz, 2013, p. 167). Weirich 
(2013) contends “a model explains a natural system because of the way the model 
represents the natural system; accounting for its explanatory power requires specifying 
the representational figures that give it explanatory power” (p. 113). He further discusses 
“models are more ambitious in their treatment of reality than are heuristic devices” (p. 
112).
Smith (2013) posits “abstraction and aggregation are two powerful tools for 
identifying a model's representation of the world; abstraction creates hierarchy, while 
aggregation internalizes or eliminates hierarchy” (p. 249). In this sense; “the conceptual 
model represents, as a purposeful abstraction and simplification of a perception of reality, 
everything that according to the world view o f the model developers is necessary to 
address the underlying research questions, but no more” (Tolk, 2013, p.6).
Regarding the effective utilization o f models, Tolk (2013) contends “the 
intelligent use of modeling and simulation science requires not just an appraisal o f how 
well a chosen method works within a given model, but strategies for choosing the
49
appropriate modeling techniques to attack a given problem” (p.VII), while Smith (2013) 
makes an emphasis on the unbounded nature o f the modeling, “though modem science 
and business have created and adopted classification schemes, taxonomies, and operating 
rules that can be applied almost universally, the practice o f building models and 
simulations remains unbounded by science” (p. 246).
The fineness or correctness o f a model could be appreciated through its resolution 
or precision. Tolk (2013) defines the resolution of a model or simulation as “the degree of 
detail and precision used in the representation of real world aspects in a model or 
simulation; resolution means the fineness o f detail that can be represented or 
distinguished in an image” (p. 17). In a similar vein, Smith (2013) discusses the 
'usefulness' o f the model: “the current practice o f modeling allows almost any approach 
while its measure of correctness is determined solely by the usefulness o f the resulting 
product” (p. 246), while Oren and Yilmaz (2013) underline the perception of reality in 
the context of the representation: “sometimes a representation of reality may be different 
than reality under several conditions such as: misperceived reality, misunderstood reality, 
distorted reality, deliberately distorted reality, apparent reality, and unknown reality” (p. 
164).
Models are “purposeful abstractions and simplification of reality resulting in a 
conceptualization that is transformed into an executable simulation system” (Tolk, 2013, 
p.l 1). Pyka and Deichsel (2013) contend “simpler models are not only easier to 
understand, but they are more tractable as well” (p. 151), and “in practice, it seems more 
likely that we do not understand the processes under investigation to a high degree, which 
makes approximation and estimation inevitable” (p. 148), whereas Douglass and Mittal
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(2013) point out the importance of exhaustive information which may lead us to the 
utilization of a complex model: “in order to express a rich knowledge set that includes 
environment, contingencies, resources, possible actions and much more; we need a 
framework that allows us to represent knowledge in many facets or dimensions” (p. 282).
To that link to the hypotheses o f this dissertation: once the complexity o f a system 
increases, a reliable system abstraction/representation through figurative illustrations or 
representation by models/methods would be required to appreciate the system 
design/concept/context as a whole. In that sense; as has been discussed in Chapter 5, the 
utilization of the figures, which illustrate top-down holistic multi-dimensional system 
representations/abstractions could be helpful not only for the decision making and 
training requirements of the system stakeholders (individuals, groups, leaders, etc.), but 
also for the development o f reliable models which would perform critical functions to 
achieve the assigned goals.
However, we are still having challenges developing optimal complex system 
abstractions. In principle, a complex context needs to be utilized to address the 
knowledge in many facets when the interest domain represents complex characteristics.
In other words, the complexity o f the methods/models must theoretically match the 
complexity o f the systems/system problems. Per contra, the fact that simpler 
models/methods are easier to understand is still valid. Models should be scoped in 
workable limits, abstraction and aggregation as well as approximation, when dealing with 
complex systems with extensive scales. The quality o f the resolution (degree of detail and 
precision used in the representation) o f a model/method inextricably links to the 
elaborated details processed in the model/method.
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Therefore, the development o f modeling & simulation and multi-dimensional
holistic illustrative system abstractions/representations is an open ended process, which
mostly relies on divergent thinking capacity and systems appreciation of the analysts. The
postulate of Smith (2013) has been included as an epilogue for this discussion:
The unbounded nature o f the current practice of modeling is supportive of 
an artistic approach to modeling that encourages creative freedom in 
imagining and building a unique new model, (p. 246)
2.6 Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM)
Hester (2010) contends that complex choices are a way of life for individuals, and 
it is usually challenging to make a decision on complex choices that involve multiple 
attributes4. “In the presence of a large number o f conflicting criteria and numerous 
alternatives, it becomes very difficult for decision makers to articulate trade-off 
information and maintain some measure o f consistency in their responses” (Jin, 2005, p. 
51).
Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) is a process that helps people make 
choices in the presence of multiple conflicting criteria (Koksalan, Wallenius and Zionts, 
2011). MCDM, used interchangeably with Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA), is 
a continuum during which supportive ideas or recommendations are developed to provide 
a clear guidance for the decision maker(s) who needs to deal with complex choices, 
which includes multiple attributes and different sets of criteria.
Considering the stakeholder preferences and value judgments as well as scientific 
modeling and risk analysis; MCDM focuses on a comprehensive, structured process for
4 Attribute is a quality or characteristic inherent in or ascribed to someone or something (Attribute, (n.d.)). An attribute 
is a concrete descriptive value, a measurable characteristic o f an entity, including interentity relationships. Attributes 
are used as both decision variables and decision criteria (Drobne, Lisec, 2009, p. 461).
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selecting the optimal alternative in any given situation (Linkov and Steevens, (n.d.))- The 
final goal in MCDM is to come to a compromised judgment or optimal decision to avoid 
conflicting evaluations.
2.6.1 Overview of Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM)
MCDM “aims at providing the decision makers with a systematic way to clarify 
the decision problem” (Jin, 2005, p. 52). The MCDM framework relies on the decision 
criteria and weightings, and it allows assessment o f trade-offs involved in the decision­
making process (Linkov and Steevens, (n.d.)). Ye (2006) discusses that multiple criteria 
decision analysis involves in defining objectives; identifying criteria, and alternatives; 
and then measuring consequences. Malczewski (1999) contends that MCDM addresses a 
set of alternatives that are evaluated on the basis o f conflicting and incommensurate 
criteria.
MCDM, as an important subfield of Operations Research/Management Science, 
has grown quickly (Koksalan et al., 2011). “As humans tend to base rational decisions on 
an assessment of multiple decision criteria, MCDM methods have become important 
tools in management sciences and operations research” (Drobne and Lisec, 2009, p. 460), 
and different schools of thought have been developed for solving MCDM problems.
Since the 1960s, MCDM has been a part o f Operations Research which explicitly 
deals with multiple criteria in decision-making processes. The two major classes of 
MCDM can be introduced as Multi-Attribute Decision Analysis (MADA) and Multi­
objective Decision Analysis (MODA). While MADA is concerned with choosing from 
small, finite, or countable number of strategies, MODA considers choosing from a large,
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infinite, or uncountable number o f alternatives. Both MADA and MODA problems are 
categorized into single-decision-maker problems and group decision problems, and these 
two categories could be further subdivided into three different groups; Deterministic, 
Probabilistic, Fuzzy Decision (Malczewski 1999).
Decision making with consideration of risk is used when determining the 
probabilities o f future or unknowable events; there are potential risks when uncertainty is 
involved (Hester, 2010). “Different types o f real life problems in management practice 
can be formulated as multi-criteria analysis problems. Such are the problems of 
evaluation and choice of resources, strategies, projects, offers, policies, credits, products, 
innovations, designs, costs, profits, portfolios, etc.” (Genova, Vassilev, Andonov, 
Vassileva, Konstantinova, 2004).
The measurement processes in MCDM are developed subjectively from various 
preferences (Saaty, 2005). MCDM provides a decision matrix framework or structure, 
which supports integrating the expected weights as well as evaluating and ranking the 
alternatives (Yoe, 2002). “This structured process would be of great benefit to decision­
making for decision problems, where there is currently no structured approach for 
making justifiable and transparent decisions with explicit trade-offs between different 
factors” (Linkov and Steevens, (n.d.), p. 827).
Within MCDM, there are multiple methods utilized which have unique 
characteristics organizing the evaluation/assessment algorithm and data. “Each one of 
these methods has its advantages and shortcomings, connected mainly with the ways of 
receiving information by the DM relating to his/her preferences” (Genova et al., 2004). 
Regarding the evaluation of different MCDM methods, Hester (2010) further discusses
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four criteria that could be applied for the assessment of different decision making 
strategies: compensatory vs. non-compensatory, effort, alternative-based vs. attribute- 
based strategies, and exhaustive.
In conclusion, decision making processes usually have three content elements 
which are alternatives, criteria and methods. From alternatives, we choose the 'best'; 
criteria is a tool for an exact judgment; and methods are ways to select one alternative 
from the whole set. During a complex decision making process, finding the best method 
for a problem might be challenging. However, the MCDM methodologies ease the 
process, as they provide different measurement algorithms, and the selection of the 
methodology depends on the problem definition and variables at hand, as well as the 
decision maker's preferences.
2.6.2 Fuzzy Sets Theory
The conceptual matrix framework o f the PDSI Model, which is delineated in
Chapter 4, has been mostly inspired from the Fuzzy Sets theory, one of the major
approaches in the school o f MCDM.
Dhar (1979) contends “the concept o f fuzzy sets theory recently has been
extended and applied in various fields'” (p. 586). Regarding the uncertainty, imprecision
and vagueness o f potential decision making problems; Jin (2005) underscores the
powerful characteristics o f fuzzy modeling:
Many systems are not amenable to conventional modeling approaches due 
to the lack of precise or accurate information, due to the strongly nonlinear 
behavior, the high degree of uncertainty, or the time varying 
characteristics. Fuzzy modeling along with other related techniques has 
been recognized as a powerful tool that can facilitate effective reflection of 
uncertainties, (p. 65)
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“To find an optimal alternative of a project, usually the states o f the system and
associated utilities are assumed to be statistically known” (Dhar, 1979, p. 585), however
this is not the case for many circumstances, since utilities o f variables usually are
unknown statistically and uncertainty is a typical characteristic of the system state. In that
sense, Dhar (1979) criticizes the statistical decision theory:
In applying statistical decision theory since the decision maker tacitly 
equates the system fuzziness with randomness and neglects certain criteria 
of merits because of unavailability o f statistical data, the application of 
only statistical decision theory for determination of the optimal decision is 
of doubtful value, (p. 592)
Belmann and Zadeh (1970) posit “by decision-making in a fuzzy environment is 
that a decision process in which the goals and/or the constraints, but not necessarily the 
system under control, are fuzzy in nature” (p. iii); likewise Dhar (1979) contends “the 
final objectives, the system states and constraints are not sharply defined and are fuzzy in 
nature” (p. 585).
A fuzzy set is “a class o f objects with continuum o f grades o f membership. The 
notions of inclusion, union, intersection, complement, relation, convexity, etc., are 
extended to such sets, and various properties o f these notions in the context o f fuzzy sets 
are established” (Zadeh, 1965, p. 338). “Fuzzy goals and fuzzy constraints can be defined 
precisely as fuzzy sets in the space of alternatives. A fuzzy decision, then, may be viewed 
as an intersection of the given goals and constraints” (Belmann and Zadeh, 1970, p. iii).
Through various fuzzy sets applications, both quantitative and linguistic criteria 
o f merits are included in the process o f assessment. Regarding qualitative fuzzy 
semantics, “the fuzzy assessments expressed in linguistic terms are often the most
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intuitive and effective way for the decision makers to deal with the subjectiveness and 
vagueness inherent in the fuzzy MCDM problem” (Yeh and Deng, 1997, p. 1567).
Some significant characteristics of step-wise algorithms which have been derived 
from Fuzzy Sets Theory as include;
• Fuzzy Sets enable decision maker(s) to perform analysis considering all 
possible system states.
• Both grades of membership for each possible system state and utility weights 
for each alternative can be incorporated into analysis.
•  Both statistical data and linguistic variables can be processed within the 
criteria of merit. (Decision maker can include the criteria o f merit that are 
usually neglected in statistical decision theory.)
• The choice of an optimal alternative, as an output of the decision making 
process, indicates the relative merits of all alternatives.
2.6.3 Recognition Heuristic and Elimination by Aspects
In case the exhaustive methods are impractical due to time constraints, resources, 
etc., a heuristic approach could be utilized to accelerate the speed of the decision making 
process, which seeks a compromised solution. Hester (2010) contends that “decisions are 
biased by individual’s availability heuristic (whatever information is most available to the 
analyst at the time of the analysis carries the most weight)” (p. 45).
The recognition heuristic is “a simple model that can be applied for many 
purposes” (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 2011, p. 114). It is “a low effort, alternative-based, 
non-exhaustive approach; it is very efficient but not necessarily optimal” (Hester, 2010,
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p. 46). The recognition heuristic “makes inferences about criteria that are not directly 
accessible to the decision maker; it exploits the basic psychological capacity for 
recognition in order to make inferences about unknown quantities in the world” 
(Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 2011, p. 101).
Regarding the significant characteristics of heuristics, some summary points 
developed by Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011) as follow (p. 474):
• “Heuristics can be more accurate than more complex strategies even 
though they process less information.”
• “A heuristic is not good or bad, rational or irrational; its accuracy depends 
on the structure of the environment.”
• “With sufficient experience, people learn to select proper heuristics from 
their adaptive toolbox.”
• “Decision making in organizations typically involves heuristics because 
the conditions for rational models rarely hold in an uncertain world.”
Elimination by aspects, as a technique, is also “a heuristic followed by decision 
makers during a process o f sequential choice and which constitutes a good balance 
between the cost of a decision and its quality (Laurent, 2006, p. 1). It is a “medium effort, 
attribute-based, non-exhaustive approach” (Hester, 2010, p. 45). “At each stage of 
decision, the individuals eliminate all options not having an expected given attribute, 
until only one option remains” (Laurent, 2006, p. 1).
Elimination by aspects “can be utilized to eliminate some sub-optimal alternatives 
early in the decision process; if  we order our attributes in descending order of
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importance, this approach is very useful in attaining a good choice quickly” (Hester, 
2010, p. 45).
CHAPTER 3
ANALYSIS OF THE INCORPORATION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, 
AND PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY
3.1 Introduction
Within the broad domain of Homeland Security, the Emergency Management 
concept plays a critical role for the conceptual design of the Homeland Security missions 
and functions. Following the foundation of the DHS, the development o f Homeland 
Security concept was inspired from Emergency Management, which has addressed the 
response activities' in the past.
In the last decade, since the terrorist acts o f 9/11, parallel with the increase in the 
vulnerability of urban areas, myriad efforts, including public, state or private initiatives 
(policy/strategy development, legislation, academic research and activities, administrative 
regulations, exercises, etc.) have been made to enhance the national preparedness. These 
efforts incorporated the essence of the Emergency Management concept differently in 
their relevant studies under the oversight of the Homeland Security enterprise leaded by 
DHS.
Initial contextual analysis (conducted through the review of relevant literature, 
which comprises numerous governmental and public references) reveals an 
epistemological problem with the existing contextual structure of Homeland Security 
regarding the incorporation of the Emergency Management concept.
Furthermore, an examination of the ESFs which have been framed within the 
NRF (a critical mandate o f Homeland Security domain) - through a holistic systems
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thinking with post-disaster security centric focus - reveals that the conceptual design of 
the ESFs - particularly the ESF-5 and ESF-13 - also suffer from similar epistemological 
problems. These issues require the modification of contextual system design as well as 
the development of additional vulnerability assessment models to enhance the Public 
Safety and Security planning process.
In this regard, Chapter 3 analyzes the contextual architecture o f Homeland 
Security regarding the incorporation of the Emergency Management concept, and Public 
Safety and Security within NRF according to the methodology delineated in Chapter 3.2. 
The analysis primarily focuses on the definitions and major components/phases of the 
concepts. (Comprehensive analysis of the whole context is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.)
3.2 Analysis Methodology
Systems analysis “does involve finding the 'best' way to address the problem, or 
in mathematical terms 'optimization' among alternatives” (Keating, 2008), while systems 
thinking “includes holism, an ability to think about the system as a whole” (Week et al., 
2011, p. 190). Systems thinking “tries to understand the whole (system) and its parts 
(subsystems), the relations between the parts and the whole, and the relation of the whole 
with its context or environment” (Laszlo, 1998, p. 9). The utilization o f holistic approach 
through systems of systems thinking is critical since it helps to avoid a Type IV error, 
which is to try to solve the problem with inappropriate, incompetent or insufficient tools, 
methodologies, and resources (Secilmis, 2012).
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In the light of the systems thinking and holistic approach theories, the contextual 
analysis o f Homeland Security regarding the incorporation of the Emergency 
Management concept, and the Public Safety and Security function within the NRF has 
been conducted based on the Contextual Analysis Methodology (CAM)5 depicted in 
Figure 15. The CAM is accomplished in six phases. Although it suggests a sequential 
flow throughout the analysis process, nonlinear interactions and information exchange 
could take place when necessary.
Relevant Environment Specification
Contextual
IdentificationSystem of Interest 
Identification
Com parison/Synthesis 
and A ssessm entSpecification of Problems
Conclusions &Recomm endations
Figure 15 Contextual Analysis Methodology
5 Contextual Analysis Methodology (CAM) has been developed mostly inspiring from the Keating's (2000) 
methodology for conducting analysis of system structure (p. 189).
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3.3 System of Interest Identification (Phase 1)
Keating (2000) notes that “detailed analysis requires the system of interest is 
clearly identified; failure to identify the system for study can result in unnecessary 
ambiguities in further stages of analysis” (p. 186). To point out the focus o f this analysis, 
two corollaries (Table 5) have been developed based on the discussions in Chapter 1.2 
(Problem Domain), since Chapter 1.2 has already clarified the system of interest that is to 
be addressed during the dissertation.
Table 5 Focus of the Analysis
Corollary 1
Incorporation of the Emergency Management concept within 
the Homeland Security contextual system design should be re­
aligned contextually to enhance the resiliency and 
preparedness o f the overall system, since the efficiency of both 
organizational and functional system structures strongly relies 
on the coherence in the contextual structure,
Corollary 2
Post-disaster security centric planning approach should be 
promoted within the National Response Framework to 
improve the reliability o f security plans.
In line with these corollaries, the purpose of the analysis is to identify the major 
implications of contextual inconsistencies stemming from the inaccurate incorporation of 
the Emergency Management concept throughout many official documents, and to
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evidence the significance of the Public Safety and Security function and post-disaster 
security centric planning approach within NRF.
3.4 Relevant Environment Specification (Phase 2)
This phase comprises the identification of wider system characteristics in a
holistic approach which are external to the system of interest. “The relevant environment
for a system is the set of entities and patterns external to the system that either have an
influence on the system or are influenced by the system” (Keating, 2000, p. 186). To
avoid Type III error6, which refers to “muddled thinking, or solving the wrong problems
precisely” (Secilmis, 2012), this phase should be considered seriously. In this vein, the
theoretically relevant environment that influences the focal discussions o f the analysis
has been specified in the following paragraphs.
Emergency Management, as a profession, “did not exist 35 years ago” (FEMA
Pub 1, 2010, p. 15); it “started slowly being recognized after the Disaster Relief Act of
1974” (McEntire, (n.d.), p. 12). Today, Emergency Management plays a critical role for
the accomplishment of other Homeland Security missions. However as Blanchard (2007)
has discussed, it contextually resides in an erratic structure:
Emergency Management in the U.S. is very much conditioned and 
constrained by the various contexts within which it must function. It operates 
within the changing intergovernmental system. The “power relationship” 
amongst these levels of government has shifted over time when it comes to 
hazards, disasters, emergency management, and now homeland security, (p.
23)
6 Mitroff (1998) discusses five basic types of Type HI Error. Each type represents a different sense but they are not 
independent;
• Picking the wrong stakeholders
• Narrowing one's options
• Picking the wrong language of variables
• Narrowing the boundaries/scope of a problem 
Ignoring parts/systems connections
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Emergency Management belongs to a contextual domain where numerous 
concepts have linked to each other. While Blanchard (2007) contends that Emergency 
Management is not synonymous with Homeland Security, the National Incident 
Management System (2008) discusses that Incident Management refers to how incidents 
are managed across all Homeland Security activities, including prevention, protection, 
and response, mitigation, and recovery (although the aforementioned activities 
theoretically address the components Emergency Management). On the other hand, the 
Post-Katrina Act (2006) ascribes a broad governmental functional role to Emergency 
Management, which almost covers all mission areas o f Homeland Security.
While the Bridging the Gap (2010) report defines Emergency Management as a 
subset of the Incident Management, the National Incident Management System (2008) 
articulates that NIMS has been built on the foundation provided by existing emergency 
management and incident response systems. Furthermore, the National Emergency 
Management Agency (NEMA) follows totally a different approach defining Emergency 
Management and Disaster Management as synonymous concepts: “the discipline of 
dealing with and avoiding risks, particularly those that have deleterious or catastrophic 
consequences for communities, regions, or entire countries” ( What is Emergency 
Management, (n.d.)).
Regarding post-disaster security centric planning, the relevant environment that 
virtually surrounds post-disaster security also stays within the boundaries o f Homeland 
Security. The Public Safety and Security function, which addresses the security 
requirements to be fulfilled during an emergency, has been designed within NRF as it is 
one of the conceptual pillars of Homeland Security.
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Security “enhances freedom of action by reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile 
acts, influence, or surprise” (Joint Operations, 2011, A-3). “The ultimate goal of security 
operations is to protect the force from surprise and reduce the unknowns in any situation. 
Security operations encompass five tasks; screen, guard, cover, area security, and local 
security” (Offense and Defense, 2012, p. 5-3).
“The security sector consists o f both uniformed forces—police and military— and 
civilian agencies and organizations operating at various levels within the operational 
environment. Elements o f the security sector are interdependent; the activities o f one 
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Figure 16 Elements o f the Security Sector (Stability Operations, 2008)
From the holistic perspective o f Homeland Security, there are two major target 
audiences in the existing security paradigm: people and assets. As its name implies, the 
ESF 13 (Public Safety and Security) has been designed within the NRF to ensure security
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and protection for both audiences. The Public Safety and Security support function 
provides “the conduit for utilizing and incorporating the extensive network of public 
safety and security coordination established for steady-state prevention efforts through a 
variety of interagency plans” (Emergency Support Function 13, 2008, p. 2).
3.5 Specification of Problems (Phase 3)
The problems which address the discrepancies in the contextual layer of the 
'System of Interest' are identified during this phase in accordance with implications 
derived from the 'Relevant Environment Specification' phase. However, substantiation of 
the problems as valid findings still requires evaluations and assessments that are to be 
performed in the 5th Phase (Synthesis and Assessment). This phase is considered as 
critical since its outcomes would navigate the rest of the analysis process. Therefore, 
“enough time should be allocated for the identification of system problem in the 
beginning of analysis” (Secilmis, 2012).
With the System of Interest and Relevant Environment of the problem domain 
identified and the focus of the analysis summarized with corollaries stated in Chapter 3.3, 
the synopsis of the analysis problems to underline the background motives o f the analysis 
is as follow:
• Incorporation of Emergency Management concept within the extensive 
contextual structure of Homeland Security shows epistemological 
problems with numerous discrepancies.
•  Conceptual design of the ESFs within the NRF has similar problems, 
and existing urban area Public Safety and Security planning processes
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have not been supported by the methodologies which address post­
disaster security requirements.
In this phase, as a part o f the technique adopted by this methodology (CAM), the 
analysis regarding the incorporation of Emergency Management has been expanded with 
citations from different references providing specific background information explicitly. 
The citations have been clustered into two groups in Appendix A:
• General and Coordination Issues
• Poor Policy Formulation (Epistemological Problems) and Lack o f Training
3.6 Contextual Identification (Phase 4)
Keating (2000) contends “every structure must operate within a context, and in 
effect; context provides both constraint and facilitation to the operational structure” (p.
188). In that sense, the contextual and organizational structures of a system have an 
inextricable link to each other and this link directly affects the viability functions of the 
system. A coherent context allows a well-designed, reliable organizational system 
structure that eventually yields properly running system functions.
During the analysis, a rational mixture of holistic and reductive approaches 
should be employed to explore the context o f the whole system as well as to identify the 
problems precisely (Secilmis, 2012). To that end, Phase 4 is dedicated to identification of 
the substantial data reviewing through the references that constitute the contextual 
structure of the problem domain (utilizing the data triangulation process: gather-analyze-
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refine. See Chapter 4.8 for further information). The captured data would support the 
assessments which are to be made during the 5th phase (Synthesis and Assessment).
3.6.1 Emergency Management within the Homeland Security Contextual Structure
The evolution of Emergency Management in the context o f Homeland Security
has moved along with the development o f the Homeland Security concept. Having
already discussed previously, the incorporation of the Emergency Management concept
within the different layers of the Homeland Security system design lacks contextual
coherence with numerous discrepancies. During the evolutional process, the notion and
principles o f Emergency Management have been adapted differently in numerous
documents without epistemological consistency. This course has catalyzed the production
of different terms and definitions, which are mostly used interchangeably.
Particularly, when capstone documents like NIMS, NRF, QHSR, DHS Strategic
Plan, etc. are reviewed comparatively, the take-away is too fuzzy either to appreciate the
exact role o f Emergency Management in the DHS Integrated Strategic Framework or to
make a clear distinction between the contents of the definitions of Emergency
Management and other concepts - Homeland Security, Incident Management, Disaster
Management, Crisis Management, National Preparedness. In a similar vein, the
discussion of McEntire (2004) underlines this confusion:
Another way to foster the theory is to seek an alternative name for the field 
o f emergency management. There are many possibilities being discussed 
including disaster management, risk management, sustainable hazards 
management or disaster vulnerability management. While it is doubtful
7 DHS Integrated Strategic Framework has been illustrated in DHS Strategic Plan (2012. p. A-3) without including any 
explanatory information which would help the interpretation of this figure. It is contended that this framework 
represent an ill-designed system architecture since the logic behind its design plan is blurry and does not match with 
facts of the historical development process o f Homeland Security which have delineated in the relevant documents.
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that the term emergency management will disappear because of its 
increased recognition in recent years, scholars should at least make explicit 
the drawbacks of continuing to rely on this name for the discipline, (p. 9)
In the following paragraphs, the concepts o f Homeland Security, Incident 
Management, Disaster Management, Crises Management, National Preparedness and 
Emergency Management are explored (to elaborate similarities and distinctions to be 
considered in the following phase - Synthesis and Assessment). This is completed 
through literature review with regard to definitions and major components/phases, since 
the Homeland Security theoretical constellations, which constitute the contextual 
structure, have been clustered around these overarching concepts.
Homeland Security8
Homeland Security is “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks 
within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the 
damage and recover from attacks that do occur” (National Strategy for Homeland 
Security, 2007, p.3). Homeland security “describes the intersection o f evolving threats 
and hazards with traditional governmental and civic responsibilities for civil defense, 
emergency response, law enforcement, customs, border control, and immigration” 
(Quadrennial Report, 2010, p. viii).
Incident Management9
Incident Management is “the broad spectrum of activities and organizations 
providing effective and efficient operations, coordination, and support applied at all
8 For further information about Homeland Security concept see Chapter 2.2.1.
9 For further information about NIMS see Chapter 2.2.3.
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levels of government” (National Incident Management System, 2008, p. 140). Incident 
management "includes measures and activities performed at the national level and 
includes crisis and consequence management activities” (Homeland Security, 2005. IV- 
7).
Origination of NIMS dates back to 2003. On February 28, 2003, Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) - Management o f Domestic Incidents, 
directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and administer a national 
incident management system (Fundamentals o f  Emergency Management, 2011).
The NIMS framework “sets forth the comprehensive national approach” (National 
Incident Management System, 2008, p. 5). “Originally published on March 1, 2004, the 
NIMS document was revised in 2008 to reflect contributions from stakeholders and 
lessons learned during recent incidents” (National Incident Management System, 2008, p.
4).
Civil Support Operations (2010) defines the NIMS as it “establishes the national
approach for incident management across local, state, and federal levels (All types of
emergencies and disasters generally are known as incidents)” (p. 2-1), while National
Incident Management System (2008) makes a distinction between Emergency
Management and Incident Response:
Emergency management and incident response refer to the broad spectrum of 
activities and organizations providing effective and efficient operations, 
coordination, and support. Incident management, by distinction, includes 
directing specific incident operations; acquiring, coordinating, and delivering 




Disaster is “a crisis situation causing wide spread damage which far exceeds our
ability to recover” (Thirunavukarasu, (n.d.)). Disasters “often strike with limited or no
warning, and by definition they result in large-scale death, destruction, and mass hysteria;
they often have long-lasting and large-scale economic, political, and psychological
effects” (Mener, 2007, p. 3). McEntire and Marshall (2003) contend:
Disasters are qualitatively distinct from accidents and emergencies. First 
responders are required for small incidents, while their efforts are 
supplemented and superceded by those of emergency managers in larger 
disasters. Therefore, first responders are not emergency managers, 
although they are certainly important participants in emergency 
management. Emergency managers, on the other hand, are really disaster 
managers, (p. 122)
Regarding the management o f disasters, Thirunavukarasu (n.d.) defines 5 phases 
in a disaster management cycle - Disaster phase, Response phase, Recovery/ 
Rehabilitation phase, Risk Reduction/ Mitigation phase and Preparedness phase. Disaster 
Management (Emergency Management) is “the discipline o f dealing with and avoiding 
risks, particularly those that have deleterious or catastrophic consequences for 
communities, regions, or entire countries” (What is Emergency Management, (n.d)).
Crisis Management
Johansson (2010) discusses Crisis Management in the context o f Emergency 
Management: “Crisis Management is normally divided into four main phases; mitigation 
(also referred to as prevention), preparedness, response and recovery” (p. 13); while Joint 
Publication 3-26 focuses on Crisis Management underlining the significance of Law 
Enforcement: “Crisis Management is predominantly a law enforcement response and in
72
such cases involves measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use o f resources needed to 
anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism under federal law" 
(Homeland Security, 2005, IV-8).
The relationship between Crisis Management and Consequence 
Management10 has been depicted in Figure 17. The pinnacle of the pyramid 
represents the starting point of the response activity. While the control of the initial 
phases is dealt with through Crisis Management, the control of the final phases is 
overtaken by the Consequence Management, and Law Enforcement is the most 
critical mission at the very beginning o f the response activity.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
AND CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT
FOLLOW-ON ASSETS TO SUPPORT THE RESPONSE 
TO CONSEQUENCES ON LIVES AND PROPERTY
Figure 17 Relationship between Crisis Management and Consequence Management
(Homeland Security, 2005, IV-8)
10 Consequence Management includes the actions required to manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters 
and catastrophes. DHS/FEMA has the primary responsibility for coordination o f  federal Consequence Management 
assistance to state and local governments (Homeland Security, 2005, IV-8, 9).
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National Preparedness
Preparedness “is the range of deliberate critical tasks and activities necessary to
build, sustain, and improve the operational capability to prevent, protect against, respond
to, and recover from domestic incidents” (National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2006,
p. 104). “Within the National Incident Management System, preparedness focuses on the
following elements: planning; procedures and protocols; training and exercises; personnel
qualification and certification; and equipment certification” (National Incident
Management System, 2008, p. 145).
Contextually, 'Preparedness' is usually defined as one of the four historical
mission areas of Emergency Management; however, as Blanchard (2007) has discussed,
sometimes it has been linked to 'Emergency Preparedness':
The Disaster Relief Act of 1974 described the conditions under which the 
President could request assistance for emergencies and disasters. In the 
1978, National Governors Association (NGA) issued Emergency 
Preparedness Project Final Report, which defined four phases for 
Emergency Preparedness - Mitigation, Preparedness, Response and 
Recovery, (p. 18)
In 2003, HSPD-8 defined the term "preparedness" as it “refers to the existence of 
plans, procedures, policies, training, and equipment necessary at the Federal, State, and 
local level to maximize the ability to prevent, respond to, and recover from major events” 
(National Preparedness, 2003). The Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-8) dated 2011, 
provided a 'National Preparedness' definition which matches with the context of 
Emergency Management as well as the Homeland Security domain as an overarching 
context:
National Preparedness refers to the actions taken to plan, organize, equip, 
train, and exercise to build and sustain the capabilities necessary to prevent,
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protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from those 
threats that pose the greatest risk to the security o f the Nation. (National 
Preparedness, 2011, p. 5)
Emergency Management
An emergency is “a situation featuring one or several abnormal events in the 
behavior of a system, if the system in question cannot be brought back to normal 
operation by normal routine procedures only” (Gheorghe, Vamanu, 1996, p. 7). 
Emergency is “any incident, whether natural or manmade, that requires responsive action 
to protect life or property” (Fundamentals of Emergency Management, 2011, p. 2-13). 
“Emergencies take many forms; they can involve any combination of consequences 
stemming from technological and man-made hazards, natural disasters, internal 
disturbances, energy and material shortages, and attack” (Comprehensive Emergency 
Management, 1979, p. 12).
Baird (2010) contends “the widespread use of'mitigation, preparation, response, 
and recovery' to help describe 'Comprehensive Emergency Management'11 is the result 
of work by the National Governors’ Association (NGA) in the late 1970s” (p. 2). The 
original NGA description states: “following the establishment of FEMA, the activities 
and objectives of federal, state, and local emergency management activities in the United 
States have been based on a ‘comprehensive emergency management model’ divided into 
four phases: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery” (Hidek, 2010, p. 210), and 
“the federal government acknowledged that emergency management included mitigation,
11 The 'comprehensive' aspect o f Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM) includes all four phases o f disaster 
or emergency activity: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery, and it applies to all risks: attack, man-made, 
and natural, in a federal-state-local partnership (Comprehensive Emergency Management, 1979, p. 11).
75
preparedness, response and recovery activities and Emergency management was slowly
being recognized as a profession” (McEntire, (n.d.), p. 12).
In 2006, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA)
provided the following Emergency Management definition which has been discussed
during this analysis as an important catalyst o f the epistemological problems:
Emergency Management is the governmental function that coordinates and 
integrates all activities necessary to build, sustain, and improve the 
capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, or 
mitigate against threatened or actual natural disasters, acts o f terrorism, or 
other man-made disasters, (p. 1394)
In Fundamentals o f  Emergency Management (2011), a FEMA document,
Emergency Management has been defined as “the managerial function charged with
creating the framework within which communities reduce vulnerability to hazards and
cope with disasters. Emergency management key components include;
Prevention/Protection, Preparedness, Mitigation, Response and Recovery” (p. 4.2), while
NEMA has provided the following Emergency Management definition which is
considered synonymous with the Disaster Management:
Emergency management (disaster management) is the discipline o f dealing 
with and avoiding risks, particularly those that have deleterious or 
catastrophic consequences for communities, regions, or entire countries.
Focus on mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. Effective 
emergency management relies on integration of emergency plans at all levels 
o f government and non-government. Activities at each level (individual, 
group, community) affect other levels. (What is Emergency Management,
(n.d))
Emergency Management has also been defined within the NRF as an ESF:
Emergency Management (ESF-5), which is one of the Emergency Support 
Functions within the National Response Framework, is responsible for 
supporting overall activities o f the Federal Government for domestic incident
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management. It is organized in accordance with the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS). (Emergency Support Function 13, 2008, p. 1)
Furthermore, in Fundamentals o f  Emergency Management (2011), a 
categorization for Emergency Management activities has been included: “there are two 
ways to categorize emergency management activities; Emergency management core 
functions and Emergency management program functions. Emergency management core 
functions are performed during emergencies while Emergency management program 
functions continue on a day-to-day basis” (Fundamentals o f Emergency Management, 
2011, p. 10-6) (Table 6).
Table 6 Emergency Management Core and Day-to-Day Program Functions
(Fundamentals o f Emergency Management, 2011)
Core Functions Day-to-Day Program Functions
• Direction and control • Laws and Authorities
• Information Collection •  Risk Analysis
and Dissemination • Hazard Mitigation
• C ommunications • Resource Management
• Warning • Planning
• Emergency public • Direction, Control, and Coordination
information • Communication and Population Warning
• Evacuation (or in-place • Operations and Procedures
sheltering) • Logistics and Facilities
• Mass care • Training
• Health and medical • Exercises, Evaluations, and Corrective Actions
• Resource management • Public Education and Information
• Finance and Administration
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Lastly, Emergency Management has also been considered as an integrated effort,
and a subset of incident management as delineated in the following excerpts:
Emergency Management is the risk-based coordinated and collaborative 
integration of all relevant stakeholders into the four phases o f emergency 
management (mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery) related to 
natural, technological, and intentional hazards. Its framework is both top- 
down as well as bottom-up -  meaning that the theory and practice of 
emergency management has been significantly shaped by contributions from 
all levels o f government. (Blanchard, 2007. P. 10)
Emergency Management, as subset o f incident management, is the 
coordination and integration of all activities necessary to build, sustain, and 
improve the capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover 
from, or mitigate against threatened or actual natural disasters, acts of 
terrorism, or other manmade disasters. (Bridging the Gap, 2010, p. 106)
3.6.2 Public Safety and Security
'Public Safety and Security', which includes law enforcement, public order, and 
physical protection of critical infrastructures and key assets in urban areas, has always 
been the primary focus for leading authorities and security agents during both 
ordinary/peacetime or crisis/wartime system states.
In a crisis in a highly populated urban environment (after high scale natural or 
man-made disasters), the security agents, on behalf o f the law enforcement authority, are 
responsible for preventing panic and chaos, establishing security, maintaining law and 
order, and facilitating successful execution of other response/recovery missions. The 
police and military usually assume the primary response role to meet the aforementioned 
urban security requirements. Other state, public or private local agents are involved in 
response missions, when necessary.
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Wigginton (2007) contends “traditionally, the mission of police is to protect life, 
prevent crime and maintain order” (p. 14); likewise, the military is supposed to have 
similar missions/responsibilities to support the police force by request. Buddelmeyer 
(2007) underlines the significant support of the military during Hurricane Katrina: “the 
federal military and National Guard response to Hurricane Katrina was both necessary 
and exceptional; Katrina demonstrated that no other organization maintains the 
manpower, resources, and capabilities necessary to execute large-scale disaster relief like 
the military” (p. 25).
In Stability Operations (Joint Publication) (2011), the elements o f a stable state 
are introduced as “human security; economic and infrastructure development; governance 
and the rule of law” (p. 1-2). Within the framework o f Stability Operations, the end state 
conditions include the following (Stability operations, 2008, p. 1-16):
• A safe and secure environment
• Established rule of law
•  Social well-being
• Stable governance
• A sustainable economy
In a similar way, regarding the rule o f law, the 'Law and Order Operations'
(2011) introduces three categories in terms of Law and Order measures:
Law and Order measures can be generally aligned within three categories; 
law enforcement, physical security, and crime prevention. They are most 
effective when conducted in a synchronized and integrated manner, 
producing a layered approach to security and Law Enforcement. The intent 
o f Law Enforcement, physical security, and crime prevention measures are to 
prevent, detect, and respond to crime and criminal activity, (p. 3-7)
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Within the boundaries o f the stability paradigm, it could be postulated that Law 
Enforcement, Security and Public Order missions should be considered seriously during 
assessments performed to identify Public Safety and Security requirements, since all 
these missions have an inextricable link to each other as the security agents usually 
perform them in an integrated/interconnected fashion.
Secilmis2 (2012) discusses the significant role that Law Enforcement has in the 
continuum of post disaster recovery efforts in the wider context of Homeland Security.
He contends that the lack of necessary Law Enforcement implementation could aggravate 
the crisis environment to chaos or anarchy; therefore, in the state o f a post disaster 
environment, decision makers should confirm that they have necessary assets and reliable 
law enforcement plans to establish physical security and public order in the disaster area 
to assure that other disaster response/recovery efforts can be conducted smoothly.
In a similar way, Bowman (2000) underlines the significance o f the Law 
Enforcement: "Law enforcement promotes the rule o f law. The significance of this cannot 
be overestimated. Promoting the rule o f law plays a key role in assuring them that they 
will eventually achieve stability" (p. 30).
Having resonated with the anterior discussions, it is assumed that any other 
response or recovery missions cannot be accomplished in a post-disaster environment 
where the Public Safety and Security mission fails. Considering that it may provide a 
wider insight for the discussions in the 5th phase of this analysis (Synthesis and 
Assessment), the criticality of the Public Safety and Security has been highlighted using 
the following metaphors depicted in Figure 18:
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• Metaphor 1
Symbol: Circulatory System of Human Body.
Intriguing Question: How critical is the circulatory system for the viability 
of other human body systems?
• Metaphor 2
Symbol: Urban Area Road Network.
Intriguing Question: What is the significance of a road network for the 
continuation of daily critical routines in an urban area?
• Metaphor 3 
Symbol: Skyscraper.
Intriguing Question: Is it technically possible to construct the upper stories 






First Response (saving lives)
Public Safety and Security
Figure 18 Public Safety and Security Metaphors (Circulatory System, Road 
Network, and Skyscraper Construction)
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The following corollary could be postulated to signify these metaphors: 
“Considering the execution of other follow-up response/recovery missions within the 
NRF, the Public Safety and Security mission, which directly links to Emergency 
Management and Homeland Security, is as critical as the circulatory system in the human 
body, as a road network in an urban area, and as building the foundation in a skyscraper 
construction.”
Public Safety and Security (Emergency Support Function-13)
In the U.S., Public Safety and Security as a response mission has been designed
within the context of NRF, which stays in the domain of Homeland Security.
As discussed in Chapter 2.2.4; the NRF is “a guide to how the Nation conducts
all-hazards response” (National Response Framework, 2008, p. 1). It establishes “a
comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident response” (FEMA
Pub 1, 2010, p. 12). It “builds upon the NIMS which provides a consistent template for
managing incidents” (p. 1), and it is “comprised of the core document, the ESFs, Support,
and Incident Annexes, and the Partner Guides” {National Infrastructure Protection Plan,
2009, p. 3). National Response Framework (2008) outlines the function of ESFs:
The ESFs serve as the primary operational-level mechanism to provide 
assistance in functional areas such as transportation, communications, public 
works and engineering, firefighting, mass care, housing, human services, 
public health and medical services, search and rescue, agriculture and natural 
resources, and energy, (p. 57)
Amongst these ESFs, ESF-13 (Public Safety and Security) provides “the conduit 
for utilizing and incorporating the extensive network of public safety and security
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coordination established for steady-state prevention efforts through a variety of
interagency plans” (Emergency Support Function 13, 2008, p. 2), and it further provides:
A mechanism for coordinating and providing Federal-to-Federal support;
Federal support to State, tribal, and local authorities; and/or support to other 
ESFs, consisting o f law enforcement, public safety, and security capabilities 
and resources during potential or actual incidents requiring a coordinated 
Federal response, (p.l)
3.7 Synthesis and Assessment (Phase 5)
This phase is dedicated to examination and interpretation of the data obtained 
through the previous phases as well as other sources from literature review. The 
outcomes of this phase may include the causes of contextual deficiencies and 
discrepancies, and further inputs for the determination of the potential solutions.
3.7.1 Incorporation of Emergency Management Concept
The Homeland Security enterprise represents an ultra-complex system of systems 
that assumes a tough responsibility to ensure the security o f U.S. citizens within the 
borders of the homeland. The findings of the previous chapters have been synthesized 
and aggregated in this phase in a chronological order to assess the problem holistically in 
the different layers of the Homeland Security spectrum.
Starting with the Synthesis and Assessment phase, a brief summary of the 
analysis problem is highlighted in Table 7. As discussed in previous chapters, there are 
significant setbacks in the contextual evolution of the Homeland Security enterprise, 
regarding the incorporation of Emergency Management concept. These are mostly due to 
the lack of common understanding of Emergency Management definition and its 
components.
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Table 7 A Brief Summary o f the Analysis Problem
ANALYSIS PROBLEM
T h e  in c o r p o r a t io n  o f  th e  E m e r g e n c y  M a n a g e m e n t  c o n c e p t  in  th e  
d if f e r e n t  la v e r s  o f  th e  c o m p r e h e n s iv e  H o m e la n d  S e c u r it y  s y s t e m  
d e s ig n  in d ic a t e s  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  in c o n s is t e n c y .
“What is Emergency Management itself?” has been one of the challenging 
questions in this research. Since the principal focus of this analysis has been on the 
content o f official capstone documents, the analysis inferences and conclusions would 
mostly be based on the data included in those documents. Having this caveat, there is 
very limited information in the official documents regarding the definition o f the 
Emergency Management concept. This affirms the conclusion of Blanchard (2007): 
“there is not an established Emergency Management Doctrine” (p. 3).
Although there are diverse definitions and explanations in the public references, 
some auxiliary official documents which use the term Emergency Management 
interchangeably with Disaster Management (as in NEMA's definition), Crisis 
Management, Risk Management and Incident Management; the capstone official 
documents, such as Federal Emergency Management Agency Publication 1 (2010), 
Fundamentals o f  Emergency Management (Independent Study 230.b. FEMA) (2011) and 
National Response Framework (2008) comprise the same definition which refers to Post 
Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) (2006) (see Page 75 for the 
PKEMRA definition).
84
Regarding the Emergency Management concept, the other type of information 
articulated in the official documents is the historical phases, components or missions of 
Emergency Management. While the content of the Emergency Management definition is 
mostly consistent in the principal official documents, which refer only to PKEMRA's 
definition (although PKEMRA's Emergency Management definition is theoretically 
conflicting with the definitional content of Homeland Security as it is elaborated in the 
next paragraphs), the phases or components o f Emergency Management have been 
discussed diversely in numerous documents, with different sort of elements. Table 8 
provides examples o f the confusion about phases/components.
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Table 8 Evolutional Adaption of the Emergency Management Phases/Components
Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM) 
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national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident 
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managed across all Homeland Security activities,
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In order to identify the grass roots causes o f the epistemological problem, the 
evolution of the Emergency Management and Homeland Security concepts should be 
scrutinized in chronological order.
The starting point o f the inquiry theoretically leads to the 'Response' mission, 
which dates back to 1800s. National Response Framework (2008) elaborates the 
discussion:
Response doctrine is rooted in America’s Federal system and the 
Constitution’s division of responsibilities between Federal and State 
governments. Because this doctrine reflects the history of emergency 
management and the distilled wisdom of responders and leaders at all levels, 
it gives elemental form to the Framework, (p. 8)
Fundamentals o f  Emergency Management (2011) stated “the role o f the Federal
Government in disaster response has evolved throughout the past 200 years” (p.2-1). “As
disasters have occurred in the United States, policies relating to emergency management
have also been developed” (McEntire, (n.d.), p.l 1). Mener (2007) underlines the role of
federal government in disaster response:
Throughout the 19th century and the early 20th century, disaster response was 
handled by the federal government on a case-by-case basis without any 
clearly defined system. The vast majority o f incidents were handled by state 
and local authorities independent of federal involvement. When federal 
disaster management was necessary, the military was the primary coordinator 
and source of manpower, (p. 7)
Lindsay (2010) contends “the approach to disaster relief changed dramatically 
from 1950 to 1979, when it transitioned from a largely uncoordinated and decentralized 
system of relief to the current model, which is dominated by the federal government” (p. 
21). “After the promulgation of the Disaster Relief Acts of 1950, the process of 
administering disaster relief was further shaped by the Disaster Relief Acts o f 1966,
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1974” (Lindsay, 2010, p.23); and in 1979, “President Jimmy Carter created the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) by executive order and Robert T. Stafford 
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Public Law 100-707), was passed in 
1988. It was an amended version of the Disaster Relief Act o f 1974” (McEntire, (n.d.), p. 
12 ).
McEntire (n.d.) noted “in conjunction with Stafford Act, FEMA also established 
the Federal Response Plan in 1992 as a way to better coordinate the government’s 
reaction to disasters; it included the involvement o f 28 federal agencies as well as the 
American Red Cross” (p. 12).
After the 2000s, the two significant milestone events, September 11th and 
Hurricane Katrina, seriously influenced the evolution of both Emergency Management 
and Homeland Security. Figure 19 depicts these milestone events and key elements o f the 
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Figure 19 Key Elements of Homeland Security Evolution Process12 
Pre-2001 Period
For the pre-2001 period, it is assumed that there was a common agreement for the 
definition and phases of Emergency Management, which referred to the guide o f National 
Governors’ Association. In the A Governor’s Guide' which dated 1979, Comprehensive 
Emergency Management (CEM) was defined addressing the state’s responsibility and 
capability for managing all types o f emergencies and disasters by coordinating the actions
12 Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD) could also be included in this context. NRF (2012) box with the 
dotted line represents the working draft document.
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of numerous agencies. The “comprehensive” aspect of CEM included all four phases13 of 
disaster or emergency activity - mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery.
Period between 2001 and 2005
After the September 11 terrorist acts, DHS was established in 2002, and the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security (2002) identified three strategic objectives of 
Homeland Security, in order o f priority and six critical mission areas:
The Strategic Objectives of Homeland Security:
• To prevent terrorist attacks within the United States;
•  To reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism;
• To minimize the damage and recover from attacks those do occur. 
Homeland Security Critical Mission Areas:
• Intelligence and warning,
•  Border and transportation security,
•  Domestic counterterrorism,
• Protecting critical infrastructure and key assets,
• Defending against catastrophic terrorism,
• Emergency preparedness and response.
From a holistic perspective, while no direct reference has been attributed to the 
Emergency Management concept in the National Strategy fo r  Homeland Security (2002),
13 "Following the establishment of FEMA, the activities and objectives of federal, state, and local emergency 
management activities in the United States have been based on a ‘comprehensive emergency management model’ 
divided into four ph ases- MPRR” (Hidek, 2010, p. 210). “The widespread use o f  “mitigation, preparation, response, 
and recovery” to help describe 'Comprehensive Emergency Management' is the result o f work by the National 
Governors’ Association (NGA) in the late 1970s” (Baird, 2010. p. 2).
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the three strategic objectives and six Homeland Security critical mission areas are based
on the principals of four phases of Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM)
defined by the National Governors’ Association. However, the focus o f the strategy has
been on terrorism as it is traced in its Homeland Security definition: “Homeland Security
is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce
America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks
that do occur” (National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2002, p. 2).
During this period, Homeland Security and Emergency Management have been
defined as an 'incident management discipline' by the National Response Plan (2004):
The NRP incorporates best practices and procedures from various incident 
management disciplines - homeland security, emergency management, 
law enforcement, firefighting, hazardous materials response, public 
works, public health, emergency medical services, and responder and 
recovery worker health and safety - and integrates them into a unified 
coordinating structure, (p. 2)
Post-2005 Period
After Hurricane Katrina, which was one o f the nation’s most destructive natural 
disasters, the evolution of the Homeland Security and Emergency Management concepts 
sailed towards a fuzzier context, creating some more epistemological problems. In 2006, 
the PKEMRA14 provided a contentious Emergency Management definition. The 
PKEMRA's definition aimed to mark the boundaries of Emergency Management in 
principle. However, since its content articulated an overarching concept addressing a 
broad mission spectrum, the new terminology theoretically could conflict with the
14 Nelson, Bodurian and McEvoy (2010) has contended "‘this legislation restored some of the agency’s autonomy by 
reclassifying FEMA as a “distinct entity” within DHS. like the U.S. Coast Guard and Secret Service, and by prohibiting 
the transfer o f FEMA resources to other DHS components” (p. 1).
domain of the Homeland Security, which was supposed to have the higher structural 
context.
Following PKEMRA, one year later, the National Strategy fo r  Homeland Security
(2007) kept up the same focus on terrorism as the Strategy o f 2002 but also suggested a 
common framework by which the American nation should focus on the four goals to 
guide, organize, and unify the Homeland Security efforts (p. 1):
• Prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks;
• Protect the American people, our critical infrastructure, and key resources;
• Respond to and recover from incidents that do occur; and
• Continue to strengthen the foundation to ensure our long-term success.
The Strategy of 2007 made no direct reference to the Emergency Management 
concept, as did the Strategy of 2002. However, the four goals in the Strategy of 2007 
were built in the light of four traditional phases of Emergency Management.
The National Infrastructure Protection Plans (NIPP) of 2006 and 2009 included 
almost no detail about the Emergency Management concept, with one exception; NIPP 
(2006) referred to the National Response Plan of 2004 which had defined Homeland 
Security and Emergency Management as an 'incident management discipline.'
This was not the case for the NIMS and NRF, which were issued in 2008. These 
documents brought more epistemological inconsistency to the existing problem domain, 
although both adopted the same Emergency Management definition o f PKEMRA (2006). 
Furthermore, NIMS (2008) provided another confusing interpretation, adapting the four 
traditional Emergency Management phases as the 'Homeland Security activities':
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NIMS uses a systematic approach to integrate the best existing processes 
and methods into a unified national framework for incident management.
Incident management refers to how incidents are managed across all 
homeland security activities, including prevention, protection, and 
response, mitigation, and recovery. (National Incident Management 
System, 2008, p. 5)
The new taxonomy of Homeland Security activities in the NIMS (2008) literally 
excluded the 'preparedness' phase o f traditional Emergency Management, but adding 
prevention' and 'protection.' Moreover, the brand new 'three phases o f effective 
response' taxonomy of the NRF (2008), which was the contemporary of the NIMS
(2008), blurred the context a little more: “Key tasks related to the three phases of 
effective response are prepare, respond, and recover” (National Response Framework, 
2008, 27).
In addition, the NIMS (2008) highlighted the need for focusing on improving 
Emergency Management, incident response capabilities, and coordination processes 
across the country due to the September 11 terrorist attacks and the 2004 and 2005 
hurricane seasons; but the NRF (2008) incorporated Emergency Management as if  it was 
only a part o f ESFs within the NRF, although the definition o f Emergency Management 
in the same document (NRF) linked to PKEMRA definition which was requesting more 
than that.
In the following years, the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) 
(2010) provided an extensive definition of Homeland Security which expanded its 
boundaries in comparison with the one defined in the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security o f 2002 and 2007, putting a provident distance between its primary 
responsibilities and Emergency Management: “ ...In other areas, such as critical
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infrastructure protection or emergency management, the Department’s role is largely one 
of leadership and stewardship on behalf of those who have the capabilities to get the job 
done” (p.iii).
QHSR (2010) also stated “for the past 7 years, homeland security has rested on 
four key activities— prevention, protection, response, and recovery—oriented principally 
against the threat of terrorism” (p. 14), and delineated the new homeland security 
missions:
1. Preventing terrorism and enhancing security;
2. Securing and managing our borders;
3. Enforcing and administering our immigration laws;
4. Safeguarding and securing cyberspace; and
5. Ensuring resilience to disasters.
Although the four key activities and the design of the missions in QHSR are
similar to the foundational roots o f Emergency Management, it directs the Emergency
Management focus only to the 5th mission (Ensuring resilience to disasters) underlining
the resiliency requirement to disasters:
The strategic aims and objectives for this mission are grounded in the four 
traditional elements o f emergency management: hazard mitigation, 
enhanced preparedness, effective emergency response, and rapid recovery. 
Together, these elements create the resilience to disasters so necessary to 
the functioning and prosperity o f this Nation, (p.31)
While QHSR directed the Emergency Management focus only to the 5th mission 
and particularly referred to four traditional elements o f Emergency Management: hazard 
mitigation, enhanced preparedness, effective emergency response, and rapid recovery, the
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capstone document of FEMA, Publication 1 (2010), contextually linked to the broader 
PKEMRA Emergency Management definition and five core missions o f preparedness, 
protection, response, recovery, and mitigation: “According to PKEMRA, FEMA leads 
and supports the Nation in a risk-based, comprehensive emergency management system 
of preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation” (FEMA Pub 1, 2010, p. 
55).
Fundamentals o f  Emergency Management (2011), which is the FEMA's
Independent Study 230.b., suggests five key Emergency Management components15 that
include 'prevention', similar to what FEMA Publication 1 (2010) described before.
Meanwhile, the FEMA Strategic Plan (2011) heads towards the shores o f QHSR, which
has a different perspective than Fundamentals o f  Emergency Management (2011), and
FEMA Publication I (2010).
In March 2011, the Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-8) 'National
Preparedness' was issued with a revolutionary agenda and scope:
The directive has aimed at strengthening the security and resilience of the 
United States through systematic preparation for the threats that pose the 
greatest risk to the security of the Nation, including acts of terrorism, cyber­
attacks, pandemics, and catastrophic natural disasters. (National 
Preparedness, 2011, p. 1)
Although PPD-8 (2011) included early inferences and similar epistemologically 
inconsistent perspective regarding the incorporation of the Emergency Management 
concept within the architecture o f the Homeland Security enterprise, it delivered 
significant Presidential Guidance, which has links to primary focus o f this dissertation 
analysis:
15 Emergency management key components include: Prevention/Protection Preparedness Mitigation Response 
Recovery (Fundamentals o f Emergency Management, 2011, p. 4-2).
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This directive shall be implemented consistent with relevant authorities, 
including the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act o f 2006 
and its assignment of responsibilities with respect to the Administrator of 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency, (p. 5)
The term "national preparedness" refers to the actions taken to plan, 
organize, equip, train, and exercise to build and sustain the capabilities 
necessary to prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to, 
and recover from those threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of 
the Nation, (p. 5)
The national preparedness system shall include a series of integrated 
national planning frameworks, covering prevention, protection, mitigation, 
response, and recovery, and the frameworks shall be coordinated under a 
unified system with a common terminology and approach, built around 
basic plans that support the all-hazards approach to preparedness and 
functional or incident annexes to describe any unique requirements for 
particular threats or scenarios, as needed, (p. 3)
In February 2012, DHS issued its strategic plan which covered the fiscal years 
2012-2016. The DHS Strategic Plan (2012) had been built on the design of the QHSR 
(2010), although the PPD-8 (National Preparedness) was promulgated in March 2011 
with a different mindset. The DHS Strategic Plan also included a DHS Integrated 
Strategic Framework' (p. A-3) without any explanatory information. Although the 
framework provided a figurative holistic system representation, it was too fuzzy to clarify 
the role of Emergency Management and other functions/missions within Homeland 
Security in accordance with what the previous documents delineated before.
Finally, towards the end of this research, the working draft o f 2012 NRF was still 
being staffed for approval. In one of the significant changes in this draft, the name of the 
ESF-5, which was 'Emergency Management' in 2008 NRF, was changed to 'Information 
and Planning' without any rationale to clarify how this framework incorporates the 
Emergency Management concept. Also, additional tables of 'core critical capabilities'
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and critical tasks' have been added to draft, which could add more confusion. The
following quote provides an insight about the design perspective o f this framework:
The NRF is one element of the National Preparedness System mandated by 
PPD-8. The NRF describes how the Nation prepares to deliver the core 
capabilities established in the National Preparedness Goal for the Response 
mission area. The other mission areas defined by PPD-8 have corresponding 
frameworks that explain how the core capabilities established for those 
mission areas are delivered. (NRF - Working Draft, 2012, p. 46)
In conclusion, regarding the incorporation of the Emergency Management 
concept within the Homeland Security contextual structure, the following deductions 
could be posited:
• Considering the whole context, it could be inferred that the September 11 
(2001) terrorist attacks and Hurricane Katrina (2005) disaster are the 
milestone events which framed the evolutionary process o f Homeland 
Security, as well as Emergency Management.
• Before 2001, there is an overall consensus on the system o f interest context, 
which links to the guide o f National Governors’ Association (1979).
•  Between 2001 and 2005, although there is no specific reference to the 
Emergency Management concept in the official capstone documents, the 
conceptual design o f the Homeland Security (particularly the objectives and 
critical mission areas), which were established after 2002, were founded on 
the principles of Emergency Management.
• After 2005, the PKEMRA's Emergency Management definition (2006) 
added to the epistemological hurdle within the overall contextual 
architecture. Although the PKEMRA's definition has aimed only to mark the
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boundaries of Emergency Management in principle, its theoretical influence 
zone covered the domain of the Homeland Security, which is supposed to 
have the higher structural context.
•  While the major theoretical conflict between Homeland Security and 
Emergency Management at the highest level distracted the whole system 
design, the divergent interpretation of the Emergency Management concept 
adopted within numerous Homeland Security key documents (like NIPP, 
NRF, NIMS, QHSR, FEMA Strategic Plan, PDD-8, etc.) has created an 
entangled ball of string.
• Although the National Preparedness (PPD-8) (2011) aimed to create an 
architecture based on a coordinated and unified system with a common 
terminology and approach, its content (when examined holistically in terms 
of definitions and components/phases o f key concepts) is epistemologically 
inconsistent and fuzzy; and the recent working draft o f National Response 
Framework (2012) is poised to be a major contributor to the existing 
epistemological complicity.
3.7.2 Public Safety and Security
The challenging aspects o f the urban environment and emergent characteristics o f  
diverse threats/hazards have been elaborated in Chapter 2.1 as they are the major 
components o f the modem security paradigm. Today, we are more likely to live in an 
environment that is:
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• Associated with densely populated urban areas, and more complexities 
representing different social, political and economic tensions,
• Dominated by emergent threats, which impose a broad spectrum o f 
challenges that have ambiguous traits.
In a crisis system state, just after a catastrophic disaster like an earthquake or 
hurricane, what is called post disaster environment, the overall situation immediately gets 
more complicated with the involvement of numerous diverse interactions between the 
system elements. Deductive logic tells us that the characteristics o f the security 
requirement will be more challenging because it would not be easy to deal with the post­
disaster urban environment where the following characteristics dominate:
• Lack of power and other supplies







In the post-disaster urban environment, the Public Safety and Security function, 
including Law Enforcement, assumes a vital role for the facilitation of other follow-up 
disaster response/recovery activities in the wider scope of the Emergency Management
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(Secilmis2, 2012). All disaster response/recovery activities, such as first response (saving 
lives), first aid and medical treatment, law enforcement, public order and security, 
evacuation, maintenance, repair, etc. should be executed coherently in a relatively secure 
and stable system state using a synchronized planning methodology. However, there is 
always high probability for having the states o f crises ranging from the least to most, like 
'chaos' or 'anarchy.'
In this demanding conjuncture, Homeland Security describes “the intersection of 
evolving threats and hazards with traditional governmental and civic responsibilities for 
civil defense, emergency response, law enforcement, customs, border control, and 
immigration” (Quadrennial Report, 2010, p.viii). In the overarching domain o f Homeland 
Security, the Public Safety and Security (ESF-13) which has been built within the context 
of NRF provides “a mechanism for coordinating and providing support; consisting o f law 
enforcement, public safety, and security capabilities and resources during potential or 
actual incidents requiring a coordinated Federal response” (Emergency Support Function 
#13,2008, p. 1).
Public Safety and Security (ESF-13) provides “the conduit for utilizing and 
incorporating the extensive network of public safety and security coordination established 
for steady-state prevention efforts through a variety o f interagency plans. Prevention and 
security plans include, but are not limited to, the following” (Emergency Support 
Function #13, 2008, p. 2):
• National Infrastructure Protection Plan
• Sector-Specific Plans
• The National Strategy for Maritime Transportation Security
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• Area Maritime Security Plans
• Vessel and Facility Security Plans
Finally, as underlined in the metaphors, the Public Safety and Security mission is 
highly critical. Lack of security on the scene could aggravate the crisis environment, 
letting it degrade to chaos or anarchy; in other words, other response or recovery 
missions cannot be accomplished in a post-disaster environment where the Public Safety 
and Security mission fails. In this sense, the lessons learned from Flurricane Katrina, 
which have been elaborated in Chapter 2.3, provide valuable insights to explore the 
discussion on the extent o f Public Safety and Security, and underpin how any lack of 
security and law enforcement missions could severely impact the post-disaster 
response/recovery activities.
3.8 Conclusions16 (Phase 6)
There is a long history of outstanding achievements and great experiences in the 
U.S. regarding Homeland Security. As the Quadrennial Report (2010) states: “Homeland 
security draws on the rich history, proud traditions, and lessons learned from these 
historical functions to fulfill new responsibilities that require the engagement o f the entire 
homeland security enterprise and multiple Federal departments and agencies” (p. 14).
The established rules and experiences gained during the disaster response' endeavors 
have been evolved throughout the past 200 years. Due to the evolution o f threats and 
hazards, the disaster relief efforts were finally institutionalized in the Federal level with 
the establishment of FEMA in 1979. It was during this period that “the federal
16 The recommendations pertinent to this analysis have been excluded from this chapter to be included in Chapter 5.
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government acknowledged that Emergency Management included mitigation, 
preparedness, response and recovery activities and Emergency Management was slowly 
being recognized as a profession” (McEntire, (n.d.), p. 12).
Although it faced many challenges during its first years from 1979-2000s,
“FEMA developed the Integrated Emergency Management System, an all-hazards 
approach based on preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation, which provided 
direction, control, and warning systems common to the full range o f emergencies from 
small, isolated events to the ultimate emergency -  war” (FEMA Pub 1, 2010, p. 15), and 
a number o f major reforms were initiated to streamline disaster relief and recovery 
operations.
From the 2000s up until now, the U.S. experienced two major milestone events 
that played a critical role on the evolution o f U.S. Emergency Management concept. The 
first event was the September 11 terrorist attack which led the foundation o f a brand new 
organization, DHS that would be responsible for security against terrorist acts. In 2003, 
FEMA was subsumed by DHS, while DHS kept its strategic focus on the threats 
emerging from the terrorist acts. The second event was Hurricane Katrina in 2005. After 
this devastating disaster, the 2006 PKEMRA was issued, including an Emergency 
Management definition and follow-up adjustments, which provided a broad spectrum for 
the maneuver of Emergency Management related concepts and activities. During this 
time, the Homeland Security mission was leaded by DHS in an overarching role that was 
supposed to integrate and coordinate all efforts and activities.
In this sense, nobody can underestimate the vigorous initiatives, and devoted 
efforts o f the U.S. to sustain a high level o f resiliency and preparedness against all type o f
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threats. However, from a holistic perspective, the Homeland Security contextual system 
design has serious discrepancies in terms of the incorporation of the Emergency 
Management definition and basic components/phases, as delineated in Chapter 3.7.1. 
Further, these discrepancies have the potential to hinder the expected overall coordination 
and coherence of the whole system architecture, which has numerous entities, missions 
and functions.
As Blanchard (2007) contends: “There is not an established Emergency 
Management Doctrine” (p. 3), which has been synthesized and well-defined particularly 
for the period after 2001 up until now. Moreover, during the evolution of Homeland 
Security, the adaption/interpretation of the definition and historical phases/components of 
the Emergency Management by different concepts in a different way has turned the 
overall contextual architecture into an enigma17 which indicates epistemologically ill- 
designed features.
In addition to the epistemological problems delineated in the analysis, the 
Homeland Security contextual system structure Iso suffers ffom the lack of holistic and 
reliable graphic/figurative system representations in a top-down approach, which is
I ftcritical for the situational awareness o f system stakeholders. Although there is a single 
example o f holistic representation - DHS Integrated Strategic Framework - in the DHS 
Strategic Plan (2012, p. A-3), it is not clear enough to appreciate the incorporation of
17 Regarding the causes o f some part o f contextual problems, Hidek’s (2010) excerpt highlights the potential impacts o f 
disconnected, uncoordinated studies “...layers o f statutes have been built upon existing guidelines without modifying 
previous statutes or reassessing the assumptions upon which they rest” (p. 253).
Situational awareness is a cognitive state that reflects the current, real-time understanding o f an environment and its 
relation to pertinent goals (Gap Assessment Report, 2010, p. 3-12).
18 Situational awareness is a cognitive state that reflects the current, real-time understanding o f an environment and its 
relation to pertinent goals (Gap Assessment Report, 2010, p. 3-12).
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Emergency Management concept within the system framework in line with the discipline 
that consistently resonates with the historical evolution of Homeland Security as it has 
been articulated in the former references. Furthermore, there is no explanatory 
information associated with this annex, and it is contended that the missions, functions, 
priorities, etc. illustrated in this figure (in the context of Homeland Security) have been 
intermingled in a fuzzy logic.
Considering the whole problem domain, it has also been concluded that there are 
two major driving factors which have caused the existing context to be fuzzier and 
epistemologically more inconsistent:
•  Evolving state of security environment which is being driven by challenging 
urban area characteristics and emergent nature o f threats/hazards.
•  The bulky scope of the Homeland Security enterprise.
The integration of impacts comprises a complex cluster of interactions between a 
vast number of interconnected, interdependent and independent elements, which should 
be the entities, functions, missions, goals, contexts, structures, etc. The potential for 
'overwhelming complexity' emerges as the most significant challenge for the context 
development and management processes, which should be dealt with seriously.
Regarding the post-disaster security centric focus, security and law enforcement 
plays a critical role for the facilitation o f other follow-up disaster response/recovery 
activities in the post-disaster urban environment. In the U.S. Homeland Security system 
architecture, the Public Safety and Security mission has been designed as an Emergency 
Support Function' within the NRF. However, the design mindset o f  this function in the
104
NRF is incompetent, and the instructions and guidelines provided in the existing Public 
Safety and Security (ESF-13) annex do not include necessary details, particularly in 
terms of interaction with the other ESFs, which would support the accomplishment o f 
security missions in severe conditions like catastrophic post-disaster periods.
Although the criticality and vulnerability assessment of critical assets in an urban 
area (including critical infrastructures, facilities, state/public/private properties, etc.) has a 
significant impact on the post-disaster security planning process, there is no model in 
practice that provides an urban area critical asset prioritization methodology that 
specifically addresses the post-disaster urban security unique characteristics.
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CHAPTER 4
POST-DISASTER SECURITY INDEX (PDSI) MODEL
4.1 Introduction
The Public Safety and Security function within the NRF plays a significant role 
for the execution other response/recovery missions under the overarching architecture of 
the Homeland Security enterprise. The NRF associated with NIMS and NIPP sets the 
policies/procedures and concepts o f operations for the Public Safety and Security 
function, including the security o f critical infrastructure and key resources. However, 
post-disaster security requirements are lacking and open to the incorporation o f new 
mindsets and innovative approaches.
A significant part of the existing knowledge about urban area security (mostly the 
security related perspectives of the military doctrines) stays within the concept o f Urban 
Area Operations. However, there is limited information (tactical level direction and 
guidance, criteria sets, techniques, methodology, etc.) in the military literature about how 
security agents should improve security plans to cope with the challenges, such as crisis 
in the post-disaster environment. In brief, decision making and prioritization 
requirements for force tailoring, unit positioning, identification of appropriate security 
operations techniques, etc. for a tactical unit that would be responsible for maintaining 
the security of an urban area in a post-disaster environment has not been elaborated 
categorically in the literature.
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4.2 Requirement for Better Planning and Coordination
From the Homeland Security perspective, there are two major target audiences in 
the existing security paradigm: people and assets. Within the NRF, the ESF-13 (Public 
Safety and Security) was designed to ensure the security and protection o f both 
audiences. In a post-disaster urban environment, the Police are the first echelon/tier 
responsible authority (to be supported by military and civilian security agents as 
necessary) for the coordination and execution of the Public Safety and Security mission. 
The NIPP (2009) is a critical initiative, which aims to provide the “unifying structure for 
the integration” (p. 1) o f efforts to protect the critical infrastructures and key resources.
It is assumed that the requirement for security, law enforcement and public order 
in terms of the Public Safety and Security exponentially increases in the post-disaster 
urban environment, and excessive numbers of troop deployment are likely, as was the 
case during Hurricane Katrina in 2005. To accomplish the Public Safety and Security 
mission in a post-disaster urban environment, a successful security planning process 
should be completed in advance. During this planning process, the security assessments 
(vulnerability assessments and prioritization) for critical assets in a jurisdiction become 
important, since they would be required during any decision making process on the 
selection of optimal courses of actions for the security operations requirements, such as 
force tailoring, unit positioning, identification of appropriate security operations 
techniques, etc.
The assessment data provided through this process is also critical for both internal 
and external coordination requirements, as coordination activities play a crucial role in 
synchronous operations. In that vein, the Public Safety and Security operations will
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require similar coordination activities in the post-disaster environment. To underline the 
significance of this coordination requirement between Homeland Security stakeholders, 
the dramatic difference between the military capability requirements in typical and 
catastrophic incidents is depicted in Figure 20. The figure implies that support troops 
deployed from adjacent regions or other locations in great numbers should be oriented by 
the local troops and pertinent authorities, and this means that an effective and 


















Figure 20 Required Military Capability in Typical and Catastrophic Incidents (Civil
Support Operations, 2010)
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Additionally, the National Guard response to Hurricane Katrina in terms of troop 
numbers in Figure 21 provides a spectacular illustration o f how massive a response 













Figure 21 National Guard Response to Hurricane Katrina19 (Wombwell, 2009, p. 70)
After Hurricane Katrina, due to the severe impact o f the storm and the lack of 
effective preparedness (mostly lack of pre-coordination o f common supporting 
methodologies and advance exchange of necessary information), the execution of the 
Public Safety and Security missions failed early and further deteriorated the execution of 
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19 When Hurricane Katrina hit, almost 6,000 National Guardsmen were on state active duty in Louisiana. Three days 
later, the number of Guardsmen in Louisiana doubled to more than 12,000 (Wombwell, 2009, p. 70).
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Although the process successfully deployed a large number o f National 
Guard troops, it did not proceed efficiently, or according to any pre­
existing plan or process. There was, in fact, no established process for the 
large-scale, nation-wide deployment o f National Guard troops for civil 
support. (Committee, 2006, p. 10)
While the military clearly provided vital support, no one had the total 
picture o f the situation on the ground, the capabilities that were on the 
way, the missions that had been resourced, and the missions that still 
needed to be completed. (Pickup, 2006, p.3)
One thousand FEMA employees set to arrive in New Orleans on 
Wednesday, August 31, but turned back due to security concerns. (Select 
Bipartisan Committee, 2006, p. 249)
The security landscape of the post-disaster urban environment is exemplified by 
Hurricane Katrina in this dissertation, since it provided a plentiful number o f lessons 
learned. However, as the discussion expands with different cases, the post-disaster 
security requirements still have much room for improvement. In addition, existing Public 
Safety and Security planning methodologies should be supported by different 
tools/models to provide more precise solutions for the security and coordination 
requirements.
New vulnerability assessment and prioritization models, which would process 
multiple criteria and different systems state variables for the critical assets, and produce 
generalizable indices for decision making requirements, should be developed to support 
the post-disaster security planning processes that theoretically should address the worst- 
case scenarios o f the fuzzy post-disaster environment. This type of model would fully 
support the tactical level security agents in decision making and planning processes 
regarding force tailoring, unit positioning, identification o f appropriate security 
operations techniques, etc. in the context o f post-disaster security operations.
I l l
4.3 Existing Security Planning Practices
Before exploring the existing security planning considerations, the tactical aspects 
of the current security operations concept should be captured. To that end, Security 
Operations have been outlined at Appendix B. The protection of the population and 
critical assets is the top priority in post-disaster urban area security operations. There are 
different techniques available to security agents, as discussed at Appendix B. Four of 
these techniques -  Patrol, Guard, 'Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance' (ISR) 
and Response/Reaction Force - have primary roles in security operations. The concept of 
security operations is practically based on the execution o f these techniques by troops 
assigned to area of responsibility. To elucidate the existing practice o f security operations 
planning and execution, the following questions could be articulated:
• What are the methodologies being used to develop post-disaster 
security plans for urban areas?
•  What kind of criteria is being utilized in these methodologies?
• Specifically, how are the force tailoring20 and unit positioning21 
decisions being made to allocate the optimal numbers o f troops for the 
execution of security operations techniques (Patrol, Guard,
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance' (ISR) and 
Response/Reaction Force, etc.)?
20 Force tailoring refers to the process o f determining and deploying the right mix of capabilities to support the force or 
mission. During Urban Operations, the sustainment commander can tailor the support element required to accomplish a 
specific mission or task, thereby mitigating the risk associated with deploying a larger, more robust capability package 
forward into the urban area (Urban operations, 2006, p. 10-7).
21 Unit positioning/Deployment refers to the positioning o f  forces into a formation for battle (DoD Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms, 2010, p. 105). Factors affecting base and unit positioning include the implications of 
the current threat assessment, the suitability and survivability o f available facilities, and the subordinate unit mission 
requirements. Component commanders and their staffs should use these factors and their own risk assessments to 
determine whether units should be dispersed or grouped together for mutual support (Joint Security Operations in 
Theater, 2010, p. 111-18).
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Based on the information provided through literature review and interviews with 
the subject matter experts, the common approach to develop a security plan for an urban 
area hinges on the identification of critical assets within the area of responsibility, and 
follow-up criticality and vulnerability/threat assessments. Through various criticality and 
vulnerability/threat assessment methodologies, the decision makers can provide some 
security requirement parameters for each critical asset, and eventually a decision making 
process supported by different prioritization approaches could be executed for the 
organization and deployment o f the available troops in term o f force tailoring' and 'unit 
positioning'. Finally, with the identification o f security operations techniques to be 
executed by the deployed troops in area of operation, the overall planning process is 
roughly completed.
As it has been stated in Police Intelligence Operations (2010), “there are 
numerous tools available to assess the criticality and vulnerability o f a particular asset, 
and each of these tools has unique inherent strengths and weaknesses” (p. 5-17).
However, there is no methodology or technique in place yet to provide a comprehensive 
approach that incorporates the complex characteristics of the post-disaster urban 
environment and diverse threat spectrum into its process design.
The argument can be traced through the NIPP as well as other tools available for 
the Police and Military. The Emergency Services Sector-Specific Plan (SSP)22 that is a 
part of the NIPP provides a sophisticated assessment and prioritization tool to address 
critical infrastructure protection. “The cornerstone o f the NIPP is its risk analysis and
22 The Emergency Services Sector-Specific Plan (ES SSP) is an annex to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
(NIPP) and addresses efforts to improve protection o f the ESS in an all-hazards environment (p. i). The ES SSP, in 
conjunction with the NIPP, provides the unifying Federal structure for the integration of Emergency Services Sector 
(ESS) critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) protection efforts into a single national program (Emergency 
Services Sector-Specific Plan, 2010, p. v).
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management framework (Figure 22) that establishes the processes for combining 
consequence, vulnerability, and threat information to produce assessments o f national or 
sector risk” (National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2009, p. 2).
Continuous improvement to enhance protection of C1KR
Figure 22 NIPP Risk Management Framework (National Infrastructure Protection
Plan, 2009)
In this framework, the base element for the vulnerability component is the 
Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection (ECIP)23 security survey, which resides in the 
Infrastructure Survey Tool (1ST)24 and utilizes the approved DHS Infrastructure 
Protection vulnerability methodology (Emergency Services Sector-Specific Plan, 2010). 
However, although the NIPP Risk Analysis and Management Framework and the other 
tools used in the ECIP program may provide outstanding capabilities for resource 
allocation decision processes, the employment o f these tools to support the tactical level 
security planning processes is unlikely, since they do not adequately address the post-
23 The Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection (ECIP) program is designed to assess risks to fixed facilities to 
compare - with risks to like facilities (Emergency Services Sector-Specific Plan, 2010, p. ii).
24 The Infrastructure Survey Tool (1ST) provides asset or facility based information from a wide range o f CIK.R 
facilities, such as commercial buildings, electrical substations, and dams (p. 5). It has more than 1500 variables 
covering 6 major components and 42 subcomponents (Fisher, Buehring, Bassett, Dickinson, Haffenden, Klett, and 
Lawlor, 2009, p. 9).
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disaster aspects of the security paradigm from a perspective o f security concept of 
operations as discussed in Appendix B.
In police security operations, the primary focus is on the practice of patrolling', 
which has a broad spectrum consisting of different types. The methodology for the 
development o f patrol plans is usually shaped with inputs provided through numerous 
computer-based software applications that allow a wide range of applicable data to be 
overlaid, including demographic data, industrial hazard areas, sensitive assets, key traffic 
routes and congestion points, existing patrol and police station operational boundaries. 
They also allow security agents to overlay crime and incident data on a digital map o f the 
Area o f Operations (AO) as it is elaborated in Law and Order Operations (2011).
While existing planning approaches for patrol planning supported by 
aforementioned computer-based software applications enable security agents to enhance 
the security measures to some extent, they would not be sufficient to support the 
development o f comprehensive security plans that integrate the execution o f other 
necessary security operation techniques besides patrolling. Also, since existing methods 
mostly rely on historical crime data without incorporating the ambient tensions and 
variables specific to each critical asset, the outcomes of plans developed through these 
methods would likely not be resilient enough to tackle the complexities o f post-disaster 
urban environment.
25 This data comes from historical records of criminal and other police and security-related activity, demographic data 
for the jurisdiction in question, seasonal and other cyclical events or activities, and areas o f  specific command emphasis 
(Law and Order Operations, 2011, p. 2-22).
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In the context o f the military security concept of operations; while patrol 
planning26 has similar established practices like the police security operations, the 
security paradigm is usually managed through the principles o f Military Decision Making 
Process (MDMP)27 as it is a common approach applied for all military actions which 
requires the commander's decision at the appropriate level. However, there is also limited
- JO
discussion in the military literature regarding the identification of force tailoring and 
unit positioning requirements o f the troops to be deployed in the post-disaster urban area. 
For these particular requirements, military references usually advice general approaches 
and techniques without providing specified direction and guidance, criteria sets, etc. as 
outlined in Appendix C. To deliver precise outputs, these approaches and techniques 
require elaboration thorough the decision making processes which relies on the decision 
makers' vision and personal capability.
In addition to primary approaches/methodologies employed within the context of
■JQ
the military decision making process (like METT-TC, OAKOC, IPB) [see Appendix C
26 Patrol areas and patrol distribution are methods used by Law Enforcement agencies to divide a jurisdictional area 
into manageable and organized subordinate areas for Law Enforcement personnel to conduct operations. Patrol 
distribution must consider, at a minimum, the following factors (Law and Order Operations, 2011, p. 2-22);
• Crime and complaint histories for the AO.
• Geography and characteristics o f the AO, including;
- Population and critical resource densities across the AO.
- Obstacles and number o f ingress or egress routes.
• Minimum response requirements.
• Manpower and mission requirements, including personnel available and mission loads.
27 The military decision making process (MDMP) is an iterative planning methodology to understand the situation and 
mission, develop a course o f action, and produce an operation plan or o rder. The military decision making process 
integrates the activities o f the commander, staff, subordinate headquarters, and unified action partners to understand the 
situation and mission; develop and compare courses o f action; decide on a course of action that best accomplishes the 
mission; and produce an operation plan or order for execution (The Operations Process, 2012, p. 2-11). Theoretically, 
decision making process (and the mission analysis within the decision making process algorithm) begins with the 
receipt of the mission and it is usually followed by the risk/threat/hazard assessment.
28 The scope of the military literature research is limited to U.S. military literature.
29 METT-TC: Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troops and Support Available, Time Available, Civil 
Considerations.
OAKOC: Observation and Fields o f Fire. Avenues o f Approach, Key Terrain, Obstacles, and Cover and 
Concealment.
IPB: Intelligence Preparation o f the Battlefield.
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for further information excerpted from Urban Operations (2006)], the MSHARPP30 and 
CARVER31 assessment techniques provide relatively advanced toolsets for the security 
planners as they are elaborated in Antiterrorism (2011). However, since both focus on 
terrorist threats, and their concept frameworks have not been designed to address the 
complex characteristics o f the post-disaster urban areas, the use of those tools would not 
meet the post-disaster security planning requirements.
4.4 Conceptual Background of the PDSI Model
The concept design of the PDSI Model is derived from a combination of the 
epistemological perspective o f modeling, Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM), 
systems thinking and relevant aspects of the military literature including MDMP.
The essence of the PDSI Model relies on the realistic assumptions o f post-disaster 
security, and mostly addresses the planning requirements for the deployment o f the 
security agents (including both the local/state police and military forces and external 
support agents from adjacent regions or other locations as necessary) who are responsible 
for securing any urban area, and maintaining law and order after a catastrophic natural or 
man-made disaster.
Prescriptive research aims to provide a remedial solution as implied in its name.
Wollman (n.d.) further delineates what the prescriptive research is:
Prescriptive research comes up with an assertion, a solution, and a proposal 
for how to address a known problem space. The implication o f most research 
questions in prescriptive research is what we should do now: how a policy 
should be changed or improved; how an organization can achieve specific 
outcomes or meet requirements; a set of recommendations or solutions or 
ideas that involve change and action.
30 MSHARPP: Mission, Symbolism, History, Accessibility, Recognizability, Population, and Proximity.
31 CARVER: Criticality, Accessibility, Recuperability, Vulnerability, Effect and Recognisability.
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The PDSI Model has been developed through a prescriptive research 
methodology. Its foundational motives are based on the following three conclusions, 
which were derived from the literature review and analysis results delineated in previous 
chapters. The conclusions are:
Conclusion 1: Increasing complexity o f urban environment and emergent 
characteristics of diverse threats (all types o f natural and man-made threats) 
impose serious challenges to the post-disaster urban security.
Conclusion 2: Since the Public Safety and Security function plays a critical role 
for the execution of other follow-up disaster response/recovery missions in the 
context o f the NRF, the security agents should ensure that they have reliable 
Public Safety and Security plans in place.
Conclusion 3: To maximize the efficiency, the Public Safety and Security plans 
should be developed utilizing appropriate tools and methodologies that can 
address post-disaster urban environment characteristics theoretically reflecting 
worst-case scenario features, such as lack of power and other supplies, lack of 
communication, disorder, emergency, potential threats, complexity, uncertainty, 
poor coordination, etc.
4.5 Significance of the PDSI Model
Regarding the existing practice o f urban security operations planning, the 
criticality and vulnerability assessment o f critical assets has a significant impact on the
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planning of security operations techniques which are to be executed on the ground as 
necessary. Presently, a number o f different tools are available for the security agents as 
discussed in the previous chapters. These tools are used to provide data for asset 
prioritization for different purposes as some of them support the decision making 
processes on resource allocation. However; from the tactical level security planning 
perspective, there is no model o f an urban area critical asset prioritization methodology 
that employs both a multiple criteria decision making approach (like fuzzy sets for 
multiple system states), and criteria sets that specifically address unique post-disaster 
urban security characteristics.
To that end, the implementation of the PDSI Model would be valuable for urban 
area security planners, enhancing the quality o f their post-disaster security plans, which 
also have critical implications for the continuation o f other disaster response/recovery 
missions. With the conceptual background delineated in Chapter 4.4, the significance of 
the PDSI Model is outlined in the following three topics:
1. Since the security implications and vulnerabilities vary according to different 
system states, the model design has been built in a matrix form. So different 
grades o f membership and indexes, which represent outcomes o f different 
system states can be aggregated in a fuzzy sets approach.
2. Since the post-disaster environment has unique characteristics, the Criteria of 
Merit to be processed through the model have been developed based on 
realistic assumptions that address these unique features. In addition to 
comprehensive review and synthesis o f the relevant literature, the decision 
tree analysis in Chapter 4.8 supports the validation of the criteria set.
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3. The PDSI Model empowers a methodology that ensures generalizable indices 
with the incorporation of generalizability grades o f membership for each 
Criteria o f Merit, and each Possible System State. Therefore, the potential 
outcomes would be helpful at different levels in the planning processes in the 
wider context o f the Homeland Security enterprise, as delineated in Chapter 5.
4.6 PDSI Model Algorithm
4.6.1 Introduction
The expected outcome of the PDSI Model is basically to provide an efficient 
vulnerability assessment tool for security planners who deal with post-disaster urban area 
security in the tactical level. In addition, the model's implementation would also likely to 
have operational and strategic level implications. The concept design and step-wise 
algorithm of the PDSI Model have been delineated in this dissertation. However, a 
software program supported by Geographic Information Systems (GIS) is still required 
for the practical use o f the model in future. The PDSI Model includes five sequential 
components (Figure 23):
1. Identify Boundaries
2. Identify Critical Assets
3. Measure Basic Criticality Value (BCV)
4. Measure Post-Disaster Security Fuzzy Index (PDSFI)
5. Measure Post-Disaster Security Index (PDSI)
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Figure 23 Components of the Post-Disaster Security Index Model
Before starting to explore each phase, note the basic assumptions outlined below 
for further appreciation o f the implementation process:
•  The model concept addresses the post-disaster urban area environment which 
has unique characteristics that are depicted, but not limited to those in Figure 
24.
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Figure 24 Unique Characteristics o f Post-Disaster Urban Environment
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•  There are four major security operations techniques: Patrol, Guard,
' Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance' (ISR), Response/Reaction 
Force.
• The security agents who are responsible for securing any area of 
responsibility (sectors/sub-sectors) in a jurisdiction utilize the outputs of this 
model to improve post-disaster security plans in terms o f force tailoring and 
unit positioning as well as identifying the required security operations 
techniques to be executed on the scene.
•  The model could be utilized for any urban area o f responsibility (sub-sector, 
sector, district, city, state, etc.) as appropriate, and the outputs could be 
integrated/aggregated and interpreted in a bottom-up and top-down approach 
through various methods.
4.6.2 Identify Boundaries (Phase 1)
In the first phase o f the PDSI Model, the areas of responsibility are identified in 
line with any existing administrative boundaries: e.g.; police districts , patrol division 
sectors, etc. Different techniques could be utilized for this requirement, however a unified 
approach should be adopted for the whole interest area (as illustrated at Figure 25) to 
ensure the consistency and generalizable integration/aggregation inferences be derived 
for specific purposes.
32 After Hurricane Katrina, Emergency Support Function (ESF)-13 (the Public Safety and Security) requests were 
processed through the Law Enforcement Coordination Center (LECC) at Louisiana State Police (LSP) headquarters in 
Baton Rouge (Select Bipartisan Committee, 2006, p. 257). The LECC divided the federal law enforcement entities by 
New Orleans police districts. Each federal law enforcement agency was responsible for coordinating with the precinct 
captain of the district (Select Bipartisan Committee, 2006, p. 259).
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Figure 25 Identification o f Boundaries (Subdivision of the Interest Areas o f
Responsibility)
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4.6.3 Identification of Critical Assets (Phase 2)
Having clarified the boundaries, the critical assets (which include critical
infrastructures, facilities, state/public/private properties, etc.) in each sector are identified
with rough estimates, and enumerated (see an example at Figure 26). If it were
technically possible, all the assets in the sector could be assumed as critical and
enumerated accordingly. However, since it would be unfeasible to work with all assets in
an urban area throughout the assessment process, the former instruction should be
followed.
CRITICAL ASSETS INSECTOR ALFA
I- Nortotk Scope Aren-
? US Bankruptcy f  o u t!
1 Nor folk N pighbo'hood I e isur *•
4 Bank of Com m onw ealth
5 W ells fargo  Bank
6  fjnvorth  U nited M ethodist Chtwrh
7 Com m onw ealth P roperty A ssoriates 
8- Norfolk City P o lite
4  freem aso n  St Baptist Churrh 
10- M oses M yers House
I I-  Tidew ater Com m vndy college 
12- St Paul's Place Co
I  V- Norfolk P o iite  M useum
14- MacArthur Pharmacy
15- St P au l's  TexiKo
16- Nordstrom  MacArthur C en te r
17- D illard's M acArthur Center 
18 Secret Service US
14 Norfolk Fire D epartm ent
20- Norfolk luvenlleC ourt Clerk
21- Downtown P lara Shopping Center
22- St P au l's  Episcopal Church
23 Consulate General of Sw eden 
24- Virginia Port Authority 
7S- Banks of Ham pton Roads 
26- SunTrust
71 H am pton Roads Naval M useum  
28- Norfolk Crvk Plaza 
29 Old Point N ational Bank 
10- City o f  Norfolk D epartm ent
I I  Consulate G eneral of ttafy
32- Norfolk Parking D epartm ent
33- Townbank Branch O ffk e
34- Norfolk Circuit Court Clerk 
n  RBCBank
34  ̂W achovia Bank
37 Norfolk Yard Sales D epartm ent
38- Norfolk Real e s ta te  D epartm ent
39- W aterside Festival M arketplace 
40  Banks o f Ham pton Roads
Figure 26 Identification and Enumeration o f Critical Assets
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Although the initial criticality identification could be made through either 
intuitive methods like Recognition Heuristic and Elimination by Aspects as discussed in 
Chapter 2.6.3 or any other methods to be performed by the subject matter experts, official 
guidance provided by local, state or federal authorities associated with the set o f certain 
criteria and classifications defined within the appropriate margins would support optimal 
decisions and produce generalizable outputs.
As a guide for planning purposes, a list of the potential types o f critical assets in 
an urban area is included in Table 9, which has been adapted from the list o f the Critical 
Infrastructure and Key Resource Sectors (CIKR) (Table 1).
Table 9 Potential Types o f Critical Assets
P o w e r  P la n ts  
G o v e r n m e n ta l B u ild in g s  
M a jo r  In d u str ia l F a c i l i t ie s
_____________________ B a n k s/A T M s______________________
G a s  S ta t io n s  
M a jo r  R e ta il  
S h o p p in g  M a lls
_____________________ H o s p ita ls _______________________
________________________ S c h o o ls ________________________
P la c e s  o f  W o r sh ip  
A ir p o r ts  
M a jo r  T ra n sp o rta tio n  T e r m in a ls  
H ig h ly  P o p u la te d  B u ild in g s  
R e c r e a t io n  C e n te r s  
R o a d  I n te r s e c t io n s  (T r a ff ic  C o n tr o l)
P o s s ib l e  S h e lt e r s - P o s t  D is a s te r  
P o in t s  o f  D is tr ib u t io n  ( P O D ) - P o s t  d is a s te r  
P r is o n s
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4.6.4 Measurement o f Basic Criticality Index (BCI) (Phase 3)
Various asset criticality assessment methods can be used to produce a criticality 
index to be processed in the PDSI Model. However, the possible outcomes o f these 
methods would address contextually different aspects as each of their conceptual designs 
has been built to achieve a different goal. Nevertheless, the criticality index provided 
through the Basic Criticality Index (BCI) Assessment Matrix (Table 4-4), which has been 
developed in line with the context o f the PDSI Model, would adequately reflect the post­
disaster urban environment characteristics considering the viability functions o f the key 
sectors/services.
The function of the BCI is to normalize the Post-Disaster Security Fuzzy Index 
(PDSFI), which is to be produced in the next phase. The BCI, for each critical asset, is 
obtained through the equation included in the relevant key sector/service row at Table 10. 
It provides a score between 0 and 1 that reflects the relative functional weight of 
criticality o f the assigned asset in terms of its level o f involvement in the relevant 
sector/service group33. However, the BCI does not reflect the post-disaster security 
requirements o f the assigned assets. Rather, it addresses the criticality o f assets in the 
system state of the post-disaster urban environment where the key sectors/services play a 
significant role for the continuation o f daily life activities. The ultimate role o f the BCI is 
to normalize the PDSFI to culminate in PDSI at the last phase. See Appendix D for the 
detailed instructions for the measurement o f the BCI.
33 Urban Area Key Sectors/Services list has been generated in line with essence o f  18 Critical Infrastructure and Key 
Resource Sectors (CIKR) that have been developed within the context o f National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
(NIPP).
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T a b le  10 B a s ic  C r itica lity  In d ex  (B C I)  E q u a tio n s
No Urban Area Key Sectors/Services BCI(i)
1 Governance, Homeland Security, Law/Public Order, Emergency Service BCI1=S1 x (SRW1 UEW 1)
2 Housing Accommodation BCI2=S2 x (EW2 U OW2)
3
Power Energy Service (Power plants, 
nuclear reactors, dams, fuel supply 
stations, etc.)
BCI3=S3 x (SRW3 U EW3)
4 Healthcare and Public Health BCI4-S4 x (SRW4 U EW4)
5 telecommunication (including Information Technology)
BCI5=S5 x (SRW5 U EW5)
6
Transportation Postal and Shipping 
Service (including airports, major 
transportation terminals)
BCI6=S6 x (SRW6 U EW6)
7 Food'Water and Other Goods Service (Shopping malls, major retail, etc.) BCI7=S7 x (EW7 U SW7)
8 Banking and Finance (including banks ATMs, etc.)
BCI8=S8 x (SRW8 U EW8)
9 Critical Manufacturing (including major industrial facilities) BCI9=S9 x (EW9 U IW9)
10 Training and Education Activities (including schools) BCI10=S10 x (EW10 U STW10)
11 Worship Activities (Places of worship, etc.)
BCI11=S11 x (EW11 USCW11)
Variables: Si: Scaling Constant: SRW: Service Relativity Weight; EW: Employment Weight: 
OW: Occupancy Weight; SW: Size Weight; IW: Investment Weight; STW: Student Capacity 
Weight; SCW: Seating Capacity Weight
The combination rule for the equations: A U B  = (A+B) - (AxB)
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4.6.5 Measurement o f  Post-Disaster Security Fuzzy Index (PDSFI) (Phase 4)
The Post-Disaster Security Fuzzy Index (PDSFI) component provides a matrix 
assessment structure that constitutes the backbone o f the PDSI Model. The theoretical 
concept of this matrix structure simply relies on the incorporation of three sub­







Figure 27 Three Main Components of PDSFI Matrix
The ultimate goal in this phase is to produce a PDSFI for each critical asset 
through the process formulated within the Fuzzy Matrix component (elaborated in Table 
12) considering the parameters to be derived from the incorporation o f the Ambient 
Criteria of Merit and Possible System States listed in Table 11.
Table 11 Ambient Criteria o f Merit and Possible System States
AM BIENT CRITERIA O F M ERIT POSSIBLE SYSTEM  STATES
•  Physical Security (C l)
•  Num ber o f Inhabitants/ Visitors (C2)
•  Size/ Area (C3)
•  Traffic Access/M obility (C4)
•  Offences against Property (like looting, 
larceny/theft, burglary, arson, m otor 
vehicle theft, etc.) (S I)
• Offences against Persons (like murder, 
sexual assault, robbery, etc.) (S2)
•  Terrorist Attacks/ Warfare Threats 
(aggregated assaults, sabotages, etc.)
(S3)
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Technically, we can generate numerous criteria for vulnerability assessments that 
would conclude with security requirement prioritizations. However, since different 
system states dictate different security requirements, the criteria set for any system state 
should be developed in line with the essence of the system state characteristics. To that 
end, the Ambient Criteria o f Merit (Table 10) identified in this study would sufficiently 
address the post-disaster security requirement characteristics. The validation of the 
criteria set has been supported by the decision tree analysis included in Appendix H.
From the causality perspective, the vulnerability o f each asset may vary according 
to the characteristics of the system state. As an example, in a system state where there is 
lack of food, the assets which provide any kind of food services would be more 
susceptible to the potential offences while the others do not attract the offenders who 
have been motivated by the lack of food. To incorporate the assets' different vulnerability 
weights (according to the different system state characteristics) in the PDSI Model 
measurement process, three Possible System States (Table 11) have been defined in line 
with the major crime categories adopted within the common justice literature. ( Terrorist 
Attack/Warfare Threats' is the only exception of this rule, which has been added a as a 
third system state since it has been considered critical.)
Furthermore, to ensure the outputs o f this model provide generalizable indices 
that address a broad implementation spectrum, the Generalizability Grades of 
Membership' index definitions have been developed per each Criterion and System State, 
considering they would represent the generalizable local/ambient parameters regarding 
each Criterion and System State, but not the critical asset.
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Table 12 depicts the integrated PDSFI Matrix. Three steps associated with the 
matrix variables are outlined below:
1. Measurement of Input Variables
2. Measurement o f Fuzzy Matrix Variables
3. Aggregation
Table 12 Post-Disaster Security Fuzzy Index (PDSFI) Matrix
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P05FI(S2) (G5.V5) (G6, VG) (G7.V7) (G8, V8) G(S2) M(S2)
PDSFI(S3) (G9.V9) (G10, V10) (G11.V11) (G12, V12) G(S3) M(S3)
1. Measurement of Input Variables:
The list of PDSFI Matrix input variables and their sub-components are listed 
below. Further information for the measurement o f each variable and sub­
components is included in Appendix E.
a. Scaling Constants:
• scl: Scaling Constant for the Criterion o f Physical Security
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•  sc2: Scaling Constant for the Criterion o f Number of
Inhabitants/Visitors
• sc3: Scaling Constant for the Criterion o f Size/Area
•  sc4: Scaling Constant for the Criterion o f Traffic Access/Mobility
b. Vulnerability Indexes of the Critical Asset per each Criterion:
•  V(C1): Vulnerability Index of the Critical Asset for Physical 
Security
Perimeter Security Index 
Building Envelope Wall Type Index 
Building Envelope Fenestration Index
•  V(C2): Vulnerability Index of the Critical Asset for Number o f 
Inhabitants/Visitors
• V(C3): Vulnerability Index of the Critical Asset for Size/Area
•  V(C4): Vulnerability Index of the Critical Asset for Traffic 
Access/Mobility
Periphery Road Width Index 
Adjacent Primary Roads Proximity Index 
Bridge Dependency Index 
Transportation Terminals Proximity Index
c. Vulnerability Index Modifiers of the Critical Asset per each Possible 
System State:
• M(S1): Vulnerability Index Modifier o f the Critical Asset for 
Offences against Property
• M(S2): Vulnerability Index Modifier o f the Critical Asset for 
Offences against Persons
• M(S3): Vulnerability Index Modifier o f the Critical Asset for 
Terrorist Attacks/Warfare Threats
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d. Generalizability Grades of Membership per each Criterion:
• G(C1): Generalizability Grades o f Membership for Physical Security
Seismicity Vulnerability Index 
Hurricane Vulnerability Index 
Flood Vulnerability Index
• G(C2): Generalizability Grades o f Membership for Number o f
Inhabitants/Visitors
•  G(C3): Generalizability Grades o f Membership for Size/Area
• G(C4): Generalizability Grades o f Membership for Traffic
Access/Mobility
Road Length Index 
Transportation Lines Index 
Bridges Index
e. Generalizability Grades of Membership per each Possible System 
State:
• G(S1): Generalizability Grades o f Membership for Offences against
Property
• G(S2): Generalizability Grades o f Membership for Offences against
Persons
• G(S3): Generalizability Grades o f Membership for Terrorist
Attacks/Warfare Threats
2. Measurement of Fuzzy Matrix Variables:
The equations for the measurement of fuzzy matrix variables (Table 13) have 
been included in Table 14. The combination rule for Generalizability Grades of 
Membership Variables is:
A U B = (A+B) -  (A*B) (1)
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Table 13 Fuzzy Matrix Variables
Fuzzy M a tr ix
PDSFI(Sl) (61, VI) (62, V2) (63, V3) (G4, V4)
PDSFI(S2) (65, V5) (66, V6) (67, V7) (68, V8)
PDSFIJS3) (69, V9) (G10, V10) (Gil, Vll) (G12, V12)
Table 14 Equations for the Measurement of Fuzzy Matrix Variables




G1 = G(C1) U G(S1) VI = scl * V(C1) * M(S1)
G2 = G(C2) U G(S1) V2 = sc2 * V(C2) * M(S1)
G3 = G(C3) U G(S1) V3 = sc3 * V(C3) * M(S1)
G4 = G(C4) U G(S1) V4 = sc4 * V(C4) * M(S1)
G5 = G(C1) U G(S2) V5 = scl * V(C1) * M(S2)
G6 = G(C2) U G(S2) V6 = sc2 * V(C2) * M(S2)
G7 = G(C3) U G(S2) V7 = sc3 * V(C3) * M(S2)
G8 = G(C4) U G(S2) V8 = sc4 * V(C4) • M(S2)
G9 = G<C1)UG(S3) V9 = scl * V(C1) * M(S3)
G10 = G(C2)UG(S3) V I0 = sc2 * V(C2) * M(S3)
G il  = G(C3)U G(S3) V I1 = sc3 * V(C3) * M(S3)
G12 = G(C4)U G(S3) V12 = sc4 * V(C4) * M(S3)
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3. Aggregation:
Following the measurement o f fuzzy matrix variables, final aggregation is 
performed through Equation 2 below. When necessary, matrix variables could also be 
aggregated per each system state through Equations 3, 4, 5 to be processed for different 
assessment purposes (e.g.; for a specific area o f responsibility, vulnerability weights of 





L i = 1
/12 (2)
PDSFI(Sl) = x Vi
L i = 1
/ 4 (3)
PDSFI(S2) = x Vi
L i=5




Gi x  Vi / 4  (5)
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4.6.6 Measurement o f  Post-Disaster Security Index (PDSI) (Phase 5)
The Post-Disaster Security Index (PDSI), which is the final output o f the PDSI 
Model, is measured processing the Basic Criticality Value (BCV) and Post-Disaster 
Security Fuzzy Index (PDSFI) (which have already been measured in the previous 
phases) through Equation 6. The PDSI provides a score between 0 and 10.000 that 
represent the post-disaster security requirement of each critical asset assigned in the area 
of responsibility34.
PDSI = (BCV * PDSFI)* 1000 (6)
4.7 Sample Measurement
4.7.1 Scenario
The Operations Bureau in the City o f Delta Police Department has been tasked to 
develop a Post-Disaster Security Plan for the city. To proceed the planning process, they 
need to identify the criticality and vulnerability weights o f the critical assets within the 
city to decide on the best option between force tailoring (organization) and unit 
positioning (deployment) alternatives for the execution of security operations techniques 
(which could be Patrol, Guard, 'Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance'(ISR), 
Response/Reaction Force).
The Operations Bureau planning team decided to use the PDSI Model to make the 
vulnerability assessments and derive necessary data for the prioritization and decision 
making. They followed the five sequential phases delineated in Appendix F.
34 The equation is multiplied by a coefficient o f 1000 to obtain an integer which provides a score highest in precision, 
minimally rounded to the left.
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4.7.2 Measurement Results
The PDSI for each critical asset is listed in Table 15, which has been obtained 
through the PDSI Model algorithm at Chapter 4.6.
Table 15 PDSI o f the Critical Assets
Critical Asset BCV PDSFI PDSI
Blue Shopping Center (BSC) 0.548 2.334 1279
Delta City Hospital (DCH) 0.792 1.121 887
City of Delta Department (CDD) 0.950 0.699 664
Performance Sensitivity results of the indexes (Va (raw), Va, PDSFI, PDSI) are 
listed in Table 16.
Table 16 Performance Sensitivity
Index Types Critical Asset
BSC DCH CDD
Va(raw)* 6.09 5.66 4.59
Normalized Va(raw) 1 0.929 0.754
Va** 3.723 1.825 1.206
Normalized Va 1 0.49 0.324
PDSFI 2.334 1.121 0.699
Normalized PDSFI 1 0.48 0.299
PDSI 1279 887 664
Normalized PDSI 1 0.694 0.519
* Va (raw): Average of the raw Vulne
4
Va(raw) =  V(
i=1
** Va: Average of the Fuzzy Vulneral
12
Va =  ^ > \ i
i=l
*** Normalized weights are obtained 





through the division of
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4.8 Reliability and Validity of the Constructs
The conceptual design of the PDSI Model is based on the combined knowledge of 
the epistemological perspective of modeling, MCDM, systems thinking and relevant 
aspects o f the military literature, including the MDMP. The model has been developed 
through a prescriptive research methodology.
Korb, Geard and Dorin (2013) discuss how expert opinions have a significant role 
in the validation of the models, while the Bayes' Theorem suggests the incorporation of 
both the statistical tests and expert opinions during the research. In line with the 
discussion of Korb et al., the validation of the PDSI Model as a whole and the set of 
criteria incorporated in the model relies heavily on the subjective assessments of subject 
matter experts, since the statistical testing of this model requires high scale 
comprehensive experimentation through extended studies and extensive participation of 
diverse security stakeholders. Nonetheless, for the validation of the PDSI Model 
including its development process; Face Validity, Content Validity and Internal Validity 
methods have been applied during the dissertation.
For the subjective analysis o f a model and its characteristics, Oren and Yilmaz 
(2013) state that “a model is not considered to be absolutely correct or incorrect, but 
rather subjective analysis o f qualitative characteristics is considered essential for its 
acceptability and credibility” (p. 162) in the pragmatist and holistic schools, while Korb, 
Geard and Dorin (2013) claim “a great deal o f practical effort in developing models goes 
into making sense o f expert opinions about a modeling domain” (p. 255).
Regarding the Face Validity; Health and Jackson (2013) contends “while there are 
similar approaches when compared to traditional scientific techniques o f validation such
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as statistical testing, Face Validation (i.e., asking experts to determine whether the model 
behavior seems reasonable) almost completely relies on subjective human judgment” (p. 
100). In a similar way, Korb, Geard and Dorin (2013) underline the significance of face 
validity “while face validity is a weak kind of test o f a model, it is nevertheless central to 
most modeling endeavors” (p. 262). In this sense, the Face Validity o f the PDSI Model 
has been obtained through interviews with subject matter experts35 who have more than 
10 years o f experience in their respective domains. The validation questionnaire utilized 
during the interviews is included in Appendix G.
Pertaining to Content Validity, Korb, Geard and Dorin (2013) state: “Content 
Validity considers whether the most important factors and relationships between 
variables noted in the literature are present in the model; expert opinion will be the 
primary guide here, but focused reviews of the literature will also be useful” (p. 262). 
Triangulation, which could be utilized as a Content Validity approach, is “broadly 
defined as synthesis and integration o f data from multiple sources through collection, 
examination, comparison, and interpretation” (Overview of Triangulation Methodology, 
(n.d.), p. 7). It is “typically a strategy for improving the validity and reliability o f research 
or evaluation of findings” (Golafshani, 2003, p. 603). The triangulation methodology, 
which has been adapted from the cycle illustrated in Figure 28, was applied during the 
development of the PDSI Model (particularly during the development o f the variables of 
the Ambient Criteria of Merit and measurement matrixes) to synthesize and distill the 
information provided through the relevant literature.
35 The author o f this dissertation also qualifies the requirements as the subject matter expert on this domain.
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Gather data from 
multiple sources
Refine hypothesis 










Figure 28 Visual Representation of the Triangulation Process (Overview of 
Triangulation Methodology, (n.d.), p. 15)
Finally, regarding Internal Validity, Korb, Geard and Dorin (2013) highlight how
this method focuses on the assessment of the model variables:
Internal Validity examines whether variation in the model's variables is 
reasonable. This could specifically consider co-variation between sets of 
variables, to determine whether changes in some variable either cause or are 
co-dependent with changes in others, in ways which are judged sensible by 
experts; this is generally called sensitivity analysis, (p. 262)
Considering the variables o f the PDSI Model in this context, the overall situation 
usually gets more complicated with numerous diverse interactions between great numbers 
of elements existing within the system boundaries in a crisis system state like a post­
disaster environment. In such a case, it is critical that the models supporting the Public 
Safety and Security planning process address the post-disaster urban environment
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characteristics, since they theoretically reflect the features o f the worst-case scenario, like 
lack of power and other supplies, lack of communication, disorder, emergency, potential 
threats, complexity, uncertainty, poor coordination, etc. The Ambient Criteria of Merit 
incorporated in the PDSFI matrix were developed with the aim of capturing the 
aforementioned post-disaster security requirements. The Ambient Criteria of Merit play a 
significant role in the measurement/assessment process of the PDSI Model; each criterion 
in this set has multiple sub-variables that address the different aspects o f the security 
paradigm in the context of post-disaster environment. In addition, the Internal Validity of 
the Ambient Criteria of Merit have been validated through the Decision Tree Analysis, 
which has been developed based on a specific scenario (see Appendix H: Basic Reality 
Face-Off Decision Tree).
4.9 Conclusion
The vulnerability assessment (associated with the criticality assessment aspects) 
of the critical assets significantly impacts post-disaster security planning for urban areas 
considering the different types o f threats. Since the prioritization o f security requirements 
for the critical assets, which is a critical driver for decision making, relies heavily on the 
assets' vulnerability assessments. However, there is no model or methodology 
(employing fuzzy multi-criteria decision making, and incorporating different system 
states and multiple sets of criteria derived from the essence of the security concept o f 
operations) in place to provide the aforementioned vulnerability assessment capability.
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As elaborated in the Sample Measurement in Chapter 4.7, the relative weights of 
the normalized vulnerability indexes36 attributed for each critical asset vary, as do the 
number of variables processed during the measurement of each index as depicted in 
Figure 29. Through quantitative experimentation or statistical testing, it is challenging to 
choose the best quality, more precise index from among these. The validation and 
reliability testing for each index and its measurement process requires subjective analyses 
and the assessments o f subject matter experts.
However, considering the serious differences between the normalized weights, 
the trade-offs at the end of the assessment process will have an inextricable link to the 
precision or resolution of the utilized index. Furthermore, since the assessment or 
prioritization process deals with a macro level system of interest with cumulative 
elements, it is most likely that the assessment results would exponentially change based 
on the type of utilized index, which theoretically provide different levels o f precision or 
resolution.
Considering the justifications outlined for the PDSI Model's reliability and 
validity, it is assumed that it would provide valuable parameters for urban area security 
planners to enhance the reliability o f their post-disaster security plans in the context o f 
NRF. The potential outcomes of the PDSI Model have been elaborated in Chapter 5.2.
36 Each index represents different approaches and includes different variables in the measurement process.
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Normalized Va(raw) Normalized Va










1 BSC 1 1 1 1
2 DCH 0.929 0.49 0.48 0.694
3 CDD 0.754 0.324 0.299 0.519
Figure 29 Relative Performance Sensitivity o f Normalized Indexes37




To achieve resilience, we must more fully incorporate a comprehensive understanding o f  
risk to establish priorities and inform decision making. Resilience will also require a shift 
from a reliance on top-down emergency management to a process that engages all 
stakeholders. (Quadrennial Report, 2010, p. 31)
In this dissertation, the incorporation of the Emergency Management concept 
within the U.S. Homeland Security contextual structure (theoretical content) has been 
scrutinized holistically, including the conceptual design of the NRF that is one of the 
critical mandates o f the Homeland Security domain. Furthermore, in the context o f the 
NRF, particularly the significance of the ESF-5 (Emergency Management) and ESF-13 
(Public Safety and Security) has been underlined, and the PDSI Model has been 
developed with the aim of supporting the existing post-disaster security planning process, 


















Figure 30 Synopsis of the Dissertation
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5.1 Conclusions
5.1.1 Homeland Security Contextual Structure
Homeland Security led by DHS in the U.S. represents an ultra-complex 
organizational enterprise with great numbers of stakeholders, numerous missions, and 
functions that entail extraordinary oversight and synchronization. This enterprise is 
critical and has unique characteristics, since it aims to provide people with the security 
that is a first priority core human need.
After the 2000s, Homeland Security was founded on the conceptual framework of 
Emergency Management which is theoretically the successor of'disaster response' 
efforts that date back to 19th century. From the 19th century until the establishment o f 
FEMA in 1979, the disaster response was handled by decentralized initiatives. In 1979, 
FEMA assumed an overarching role on the response missions and institutionalized and 
centralized these initiatives up to 2002. However, during this time, rather than developing 
a comprehensive Emergency Management concept/doctrine, which would elaborate the 
expected contextual structure including the concept boundaries of the system, only the 
definition and phases/components of Emergency Management were circulated.
After the September 11 terrorist attacks, DHS was established and charged with 
critical responsibilities. During that time, the National Strategy for Homeland Security 
and the Homeland Security Act o f2002 defined the Homeland Security key missions and 
priorities based on the theoretical context o f Emergency Management without any direct 
reference to Emergency Management. In 2003, FEMA was subsumed by DHS, and the 
contextual conflicts started to be surfaced. After Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the Post 
Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 aggravated the epistemological
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problems, since it attributed an overarching mission spectrum to Emergency Management 
that overlapped with the theoretical domain of DHS.
In the following years, the contextual deviation and confusion regarding the 
incorporation of the Emergency Management concept in the Homeland Security context 
continued through the National Strategy fo r  Homeland Security (2007), QHSR (2010) 
and other key mandates as discussed in Chapter 3. Considering particularly the recent 
strategic documents o f Presidential Policy Directive-8 (2011), DHS Strategic Plan 
(2012) and draft NRF  (2012), the following problems still exist, and unless necessary 
actions are taken, they would negate the development of Homeland Security, which 
basically aims to enhance the preparedness and resiliency o f American Nation:
•  “There is not an established Emergency Management Doctrine” (Blanchard, 
2007, p. 3), and the conceptual relationship between Emergency Management and 
Homeland Security has not been clearly defined.
• Regarding meaning and content, there are different connotations attributed 
for Emergency Management in the various key Homeland Security mandates.
•  The conceptual design of the ESFs within the NRF suffers from the lack of 
comprehensive Emergency Management doctrine and common terminology.
•  In the pertinent official literature, there is also a lack of holistic, multi­
dimensional, top-down figurative system representation. Although it is crucial to 
let complex system stakeholders oversee the system process and development, it 
is too fuzzy to appreciate the existing system framework holistically as well as to 
understand the system boundaries, and the relationships between key elements 
(entities, stakeholders, missions, functions, etc.).
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• Upon the evolution of the threat spectrum and other challenges, new
conceptual designs have been generated during the development o f Homeland 
Security with the justification of evolutional requirements. However, the new 
regulations have inherited the aforementioned epistemological problems in a 
domino effect.
The epistemological inconsistency and lack o f holistic system representation 
within the Homeland Security contextual structure is likely to produce more confusion, 
that could end up with a fuzzy and lumpish system with poor policy context, blurred 
system representations/abstractions, poorly educated personnel devoid of necessary 
situational awareness, ill-designed organizational structures, and improperly running 
operational functions. On the other hand, contextual coherence allows a well-designed 
system structure to facilitate system viability functions properly. Therefore, the challenge 
stemming from the contextual inconsistency should be scrutinized seriously and further 
amendments should be implemented to the existing Homeland Security contextual 
structure to transform and adapt the Emergency Management concept appropriately. In 
this sense, the assertion of Gheorghe and Vamanu (1996) provides a meaningful guidance 
for those who would take part in further contextual analyses: “Validating, applying, and 
maintaining - including refining -  existing Emergency Planning Preparedness and 




The primary focus of authorities has always been the Public Safety and Security, 
including law enforcement, public order, and physical protection of critical 
infrastructures and key assets during both ordinary/peacetime and crisis/wartime system 
states. Particularly after a high scale natural or man-made disaster in an urban area, the 
security agents are supposed to prevent public order from turning into panic and chaos by 
establishing security, maintaining law and order, and letting other response/recovery 
missions be executed successfully.
All disaster response/recovery activities (saving lives, first aid and medical 
treatment, law enforcement by sustaining public order and security, evacuation, 
maintenance, repair, etc.) are necessarily supposed to be executed coherently in a 
relatively more secure and stable system state using a synchronized planning 
methodology. Security and law enforcement play a critical role in the facilitation of other 
follow-up disaster response/recovery activities.
In the U.S. Homeland Security system architecture, the Public Safety and Security 
mission has been designed as an Emergency Support Function within the NRF. However, 
the design mindset o f this function in the NRF is incompetent, and the instructions and 
guidelines provided in the existing Public Safety and Security (ESF-13) annex do not 
comprise necessary details, particularly in terms of interaction with the other ESFs, which 
would support the accomplishment of security missions in severe conditions like 
catastrophic post-disaster periods.
Although the criticality and vulnerability assessment o f critical assets (which 
include critical infrastructures, facilities, state/public/private properties, etc.) in an urban
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area has a significant impact on the post-disaster security planning process, there is no 
model in practice which provides an urban area critical asset prioritization methodology 
with both a fuzzy multiple criteria decision making approach incorporating different 
system states, and multiple sets o f criteria that specifically address the post-disaster urban 
security unique characteristics.
5.2 Recommendations
Since the epistemological inconsistency and lack of necessary holistic system 
representation within the Homeland Security contextual structure is likely to produce 
more confusion, poorly educated staff, ill-designed organizational structures, and most 
importantly, improperly running operational functions, the contextual structure should be 
scrutinized seriously as a whole and further amendments applied to ensure the 
Emergency Management concept be transformed and adapted appropriately within the 
context o f Homeland Security.
Rather than evolutional, the system should be overseen through a transformational 
perspective by controlled, coordinated and unified efforts and common terminologies as 
it has been directed by the Presidential Policy Directive-8 (National Preparedness,
2011), and systems thinking, which is supported by the holistic vision should be utilized 
by the system stakeholders who have the stewardship responsibility.
Preliminarily, a complete organizational system analysis could be performed for 
further specification and clarification of the problem domain, and identification of the 
possible solutions from an 'independent vantage point' perspective, since the system's 
contextual structure dominated by the discussed problems is highly complex and
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extensive in scale, and linked to system's organizational and functional structures. A 
proposed roadmap for a Complete Complex Organizational System Analysis’ is included 
in APPENDIX I.
After the proposed analysis is complete, the contextual system architecture should 
be redesigned by including common terminologies and proper taxonomies. A Simplify- 
Unify-Integrate' rule could be adopted to consolidate the loose and fuzzy contextual 
clusters in the system. In that sense, without trying to paraphrase the differences between 
them, two critical mandates -  NIMS and NRF -  should be integrated to produce a single 
simple capstone document.
On the other hand, the potential dilemma “while complex systems require 
complex solutions38, simple approaches39 are preferred to deal with complexity” should 
be handled with the optimal decisions. While there is no golden rule for the optimal 
design of the system context (Figure 31), a successful system re-design could be 
accomplished with the utilization of a unique methodology which is exclusive to the 
system, and the employment o f qualified subject matter experts who have the holistic 
thinking capability as well as the necessary system content knowledge that is 
epistemologically consistent with the historical development process o f the system.
38 “In order to express a rich knowledge set that includes environment, contingencies, resources, possible actions and 
much more, we need a framework that allows us to represent knowledge in many facets or dimensions.” (Douglass and 
Mittal, 2013, p. 282)
39 Simplicity is central to reducing complexity in planning and it fosters a shared understanding o f the situation, the 
problem, and the solution (Stability Operations, 2008, p. 4-1).
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S i m p l i c i t y
Complexity
Figure 31 Optimal Design o f the System Context
With regard to the conceptual design of the Emergency Support Functions, the 
Joint Field Office (JFO), Incident Command (IC) and ESFs are the key elements in 
response and recovery operations within the integrated framework of NRF and NIMS. 
Theoretically, ESFs bridge the JFO to the IC to facilitate the four major functional areas: 
operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration, as depicted in Figure 32. In 
this framework, to eliminate the negative implications of the epistemological problems 
discussed, the role of the Emergency Management (ESF-5) should be re-designed 
conceptually and graphically in the existing context to ensure it oversees the whole 
framework as an overarching coordination function rather than a support function as the 
others, which are facilitated between the functional areas to link the support cycles [as it 
is delineated in the next paragraphs; also the role o f ESF-13 (Public Safety and Security) 
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Figure 32 Facilitation o f Functional Areas
While the contextual and structural architecture o f the system is re-designed 
properly and diverse functional mechanisms are let operate efficiently, the necessary 
figurative multi-dimensional holistic system representations which would provide a clear 
insight for the individuals and other stakeholders should also be included in the relevant 
capstone documents. The concept o f the multi-dimensional holistic system representation 
is depicted in Figure 33. The sample complex system represented in the figure includes 
different layers, components and sub-components accompanied by a great number of 
functions/entities that have networked in a fuzzy structure which has different clusters
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and relation patterns. The representations to be produced in a similar way would provide 
a useful guide for the system stakeholders to make top-down and bottom-up inquiries 
through the system architecture as well as drill down exploration in any cluster (even in 
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Figure 33 Multi -Dimensional Holistic System Representation
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Gheorghe and Vamanu (1996) discuss that “Emergency Planning, Preparedness 
and Management (EPPM) knowledge should be made available at the level o f widest 
conceivable use” (p. 15). In that sense, coherently well-designed contextual structures 
with multi-dimensional holistic figures would catalyze the circulation of necessary 
knowledge enhancing the situational awareness of the system stakeholders. The 
education and training initiatives should also leverage this approach to ensure the 
complex mega-systems are manned with qualified individuals and teams who have a deep 
insight on the system design and framework.
Public Safety and Security
The Public Safety and Security function plays a critical role within the NRF, since 
any serious failure in this function could cause the collapse o f the whole framework, 
especially during a post-disaster period. Thus, the decision makers should ensure they 
have necessary assets and reliable Public Safety and Security plans to establish security 
and public order in the disaster area so other disaster response/recovery missions are 
conducted coherently. A high level o f resiliency could be derived from the military 
perspective o f effective planning: If the security plan is developed based on the possible 
implications of the worst-case scenario, then it would work at its best during the 
implementation phase whatever the conditions could be.
In line with the essence of this assumption, the Public Safety and Security plans 
should be developed with a post-disaster security centric focus that addresses the 
implications of the worst-case scenario characteristics, and utilizes some principal drivers
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like 'holistic approach, systems thinking, proactive planning, applicable criteria and 
reliable data, simplicity, etc.' (Figure 34).
Post-Disaster Security 
Environment Characteristics

























Figure 34 Post-Disaster Security Environment Characteristics and Principal Drivers
for Potential Planning Solutions
Since the Public Safety and Security is highly critical for the facilitation of other 
follow-up disaster response and recovery missions, the Public Safety and Security plans 
(ESF-13) should be improved through the utilization o f models which can process 
multiple criteria and different system state variables to address the fuzzy characteristics 
o f the post-disaster urban security. In addition, the role of the ESF-13 should be modified 
in the NRF to let it function with a central, backdrop role. Having these done, it would 
possible to provide more granularity in the content o f the Public Safety and Security 
plans, ensuring they provide relevant stakeholders and other support functions with the 
supportive decision making and prioritization parameters [e.g.; secure lines of
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transportation, potential locations/coordinates of aid delivery points, shelters, deployable 
operations centers, security zones (safe havens that would be secured with the highest 
degree security measures during the crisis), etc. could be identified utilizing the outcomes 
of the PDSI Model],
The PDSI Model introduced in Chapter 4, which has been developed with a post­
disaster centric focus, should be utilized to develop resilient security plans to support 
other disaster response/recovery activities in emergency. Since the model offers to 
produce generalizable indices for the vulnerability assessment and prioritization of the 
critical assets in any urban environment, it would provide valuable insights for all level 
security planners to tackle with the complexities during any crisis.
Furthermore, with this model implemented, the emergency response framework 
would be reinforced, since its conceptual design has been developed to address the 
characteristics of worst case scenarios derived from the post-disaster urban environment. 
To enhance the resiliency and preparedness o f the response framework, a 'Baseline 
Security Plan,' which is to be developed through the utilization of possible PDSI Model 
outcomes could be accompanied with the other plans outlined in NRF Emergency 
Support Function -13 (2008)40. Previously discussed supportive decision making and 
prioritization parameters could easily be transferred to other ESFs as necessary.
40 Public Safety and Security (ESF-13) provides the conduit for utilizing and incorporating the extensive network o f 
public safety and security coordination established for steady-state prevention efforts through a variety o f interagency 
plans. Prevention and security plans include, but are not limited to, the following (Emergency Support Function 13,
2008, p. 2);
• National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
Sector-Specific Plans
• The National Strategy for Maritime Transportation Security 
Area Maritime Security Plans
• Vessel and Facility Security Plans
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The potential outcomes o f the PDSI Model follow:
• Utilization of realistic and precise (to the largest extent possible) assessment 
parameters41 (an example is depicted in Figure 35) in the security planning 
process in terms of:
-  Force tailoring (organization).
-  Unit positioning (deployment), identification of boundaries for each 
troop/unit.
-  Identification of the security operations techniques: Patrolling, Guard, 
ISR, Response/Reaction Force, etc. (e.g. identification of critical patrol 
clusters, identification of target prioritization requirements for ISR 
assets).
PDSI LEGEND
Figure 35 Depiction of PDSIs in Color Code
41 To be accompanied by Geographic Information Systems (GIS).
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• Better coordination and interoperability opportunities for the local and 
external support troops in all levels via detailed map overlays produced with the 
support of PDSI data sets.
•  Easy identification of the local and external support requirements from 
different resources (City Police, State Police, National Guard, Active Military, 
other State Agents or Federal Organizations). The PDSI Model provides 
generalizable indices that help identify the approximate security requirements.
•  Provision of valuable inputs to be used in exercises that should be realistic in 
scenario and consequences as requested by the National Security Strategy (2010).
• Support to strategic decision making. The implementation of the model in the 
city, state or country level would also provide critical insight for the strategic 
planning and decision making processes in terms of optimizing the mix of 
military Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) elements42 as 
well as Police and other security agents, and the strategic peacetime emplacement 
(geographic footprint) requirements o f these elements. This level o f planning has 
an inextricable link to the Homeland Security missions and most o f these 
elements are assigned for disaster response/recovery support operations as 
required.
42 The optimization o f the mix of military Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) elements has been 
requested by Strategic Guidance (2012) to make them best suited to what has been stated in the strategy.
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APPENDIX A - BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR THE SPECIFICATION 
OF ANALYSIS PROBLEMS
1. General and Coordination Issues:
The past three decades have presented the emergency management 
community with significant challenges and conditions that have necessitated 
reevaluation of strategic and operational approaches to delivering emergency 
management services. (FEMA Strategic Plan, 2011, p. 1)
This country has had a great deal o f experience with disasters, and it has 
been -  in many instances -  both innovative and successful in emergency 
management. In spite of its many advances in this burgeoning profession, the 
U.S. suffers from many problems that are both unique and similar to those 
that affect other countries. In addition, the U.S. has witnessed numerous 
setbacks and disappointing mistakes from which others may learn. (McEntire, 
(n.d.), p. 1)
While the United States has been a model for emergency management 
programs around the world, it is not without numerous weaknesses. The 
emergency management profession has much room for improvement in the 
U.S. as it does elsewhere. (McEntire, (n. d.), p. 18)
Topics such as the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the 
National Response Plan (NRP) are clearly and effectively described and 
explained, but virtually no research seems available to offer emergency 
managers concerning the usefulness or performance in practice o f NIMS and 
NRP. (Barbee, 2007, p. 4)
Homeland security is a step back from the proactive approaches being 
recommended today, and it de-emphasizes all hazards other than terrorism.
This rivalry among divergent and incomplete paradigms has created 
confusion for a discipline that so desperately needs both inclusion and 
direction. (McEntire, 2004, p. 8)
On the domestic front, federal security planners faced what seemed like an 
infinite amount o f pressing tasks, with no real ability to determine whether or 
not their work would turn out to be something like a military victory. Federal 
planners also faced a serious dilemma concerning the comprehensive nature 
o f the homeland security mission, the sheer number o f agencies involved at 
all levels o f government, and extensive private sector involvement.
Furthermore, the complicated daily workings of the Homeland Security 
Council and the President’s Office o f Homeland Security were accompanied 
by a maze-like jumble of congressional oversight and appropriations 
committees. (Hidek, 2010, p. 102)
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Another problem that must be addressed is coordination among all o f the 
actors involved in emergency management in the United States. Ways must 
be found to improve communication among all pertinent actors during 
disasters and work harmoniously to promote recovery in the aftermath of 
such events. (McEntire, (n. d.), p. 17)
As currently structured, the degree of fragmentation and antagonism between 
DHS and its institutional subcomponents have created a veritable 
‘uncoordinated network. (Hidek, 2010, p. 212)
The pre-9/11 planning designed to meet the new governmental mission of 
‘homeland defense’ focused on developing an ‘integrated intelligence’ and 
planning capability to support tactical antiterrorism objectives. The result 
was the emergence of a complex web of institutional relationships, 
generating clashes to come over function, purpose, and influence. (Hidek, 
2010, p. 99)
The American disaster response system functions admirably during the vast 
majority of disasters. The system quickly arranges for emergency shelter, 
food distribution, medical care, and monetary distributions to disaster 
victims. However, the disaster response system is imperfect since the 
coordination of these fragmented resources is extremely cumbersome. 
(Mener, 2007, p. 56)
Since 9/11, the principles of transparency, cooperation, and collaboration at 
the core o f disaster management appear to be replaced a new command-and- 
control-based domestic security system. Furthermore, security initiatives to 
protect cities have gone forward following the creation and subsequent 
reorganization of DHS, complicating shared governance. (Hidek, 2010, p.
51)
As we continue to search for more optimal pathways, we can expect 
domestic preparedness to be complicated by a national system where 
disasters are governed by multiple regulations -  namely the Stafford Act, the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Post Katrina Emergency Management 
Reform Act of 2006, and the National Response Framework. These many 
plans reflect the long history o f U.S. disaster policy, through which 
competing interests and groups have been cobbled together to build new 
agencies, and layers of statutes have been built upon existing guidelines 
without modifying previous statutes or reassessing the assumptions upon 
which they rest. (Hidek, 2010, p. 253)
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2. Poor Policy Formulation (Epistemological Problems) and Lack of 
T raining
The United States must acknowledge that disaster losses are rising and that a 
more proactive approach will be required (p. 17). Policy makers need to 
develop a more coherent disaster policy that is integrated at all levels of 
government (p. 18). Instead of writing emergency operations plans, we need 
to find ways to reduce vulnerability and enhance capabilities. (McEntire, 
(n.d.), p. 17)
If you surveyed my American colleagues, you would find little to no 
understanding of the disaster response system. Virtually nobody has read the 
426 page all-hazards plan titled the National Response Plan, and with the 
exception o f some major cities, few emergency response agencies have 
reinforced or protected emergency infrastructure. (Mener, 2007, p. 2)
Poor policy formulation and lack of training limit the ability o f public 
officials to prevent disasters or react to them in an effective manner. 
(McEntire, (n.d.), p. 4)
There is not an established Emergency Management Doctrine. (Blanchard, 
2007, p. 3)
Although there is obviously a need to develop a theory of emergency 
management, there is no guarantee that this task will be easy. In fact, there 
are several major epistemological problems that are hindering the 
development o f knowledge in this area. (McEntire, 2004, p. 5)
To be successful, emergency managers need sufficient knowledge, training, 
and experience to be able to navigate within the bigger waters. (Blanchard, 
2007, p. 3)
An epistemological hurdle hinges on the definition o f emergency 
management, which is analogous to the conceptual problem of disaster. The 
term emergency management has at least two significant defects. The very 
name o f the field we study is a misnomer. Emergency managers are not 
really concerned about emergencies; they are instead interested in larger 
events that have community-wide impact. (McEntire and Marshall 2003, p. 
222)
There are serious epistemological problems facing those who study 
emergency management. These challenges range from disagreement about 
theoretical concepts and faulty assumptions about the human role in disasters 
to disputes about the inclusion of various disciplines and the relative merit of 
competing paradigms. (McEntire and Marshall 2003, p. 226)
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Emergency Management is an oxymoron. It may unintentionally suggest 
that we can control or always effectively deal with extreme events. While it 
is true that we are able to prevent some disasters or reduce their adverse 
impacts, we are less likely to manage our responses to these events in a 
totally effective manner. (McEntire and Marshall 2003, p. 223)
The term “emergency management” has at least three significant problems. 
First, as scholars we are really interested in disasters, not emergencies. 
Second, the focus on “emergency” makes the field reactive and limits its 
applicability to first responders. Third, emergency management may imply 
that we have total control in our ability to deal with the adverse occurrences 
we call disasters. Hence, emergency management is both a misnomer and an 
oxymoron. But a suitable replacement has not been found, and one may 
never be accepted due to the increasing professional recognition o f the name 
emergency management. (McEntire, 2004, p. 5)
The current language of emergency management (and homeland security) 
seems to confirm the theorems suggested by Kaplan (Baird, 2010, p. 42): 
Theorem 1: 50% of the problems in the world result from people 
using the same words with different meanings.
Theorem 2: The other 50% comes from people using different words 
with the same meaning.
The four phases of emergency management present an additional 
epistemological problem and the complexities of these phases have already 
been explored by researchers in terms of overlap and fluidity. (McEntire and 
Marshall 2003, p. 224)
Although the “four phases” are part of the common language and theoretical 
underpinning o f emergency management in the U.S., a number of 
adaptations can be found. Some sources now refer to five phases rather than 
four. Others have changed the descriptive terms for one or more o f the 
phases. Important sources appear to disagree on the language, and a number 
o f government publications examined as part o f this research are more 
confusing than informative. (Baird, 2010, p. 7)
Adding to the confusion, the core National Response Framework document 
also refers to “the three phases o f effective response: prepare, respond, and 
recover”. That is not a typo, three phases of response. (Baird, 2010, p. 10)
Confusing matters a bit, after the creation of the Department o f Homeland 
Security, RAND Corporation employees under contract to DHS to develop 
the National Response Plan and the National Incident Management System 
invented their own terminology -  what I call the Five Phases o f Homeland 
Security: Prevention, Mitigation, Readiness, Response and Recovery. This 
new terminology was invented, according to those I have communicated with
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who came into contact with RAND personnel during the review phase of the 
earlier conceptions o f the NRP, to play to the law enforcement and 
intelligence communities and their mission o f preventing terrorism. As 
noted earlier, emergency management and homeland security are not 
synonymous. The newly invented Five Phases of Homeland Security 
operate within Homeland Security and do not supplant or replace the Four 
Phases of Emergency Management -  which is, again, all-hazards, all-phases, 
all-actors. (Blanchard, 2007, p. 19)
Despite having responded to thousands of natural disasters and numerous 
terrorist attacks, at present the United States government at the federal, state, 
and local levels is exceedingly unprepared to handle the immediate 
aftereffects o f disasters. The federal government has created numerous large 
bureaucracies and congressional panels as well as generated hundreds of 
official reports each of which purports to detail appropriate disaster response 
guidelines. Nonetheless, the improvements since the first disaster response 
plan was implemented during World War I are not palpable. (Mener, 2007, 
p. 3)
Blanchard (2007) acknowledges the communication o f Mike Selves, the 
Emergency Manager for Johnson County Kansas, and President of the International 
Association of Emergency Managers, a summary follows as:
.. .Our current problems with FEMA and the role of emergency management 
in the federal structure stems, in my humble opinion, almost entirely from 
the lack of any generally understanding or acceptance of these basics... We 
are requiring NIMS training of virtually everyone in the country, what good 
is NIMS training if you don't understand the context within which NIMS 
must operate. The current screw up o f preparedness and response concepts 
at the Federal level is due to this problem of defining everything using an 
"emergency services" first responder framework. Our efforts on Capitol Hill 
have only bom any fruit at all because we are finally getting some key 
members and staffers to understand this bigger picture. The system is not 
failing because first responders need more attention; it is failing because the 
coordinators and decision-makers need more attention... (p. 2)
...one of the biggest challenges emergency managers face, as a profession, 
is dispelling the misconception that our function is simply the sum total o f 
the efforts and resources of the emergency services. The public can identify 
with firefighters, police and EMTs. However, the idea that there is a 
profession of public administration, called Emergency Management, whose 
job is to facilitate the creation o f basic disaster policy framework and to 
coordinate the implementation of the policy during a disaster, is not well 
understood. Our job ties together not only the responders but also the 
decision makers, public and private agencies not normally associated with 
emergency response and a whole array of other elements of the local 
community before, during and after any disaster event... (p. 6)
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APPENDIX B - SECURITY OPERATIONS
During the long history o f Homeland Security, including 'disaster response,'
which dates back to 1800s, military doctrine has had a significant role in the development
of relevant concepts linked to disaster response activities, particularly Public Safety and
Security. As Neiman (2001) and Hidek (2010) discussed in a similar way, Mener (2007)
highlights the security aspects of the military doctrine on the disaster management:
The overwhelming influence of the military doctrine on the disaster 
management and security related planning efforts is undeniable since the 
historical references o f the military knowledge dates back for a long time.
When federal disaster management was necessary, the military was the 
primary coordinator and source of manpower, (p. 7)
In the military literature, although 'security' usually implies defensive 
characteristics,43 it is one of the twelve principles o f Joint Operations. Joint Publication 
3-0 (Joint Operations, 2011) states “the purpose of security is to prevent the enemy from 
acquiring unexpected advantage; security enhances freedom o f action by reducing 
friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise” (p. A-3), while Offense and 
Defense (2012) states “the ultimate goal of security operations is to protect the force from 
surprise and reduce the unknowns in any situation. Security operations encompass five 
tasks: screen, guard, cover, area security, and local security” (p. 5-3). In the context o f the 
Joint Security Operations concept, the key joint security related functions and nodes are 
depicted in Figure 36.
43 There are five general characteristics o f the successful defense: preparation, security, disruption, massing effects, and 
flexibility (Urban operations, 2006, p. 8-1).
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KEY JOINT SECURITY AREA  
RELATED FUNCTIONS/NODES
FUNCTIONS | NODES I
Force Projection | Airbases/Airfields/Forward |
Movement Control § Arming and Refueling Points |
Sustainment § Seaports |
Command and Control 1 Sea Bases |
Figure 36 Key Joint Security Functions and Nodes (Joint Security Operations in
Theater, 2010, p. 1-6)
Stability Operations (2008) defines the basic elements of the security sector and 
their characteristics: “The security sector consists of both uniformed forces - police and 
military - and civilian agencies and organizations operating at various levels within the 
operational environment. Elements o f the security sector are interdependent; the activities 
of one element significantly affect other elements” (p. 6-13). In a wider context, the 
excerpts in Table 17 provide a panoramic perspective for the concept o f Security 
Operations, which has been delineated in various military references.
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Table 17 Security Operations
JP 3-07, Stability 
Operations, (2011)
Population Security. To provide protection to the population, 
JFCs employ a range of techniques (p. III-15);
(1) Static protection o f key sites (e.g., market places or 
refugee camps)
(2) Persistent security in areas secured and held (e.g., 
intensive patrolling and check points)
(3) Targeted action against adversaries (e.g., search or strike 
operations)
(4) Population control measures (e.g., curfews and vehicle 
restrictions).




Active Security. The active Lines o f Communications (LOC) 
security techniques include measures initiated to achieve positive 




(3) Fighting positions along LOCs
(4) Check points
(5) Route sweeps









Fixed Site Security techniques. Commanders may combine and 
vary these techniques according to the local situation (p. III-3);
(1) Periodic observation by patrols, to include over flights
(2) Obstacles
(3) Electronic monitoring
(4) Guards -  periodic or permanent
(5) Patrols should make periodic, random checks o f guard 
posts
FM 3-21.8, The 
Infantry Rifle 
Platoon and Squad, 
(2007)








(8) Movement to contact
(9) Dismounted, mounted, and air insertion
(10) Roadblocks
(11) Checkpoints













FM 3-21.8, The 
Infantry Rifle 
Platoon and Squad, 
(2007)
Security in the defense includes all active and passive measures 
taken to avoid detection by the enemy, deceive the enemy, and 
deny enemy reconnaissance elements accurate information on 
friendly positions. The two primary tools available to the platoon 
leader are Observation Posts and Patrols (p. 8-21).
ATTP 3-39.10, 
Law and Order 
Operations, (2011)
Law Enforcement specific activities include (p. 3-8);
(1) Police station operations
(2) LE patrolling
(3) Traffic enforcement operations
(4) Criminal investigations
(5) Employment o f forensic and biometric capabilities





Area Security. Military Police activities that support Area 
Security include reconnaissance operations, Area Damage Control 
(ADC), base and Air Base Defense (ABD), response force 






Security. Early warning of pending actions ensures the base 
commander time to react to any insurgent threat. Outposts, patrols, 
ground surveillance and counter mortar radar, military working 






Military Police support law-enforcement operations by (p.3-2);
(1) Providing liaison teams with local, state, and federal 
agencies; Host Nation police; and joint and multinational 
agencies.
(2) Employing Special Reactions Teams and hostage- 
negotiation teams.
(3) Providing traffic enforcement, Main Supply Route 
regulation enforcement, and other route-control measures.
(4) Employing Military Working Dogs.
(5) Conducting Military Police investigations (criminal and 
noncriminal).
(6) Conducting patrolling, area security, and surveillance 
measures.
(7) Implementing applicable threat-condition measures.
(8) Conducting and implementing other law-enforcement 
measures as required by the commander.
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As a snapshot that epitomizes the whole picture, the techniques or missions 
employed in security operations could be classified into four groups: active security, 
early warning, static physical security and other techniques (listed in Table 18). Within 
these techniques, patrol or patrolling' is the most significant, and mostly employed 
technique for uniformed forces to maintain the security o f urban areas. The quotes 
included in Table 19 provide insight that supports the rationale behind this assumption. 
Usually patrols are executed by the Patrol Divisions o f Police Departments in the sectors 
assigned within borders o f the jurisdiction.






Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR)
Static Physical Security 
Techniques
Fences, Barriers, Intrusion 
Detections Systems, Lighting, etc.
Other Techniques
Curfew, Restrictions, Criminal 
Investigations, Employment of 
Forensic and Biometric 
Capabilities, etc.
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Providing basic law enforcement assistance to Federal, 
State, tribal, and local agencies during incidents that 
require a coordinated Federal response. Such assistance 
may include conducting routine patrol functions and 




Police services are provided to communities using a variety 
o f traditional and non-traditional means, including marked 
patrol units, bicycle patrol, walking beats, and concentrated 
enforcement sweeps (p. 34).
Select Bipartisan 
Committee (2006)
These agencies brought a wide array of capabilities and 
tactical teams to help restore and maintain law and order. 
Most o f the federal personnel were deputized as state law 
enforcement officials, so they could fully partner with local 
police by participating in patrols, investigating crimes, and 
arresting suspects (p. 242).
The Louisiana National Guard was deployed before 
landfall, and provided security at the Superdome that 
helped maintain order there. Once looting broke out in 
New Orleans, they also patrolled the streets (p. 242).
In the context of military concept of operations, other techniques like Guard' and
'Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance' (ISR) are also critical for the
sustainment of security. They are usually performed with patrol missions to support each
other. The deployment of response' or reaction' forces is a common practice to
maintain the security of military bases or base clusters when necessary. Brief explanatory
information is included below:
Patrol. The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad (2007) defines 'patrol,' which is the
major technique in practice for the execution of security operations:
A patrol is sent out by a larger unit to conduct a specific combat, 
reconnaissance, or security mission. The terms “patrolling” or “conducting a 
patrol” are used to refer to the semi-independent operation conducted to
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accomplish the patrol’s mission. Patrols require a specific task and purpose.
(p. 9-1)
Guard. A guard force is “an effective and useful component o f a facility’s 
physical security program” (Physical Security Handbook, 2005, p. 61). A guard is “a 
security task to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while also observing and 
reporting information and preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against 
the main body” (Offense and Defense, 2012, p. 5-3). Guard is a term used when referring 
to:
• A special unit responsible to the officer o f the day for the protection and 
security of an installation or area.
• An individual responsible to keep watch over, protect, shield, defend, 
warn, or any duties prescribed by general orders and/or special orders 
(Guard Duty, 1971, p. 2-2).
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). ISR is “an activity that 
synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation o f sensors, assets, and processing, 
exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support o f current and future 
operations” (Operations, 2011, p. 4-8).
ISR “identifies information gaps and the most appropriate assets for collecting 
information to fill them; ISR synchronization considers all assets - both internal and 
external to the organization” (Operations, 2011, p. 4-8). Within this context, satellites, 
radars, detection sensors, stationary or mobile cameras, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), 
planes, helicopters, etc. are the most common ISR assets utilized in military and police
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security operations. Buddelmeyer (2007) underlines the significance of ISR assets which
have supported the Hurricane Katrina post-disaster activities:
Hurricane Katrina also demonstrated the exceptional value o f military 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets for use in 
disaster relief operations. For the first time, Air Force, Air National 
Guard, and DHS ISR assets were called to domestic contingency 
service to provide imagery and full-motion video to military decision­
makers and on-scene response providers, (p. 26)
Response/Reaction Force. Military Police Operations (2001) states that “a 
response force is summoned when the base or base cluster is faced with threat forces that 
are beyond their self-defense capability” (p. 3-7), while Tactics (2001) states “the 
response force moves quickly to counter the enemy before he can extensively damage the 
base; the base commander lifts or shifts base defense fires to support the maneuver o f the 
response force” (p. E-28). Tactics in Counterinsurgency (2009) also defines the Quick 
Reaction Force (QRF) as “a designated organization for any immediate response 
requirement that occurs in a designated area o f operation; a QRF increases the overall 
flexibility o f a base defense and is available for contingencies” (p. 6-12). In a similar 
vein, Physical Security (2010) groups the forces that respond to major threats on military 
installations in the following categories (p. 9-3):
•  Emergency responders
•  Special reaction teams
• Other response forces
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APPENDIX C -  URBAN AREA DEFENSE
Public Safety and Security in the context o f the post-disaster urban environment 
can be best linked to Urban Area Defense in the military concept o f operations. However, 
as already been said before, there is limited information in the military literature 
regarding the identification of force tailoring and unit positioning requirements of the 
troops to be deployed, or security operations techniques which could be executed in the 
post-disaster urban area.
In the context o f Military security concept o f operations; the security paradigm is 
usually managed through the principles o f MDMP as a common approach applied for all 
military actions that requires the commander's decision. For the particular requirements 
linked to post-disaster urban security, the military references usually advice general 
approaches and techniques without providing specified direction, guidance, criteria sets, 
etc.
In this sense, the following paragraphs, which represent the best tangible military 
considerations, have been excerpted from Urban Operations (2006). They could be 
exploited during the assessment o f post-disaster urban security requirements noted in this 
research:
The urban operational framework - understand, shape, engage, consolidate, 
and transition - provides structure to developing considerations for defensive 
operations. The considerations can vary depending on the level o f war at 
which the operation is conducted, the type o f defense, and the situation. Most 
issues discussed may, in the right circumstances, apply to both commanders 
conducting major Urban Operations and commanders at lower tactical levels 
of command, (p. 8-9)
The urban operational framework assists commanders in visualizing urban 
operations. This framework is simply an aid to the commander. It is not
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sequential, nor is it a planner’s tool for phasing an operation. Commanders 
should combine the urban operational framework with (p. 6-1):
• The principles of war.
• The tenets of Army operations.
• The components of operational design.
• Considerations for stability operations and civil support operations.
• Sustainment characteristics.
• Running estimates.
• Commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR).
• Each commander’s experience.
The commander defending in the urban area must assess many factors. His 
mission statement and guidance from higher commanders help him focus his 
assessment. If the mission is to deny a threat access to port facilities in an 
urban area, the commander’s assessment will be focused much differently 
than if the mission is to deny the threat control over the entire urban area. The 
mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time 
available, civil considerations (METT-TC)44 structure guides the 
commander’s assessment. Of these, the impacts o f the threat and 
environment—to include the terrain, weather, and civil considerations— are 
significant to the commander’s understanding of urban defensive operations, 
(p. 8-9)
In the urban defense, a key element is the commander’s understanding of the 
threat. One o f his primary concerns is to determine the attacker’s general 
scheme, methodology, or concept. Overall, the attacker may take one o f two 
approaches. The most obvious would be a direct approach aimed at seizing 
the objectives in the area by a frontal attack. A more sophisticated approach 
would be indirect and begin by isolating Army forces defending the urban 
area. Innumerable combinations of these two extremes exist, but the threat’s 
intentions toward the urban area will favor one approach over another. The 
defending Army commander (whose AO includes but is not limited to the 
urban area) conducts defensive planning, particularly his allocation o f forces, 
based on this initial assessment of threat intentions. This assessment 
determines whether the commander’s primary concern is preventing isolation 
by defeating threat efforts outside the area or defeating a threat attacking the 
urban area directly. For the higher commander, this assessment determines 
how he allocates forces in and outside the urban area. For the commander in 
the urban area, this assessment clarifies threats to sustainment operations and 
helps shape how he arrays his forces, (p. 8-9)
44 METT-TC is a memory aid that identifies the mission variables: Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, Troops and 
support available, Time available, and Civil considerations. It is used in information management (the major categories 
o f relevant information) and in tactics (the major variables considered during mission analysis). Mission analysis 
describes characteristics o f the area of operations in terms o f METT-TC, focusing on how they might affect the mission 
(Operations, 2011, 6-8).
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A second key assessment is the defensive qualities o f the urban environment. 
This understanding, as in any defensive scenario, is based on mission 
requirements and on a systemic analysis of the terrain in terms of observation 
and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and 
concealment (OAKOC), It is also based on potential chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear and fire hazards that may be present in the urban area. 
This understanding accounts for the unique characteristics o f urban terrain, 
population, and infrastructure, (p. 8-9)
Generally, units occupy less terrain in urban areas than more open areas. For 
example, an infantry company, which might occupy 1,500 to 2,000 meters in 
open terrain, is usually restricted to a frontage of 300 to 800 meters in urban 
areas. The density of building in the urban area, building sizes and heights, 
construction materials, rubble, and street patterns will dictate the actual 
frontage of units; however, for initial planning purposes, Table 20 provides 
approximate frontages and depths for units defending in an urban area. (p. 8-
9)
Table 20 Approximate Defensive Frontages and Depths (Urban Operations, 2006,
p. 8-10)
UNIT Frontage (Blocks*) Depth (Blocks*)
Battalion 4 - 8 3 - 6
Company 3 - 4 2 - 3
Platoon 1 - 2 1
‘Average block is 175 meters
Furthermore, the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is a 
methodology which allows commanders to develop the situational 
understanding necessary to visualize, describe, and direct subordinates in 
successfully accomplishing the mission especially when the complexity o f the 
urban environment and increased number o f variables (and their infinite 
combinations) increases the difficulty o f providing timely, relevant, and 
effective intelligence support to urban operations), (p. B-l)
IPB is the systematic process o f analyzing the threat and environment in a 
specific geographic area - the area o f operations (AO) and its associated area 
of interest (see Figure 37). It provides the basis for intelligence support to 
current and future UO, drives the military decision-making process, and 
supports targeting and battle damage assessment. The procedure is performed 




















Figure 37 Steps of IPB (Urban Operations, 2006, p. B -l)
192
APPENDIX D -  MEASUREMENT OF BASIC CRITICALITY INDEX (BCI)
The BCI provides a relative score between 0 and 1. BCI, for each critical asset, is 
obtained through the process of the formula which is included in the relevant key 
sector/service row at Table 21.
Table 21 Basic Criticality Index (BCI) Assessment Matrix
No
1
Urban Area Key Sectors/Services
Governance, Homeland Security,
Law Public Order, Emergency Service BCI1
BCI(i)
SI x (SRW1 UEW1)
2 Housing Accommodation BCI2
BCD
52 x (EW2 U OW2)
53 x (SRW3 U EW3)3
Power Energy Service (Power plants, 
nuclear reactors, dams, fitel supply 
stations, etc.)
4 Healthcare and Public Health BCI4 S4 x (SRW4 U EW4)
5
Telecommunication (including 
Information Technology) BCD S5 x (SRW5 U EW5)
6
Transportation Postal and Shipping 
Service (including airports, major 
transportation terminals)
BCI6 S6 x (SRW6 U EW6)
7 Food Water and Other Goods Service (Shopping malls, major retail, etc.) BCI7 S7 x (EW7 U SW7)
8 Banking and Finance (including banks ATMs, etc.) BCI8 S8 x (SRW8 U EW8)
9
Critical Manufacturing (including major 
industrial facilities) BCI9 S9 x (EW9 U IW9)
10
Training and Education Activities 
(including schools) BCI10 S10 x(EW10 U STW 10)
11
Worship Activities (Places of worship, 
etc.)
BCI 11 S ll x (EW11 USCW11)
Variables: Si: Scaling Constant: SRW: Service Relativity Weight; EW: Employment Weight; 
OW: Occupancy Weight; SW: Size Weight; IW: Investment Weight: STW: Student Capacity 
Weight; SCW: Seating Capacity Weight
The combination rule for the formulas: A U B = (A+B) - (AxB)
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Measurement of the Variables43
1. Scaling Constant (Si):
The Scaling Constant is a number between 0 and 1 which indicates the relative 
importance o f each urban area key sector/service component with respect to each other 
(Table 22). To ensure consistency throughout the assessment process, scaling constants 
should be assigned by local, state or federal authorities centrally, and the assigned 
weights should be applied for all assets located at the assessment area o f responsibility.
Table 22 Scaling Constant Matrix (Relative Importance of Urban Area Key
Sectors/Services)
No Urban Area Key Sectors/Services Scaling Constant (Si)
1




PowerEnergy Service (Power plants, nuclear reactors, 
dams, fuel supply stations, etc.)
4 Healthcare and Public Health
5 Telecommunication (including Information Technology)
6
Transportation/Postal and Shipping Service (including 
airports, major transportation terminals)
7
Food/Water and Other Goods Service (Shopping malls, 
major retail, etc.)
8 Banking and Finance (including banks/ATMs, etc.)
9
Critical Manufacturing (including major industrial 
facilities)
10 Training and Education Activities (including schools)
11 Worship Activities (Places o f worship, etc.)
45 Measurement o f the variables should be performed by the subject matter experts and the scales assigned for each 
assessment matrix should be optimized in future with further experimentation to produce more precise results.
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2. Service Relativity Weight (SRW):
Service Relativity Weight is a number between 0 and 1 (see Table 23) that 
indicates the relative importance of the asset with respect to ones that perform similar 
functions in that specific sector/service which is one of the 12 key urban area 
sectors/services.
Table 23 Service Relativity Weight Assessment Matrix
Service Relativity Weight (SRW )
Semantic Description Seven-level linguistic scale





E i 1 —
o f the asset with respect 3 3 = 1 ! =
to ones which perform N









similar functions in that Numerical scale
specific sector/service 1 j
0.01 0.1 0.2-0.3 0.4 0.5-0.6 0.7 ; 0.8-0.9 1
3. Employment Weight (EW):
Employment Weight is a number between 0 and 1 (see Table 24) that indicates 
the relative weight of the asset with respect to employee occupancy during day and night.
Table 24 Employment Weight Assessment Matrix
Employment Weight (EW)
e
Approximate Q2 o oe






6 2 ô3n «*> V i 3 00 <
Day (D) 0 .01 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Occupancy
Time
Night (N) 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
EW (D+N)/2
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4. Occupancy Weight (OW):
Occupancy Weight is a number between 0 and 1 (see Table 25) that indicates the
relative weight of the asset with respect to approximate inhabitant/visitor occupancy
during day and night.







































Day (D) 0.01 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Time
Night (N) 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
OW (D+N)/2
5. Size Weight (SW):
Size Weight is a number between 0 and 1 (see Table 26) that indicates the relative 
weight of the asset with respect to the size o f itself (the weight which locates at box of 
intersection of the matching story number row and size column gives the relative weight).
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Single Story 1 0.01 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
2-3 0.025 0.125 0.225 0.325 0.425 0.525 0.625 0.725 0.825 0.925
4-5 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85 0.95
Multistorey
6-10 0.075 0.175 0.275 0.375 0.475 0.575 0.675 0.775 0.875 0.975
Above 10 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
6. Investment Weight (IW):
Investment Weight is a number between 0 and 1 (see Table 27) that indicates the 
relative weight o f the asset with respect to the amount of the money invested for it.
Table 27 Investment Weight Assessment Matrix
Investm ent W eight (IW)
o s ©e
A m ount of © 9 oe § © ©
Investm ent ow> o©
®e e© e© ©
©©







13 © ©o ©o e o o © © ©CQ IT. Vi mm N mm Vi <
IW 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 l
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7. Student Capacity Weight (STW):
Student Capacity Weight is a number between 0 and 1 (see Table 28) that 
indicates the relative weight o f the training and education related asset with respect to the 
amount of the student capacity that the asset offers.
Table 28 Student Capacity Weight Assessment Matrix
Student Capacity Weight (STW)
Student
Capacity

























« OS *— N tr, C
STW 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
8. Seating Capacity Weight (SCW)
Seating Capacity Weight is a number between 0 and 1 (see Table 29) that 
indicates the relative weight of the worship related asset with respect to the amount o f the 
seating capacity that the asset offers.
Table 29 Seating Capacity Weight Assessment Matrix
















Capacity N ©  ir< ©30 N Ni «*aj V31 1 Cl










SCW 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
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APPENDIX E -  MEASUREMENT OF INPUT VARIABLES
1. Scaling Constants (sc):
The Scaling Constants (sc) are numbers between 0 and 1 which indicates the 
relative importance of each criterion in comparison with the others (Table 30). Scaling 
Constants are assigned by subject matter experts.





Number o f Inhabitants/Visitors sc2
Size/Area sc3
Traffic Access/Mobility sc4
2. Vulnerability Indexes of the Critical Asset per each Criterion:
a. V(C1): Vulnerability Index of the Critical Asset for Physical Security:
Physical Security Vulnerability Index V(C1) for each critical asset is obtained 
through the utilization of Table 31, 32, 33, 34. V(C1) provides a weight between 0 and 
10 .
Table 31 Physical Security Vulnerability Index
Physical Security Vulnerability Index - V(C1)
l Perimeter security index (Vp)
2 Building envelope wall type index (Vw)
3 Building envelope fenestration index (Vf)
V(C1) = (Vp+Vw+Vf) /  3
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Table 32 Perimeter Security Index
Perimeter Security Index (Vp)
Semantic Description
The overall efficiency o f  perim eter fences/w alls, 



















Ten-point numerical scale (V)
Vp
10 8-9 6-7 4-5 2-3 0.1
Table 33 Building Envelope Wall Type Index
Building Envelope Wall Type Index (Vw)*
W all Type
M ean value of 
standoff distances 
(Ms) (ft)
Normalized W all 
Type Index 
Vw= M s/M sm ax*10
Reinforced Concrete 29.5 1.2
Reinforced Masonry 38.5 1.6
Girts 53.3 2.2
Wood Studs -  Brick Veneer 58.3 2.5
European Block 66.8 2.8
M etal Panels 88.5 3.7
Unreinforced Masonry 110.5 4.6
M etal Studs -  Brick Veneer 120.4 5.1
Wood Studs -  EIFS 126.4 5.3
M etal Studs -  EIFS 237.9 10
* Wall Type Index values have been derived from the mean values of the 
conventional construction standoff distances identified for each type of 
the wall (Unified Facilities Criteria, 2012, p.51). The Wall Type Index 
represent the weight of the asset s vulnerability in terms of the 
protection degree of them.
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Table 34 Building Envelope Fenestration Index
Building Envelope Fenestration Index (Vf)
The percentage of the 
area of glazed surface 
in each facade (%)
5 5-10 10-15 15-30 30-45 45-70 70-100
Index Value* 1 2 3 4 5-6 7-8 9-10
Vf 2  V i * * /  (Total number of fagades+1)
Vi: Utility value for each facade/direction
*  Index Value scale represent the general guidelines for windows and glazing 
delineated in FEMA 426 (Reference Manual, 2003).
**U tility  value for the primary facade (street side) is doubled while processing 
the formula since it is exposed to potential threats directly.
b. V(C2): Vulnerability Index of the Critical Asset for Number of 
Inhabitants/Visitors:
Inhabitant/Visitor Number Vulnerability Index V(C2) for each critical asset 
is obtained through the utilization of Table 35. V(C2) provides a weight between 0 and 
10.
Table 35 Inhabitant/Visitor Number Vulnerability Index












of Inhabitants/Visitors 3o fM1 int tHi io Io Io ■o ■o sn
CO H CM in H <N m in <
Day (D) 0 .1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Occupancy
Time
Night (N) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0
V(C2) (D+N)/2
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c. V(C3): Vulnerability Index o f  the Critical Asset for Size/Area:
Size/Area Vulnerability Index V(C3) for each critical asset is obtained 
through the utilization of Table 36. V(C3) provides a weight between 0 and 10.
Table 36 Size/Area Vulnerability Index























































Single Story l 0.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2-3 0.25 1.25 2.25 3.25 4.25 5.25 6.25 7.25 8.25 9.25
4-5 0.5 1.5 2.5 3.5 4.5 5.5 6.5 7.5 8.5 9.5
Multistorey
6-10 0.75 1.75 2.75 3.75 4.75 5.75 6.75 7.75 8.75 9.75
Above 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
V(C3)
d. V(C4): Vulnerability Index of the Critical Asset for Traffic Access/Mobility: 
Traffic Access/Mobility Vulnerability Index V(C4) for each critical asset is 
obtained through the utilization of Table 37, 38, 39, 40, 41. V(C4) provides a weight 
between 0 and 10.
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Table 37 Traffic Access/M obility Vulnerability Index
Traffic A ccess /M o b ility  V u lnerab ility  Index - V(C4)
l Periphery Road Width Index (Vp)
2 Adjacent Primary Roads Proximity Index (Va)
3 Bridge D ependency Index (Vb)
4 Transportation Terminals Proximity Index (Vt)
V(C4) = (Vp+Va+Vb+Vt) /  4
Table 38 Periphery Road Width Index
P eriphery  Road W idth  Index (Vr)
Road surfacing w idth (including  
median w idth)
(f t )*
No Road Below 25 25-50 50-80 80-150 Above 150
Index Value 10 8-9 6-7 4-5 2-3 1
The 
roads/streets  
encircling the  
asset
North side (N i)
East side (Ei)
South side (Si)
West side (W i)
Vr (Ni+Ei+Si+Wi) /  4
•  Street patterns (and widths) influence all warfighting functions; however, they greatly  
affect m ovem ent and maneuver, command and control, and sustainment (Urban 
Operations, 2006, p. 6). Street w idths are grouped into three m ajor classes (Combined Arms 
Operations in Urban Terrain, 2011, p. A - l l ) ;
• Seven to  15 m eters, located in o lder historical sections o f pre-industrial cities.
• Fifteen to  25 m eters, located in new er planned sections o f most cities.
• Tw enty-five to  50 m eters, located along broad boulevards or set far apart on large 
parcels o f land.
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Table 39 Adjacent Primary Roads Proximity Index
A djacen t Prim ary R oads Proxim ity  In d ex  (Va)
Approximate distance 




































































E xpressw ays/In terstates
(with 4  o r  m ore lanes) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
(Eli)
A rterials/C ollectors (with
2 o r m ore lanes) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
(ACi)
Va (Eli+ACi)/2
Table 40 Bridge Dependency Index
Bridge D ependency  Index (Vb)
Semantic Description
The level o f  dependency  to  bridges (one o r 
m ore) for access to  th e  asset w ithin a circle 
















0.1 2-3 4-5 6-7 8-9 10
Table 41 Transportation Terminals Proximity Index
Transportation Term inals Proximity Index (Vt)
Approximate distance to
the nearest transportation H o«a-
terminals 3o in oH
H fM IN m m 01
o
(mi) o>CO H ID vHtH VOtH tHfM IDfM tHm IDm -Q<
Airport (APi) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
W aterw ay Terminal (WTi) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Railway Terminal (RTi) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Vt (APi+WTi+RTi) /  3
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3. Vulnerability Index Modifiers of the Critical Asset per each Possible System 
State:
a. M(S1): Vulnerability Index Modifier o f the Critical Asset for Offences against 
Property:
Vulnerability Index Modifier for Offences against Property (M(S1) for each 
critical asset is obtained through the utilization of Table 42. M(S1) provides a weight 
between 0 and 1.
Table 42 Vulnerability Index Modifier for Offences against Property
V u ln e ra b ili ty  In d e x  M o d if ie r  f o r  O f fe n c e s  a g a in s t  P r o p e r ty  - M (S 1)
System State (SI)
Offences Against Property (like looting,larceny/theft, 
burglary, arson, motor vehicle theft etc.)
Semantic Description Seven-level linguistic scale
Since the asset has 
substantial 
material/property which 
could attract criminals, it
h as ...........probability of
having 'Offences Against 



























0.1 0.2-0.3 0.4 0.5-0.6 0.7 0.8-0.9 1
M(S1)
b. M(S2): Vulnerability Index Modifier o f the Critical Asset for Offences against 
Persons:
Vulnerability Index Modifier for Offences against Persons (M(S2) for each 
critical asset is obtained through the utilization o f Table 43. M(S2) provides a weight 
between 0 and 1.
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Table 43 Vulnerability Index Modifier for Offences against Persons
V ulnerability  Index M odifier fo r O ffences ag a in s t P ersons - M(S2)
System State (S2)
Offences Against Persons [like murder, sexual assault, 
robbery, etc.]
Semantic Description Seven-level linguistic scale
Since the a sse t is to  have 
isolated charateristics in 
terms of location and building 
structure which exposes an 
attractive target for roving
criminals, it h a s ..........
probability of having Offences 





















0.1 0.2-0.3 0 .4  0.5-0.6 0.7 0.8-0.9
c. M(S3): Vulnerability Index Modifier o f the Critical Asset for Terrorist 
Attacks/ Warfare Threats:
Vulnerability Index Modifier for Terrorist Attacks/ Warfare Threats (M(S3) 
for each critical asset is obtained through the utilization of Table 44. M(S3) provides a 
weight between 0 and 1.
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Table 44 Vulnerability Index Modifier for Terrorist Attacks/ Warfare Threats
V ulnerability Index M odifier for Terrorist A ttack s/ C onventional W arfare
T hreats - M(S3)
System S tate (S3)
Terrorist A ttacks/ Conventional W arfare Threats 
(aggregated  assau lts , sabo tages, etc.)
Semantic Description Seven-level linguistic scale
Since th e  a s se t is a potential high 
value targ e t having e ither high 
occupancy or any symbolic value for 

































probability of having "Terrorist 
A ttacks/C onventional W arfare 
T hreats ' during p o st d isaste r 
environm ent which could make a
Numerical Scale
0.1 0.2-0.3 0.4 0.5-0.6 0.7 0.8-0.9 1
severe  impact on th e  political scene.
M(S3)
4. Generalizability Grades of Membership per each Criterion:
a. G(C1): Generalizability Grades o f Membership for Physical Security:
G(C1) could be weighted in the city level and applied for all the other sub- 
level asset estimations. It is obtained through the utilization of Table 45, 46, 47, 48, and 
provides a weight between 0 and 1.
Table 45 Generalizability Grades of Membership for Physical Security
G en era lizab ility  G rades o f  M e m b e rsh ip  for Physical
S ecu rity  - G(C1)
l Seism icity V u ln erab ility  Index (Si)
2 Hurricane V u ln erab ility  Index (H i)
3 Flood V u ln erab ility  Index (Fi)
G(C1) = (Si +  Hi +  Fi) /  3
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Table 46 Seismicity Vulnerability Index
S eism icity  V u lnerab ility  Index  (Si)
Region o f Seism icity* High M oderate Low
Num erical scale 0 .8 - 1 0 .4 -0 .7 0 .1 -0 .3
Si
*  See Figure 38
Region of Seismicity






(1) Based on NEHRP B-C soil type.
The seismicity at any site is calculated based on the 
highest seismicity at any point in a county. More 
accurate information on any site can be obtained from 
the USGS site, (http://geohazards.cr.usgs.gov/eq/)
(2 )
Figure 38 Seismicity Regions o f the Conterminous United States (Rapid Visual
Screening, 2002, p. 66)
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Table 47 Hurricane Vulnerability Index
































Numerical scale 1 0.75 0.5 0.25 0.01
The region stays on the historical tracks 
and seriously vulnerable to recurrent 
hurricanes
Hi
Table 48 Flood Vulnerability Index
























Numerical scale 1 0.75 0.5 0.25 0.01
The region is close to  water masses and
seriously vulnerable to potential floods
Fi
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b. G (C 2 ):  Generalizability Grades o f Membership for Number of 
Inhabitants/V i si tors:
G(C2) could be weighted at least in the level o f police patrol divisions' area of 
responsibility and applied for all the other sub-level asset estimations. It is obtained 
through the utilization of Table 49 and provides a weight between 0 and 1.
Table 49 Generalizability Grades o f Membership for Number o f Inhabitants/Visitors
G eneralizability  G rades of M em bersh ip  for N um ber of 
Inhab itan ts/V isito rs  - G(C2)
Ns: Approximate number of available security agents serving in the sector
Pk: Approximate number of population inhabiting in the key assets in the 
sector (day/night)
Pa: Approximate population in the sector
G(C2 )= (Ns x Pk)/Pa
Gmax(C2): Highest Generalizability Grades of Membership for Number of 
Inhabitants/Visitors estim ated within the all area of responsibility in the 
sector level.
Gn(C2): Normalized Generalizability Grades of Membership for Number of 
Inhabitants/Visitors which address vulnerability index.
Gn(C2)= 1 - G(C2 )/Gmax(C2)
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c. G(C3): Generalizability Grades o f  Membership for Size/Area:
G(C3) could be weighted at least in the level of police patrol divisions' area of 
responsibility and applied for all the other sub-level asset estimations. It is obtained 
through the utilization of Table 50 and provides a weight between 0 and 1.
Table 50 Generalizability Grades of Membership for Size/Area
G eneralizability  G rades o f M em bersh ip  fo r S ize/A rea - G(C3)
Ns: Approximate number of available security agents serving in the sector
Ak: Approximate sum of the key a sse t  areas in the sector (sq ft)
As: Approximate area of the sector (sq ft)
G(C3)= (Ns x Ak)/As
Gmax(C3): Highest Generalizability Grades of Membership for Size/Area 
estim ated within the all area of responsibility in the sector level.
Gn(C3): Normalized Generalizability Grades of Membership for Size/Area 
which address vulnerability index.
Gn(C3)= 1 - G(C3 )/Gmax(C3)
d. G(C4): Generalizability Grades o f Membership for Traffic Access/Mobility: 
G(C4) is obtained through the utilization of Table 51, 52, 53, 54, and provides 
a weight between 0 and 1.
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Table 51 Generalizability Grades o f  Membership for Traffic Access/M obility
Generalizability G rades of M em bership 
for Traffic Access/M obility - G(C4)
l Road Length Index (Ri)
2 Transportation Lines Index (Ti)
3 Bridges Index (Bi)
G(C4) = (Ri + Ti + Bi) /  3
Table 52 Road Length Index
Road Length Index (Ri)
Es: Approximate sum of the length of Expressways/Interstates (with 4 or more lanes) in 
the sector (mi)
As: Approximate sum of the length of Arterials/Collectors (with 2 or more lanes) in the 
sector (mi)
Es(max): Highest length of Expressways/Interstates (with 4 or more lanes) in sector 
level estimated within the all area of responsibility (mi)
As(max): Highest length of Arterials (with 2 or more lanes) in sector level estimated 
within the all area of responsibility (mi)
Ri = 1 - ( Es/Es(max) + As/As(max)) /  2
Table 53 Transportation Lines Index
Transportation Lines Index (Ti)
The Num ber o f Transportation  






Numerical Scale 1 0 .7  - 0 .9 0.3 - 0 .6 0 .1  - 0 .2
Airport (Ai)
W aterw ay  Term inal (W i)
Railway Term inal (Ri)
Ti= (Ai+Wi+Ri)/3
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Table 54 Bridges Index
Bridges Index (Bi)
The Number of Bridges 
in the Sector
No Bridge 1 2 3
4  and 
above
Numerical Scale 0.01 0.1 - 0.3 0.4 - 0.6 0.7 - 0.9 1
Bi
5. Generalizability Grades of Membership per each Possible System State:
a. G(S1): Generalizability Grades o f Membership for Offences against Property: 
G(S1) is obtained through the utilization o f Table 55 and provides a weight 
between 0 and 1.
Table 55 Generalizability Grades of Membership for Offences against Property
G en era lizab ility  G rad es  o f M e m b ersh ip  fo r  
O ffences a g a in s t P ro p e rty  - G(S1)
Rep: Property Crime Rate in the sector (yearly total number of 
incidents)
Rcp(max): Maximum Property Crime Rate in the sector level 
(yearly total number of incidents)
G(S1)= Rep /  Rcp(max)
b. G(S2): Generalizability Grades o f Membership for Offences against Persons: 
G(S2) is obtained through the utilization o f Table 56 and provides a weight 
between 0 and 1.
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Table 56 Generalizability Grades o f  Membership for Offences against Persons
Generalizability Grades of M em bership 
for Offences against Persons - G(S2)
Rev: Violent Crime Rate in the sector (yearly total number of 
incidents)
Rcv(max): Maximum Violent Crime Rate in the sector level 
(yearly total number of incidents)
G(S2)= Rev /  Rcv(max)
c. G(S3): Generalizability Grades o f Membership for Terrorist Attacks/ Warfare 
Threats:
G(S3) is obtained through the utilization o f Table 57 and provides a weight 
between 0 and 1.
Table 57 Generalizability Grades o f Membership for Terrorist Attacks/
Warfare Threats
Generalizability Grades of Membership 
for Terrorist Attacks/Conventional Warfare Threats - G(S3)
System State (S3)
Terrorist Attacks/ Conventional Warfare Threats 
(aggregated assaults, sabotages, etc.)
Semantic Description Seven-level linguistic scale
With respect to historical 
records/statistics and existing social 
and political spectrum, the level of 
security and stability in the city 

























0.1 0.2-0.3 0.4 0.5-0.6 0.7 0.8-0.9
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APPENDIX F -  SAMPLE MEASUREMENT
1. Identify Boundaries
For the implementation of the PDSI Model, the City o f Delta territory is divided 
into small parts in line with the City Police Districts plan, and further into smaller parts of 
patrol division sectors and sub-sectors. Later, the Operations Bureau planning team 
decides to test the PDSI Model on a pilot area first. They identify the boundary o f Alfa 
sub-sector (Figure 39) to proceed through the model algorithm.
Figure 39 Boundaries o f Alfa Subsector
2. Identify Critical Assets
The subject matter expert team assigned by the Operations Bureau roughly 
identifies and enumerates the critical assets (Figure 40) in Alfa sub-sector according to 
the set o f criteria provided by the Mayor of Delta City, which defines general indices for 
the critical asset selection The three critical assets within the Alfa subsector have been 
virtually generated to sample the assessment process;
• Blue Shopping Center (BSC)
• Delta City Hospital (DCH)
• City o f Delta Department (CDD)
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Figure 40 Critical Assets Identified in Alfa Subsector
3. Measure Basic Criticality Value (BCV)
The Scaling Constants (relative importance of the urban area key sectors/services) 
are assigned by the City Council in advance (see Table 58).
Table 58 Scaling Constant Matrix
No Urban Area Key Sectors/Services Scaling Constant (Si)
1 Governance, Homeland Security, Law/Public Order, Emergency Service 1
2 Housing/Accommodation 0.8
3 Power/Energy Service (Power plants, nuclear reactors, dams, fuel supply stations, etc.) 0.9
4 Healthcare and Public Health 0.9
5 Telecommunication (including Information Technology) 0.8
6 Transportation/Postal and Shipping Service (including airports, major transportation terminals) 0.6
7 Food/Water and Other Goods Service (Shopping malls, major retail, etc.) 0.8
8 Banking and Finance (including banks/ATMs, etc.) 0.7
9 Critical Manufacturing (including major industrial facilities) 0.7
10 Training and Education Activities (including schools) 0.6
11 Worship Activities (Places o f worship, etc.) 0.5
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Basic Criticality Values (BCV) for each critical asset are calculated in Table 59 
with the weights generated randomly.
Table 59 Basic Criticality Values
No Urban Area Key Sectors/Services BCI(i)
City of Delta Department (CDD)
Governance, Homeland Security, 
Law/Public Order, Emergency Service BCI1 SI x(SRW l UEW 1)
BCI1= lx(0.9 U 0.5)= 0.950
Delta City Hospital (DCH)
Healthcare and Public Health BCI4 S4 x (SRW4 U EW4)
BCI4= 0.9x(0.8 U 0.4)= 0.792
Blue Shopping Center (BSC)
Food/Water and Other Goods Service 
(Shopping malls, major retail, etc.) BCI7 S7 x (EW7 U SW7)
BCI7=0.8x(0.1 U 0.65)= 0.548
Variables: Si: Scaling Constant; SRW: Service Relativity Weight; EW: 
Employment Weight; OW: Occupancy Weight; SW: Size Weight; IW: 
Investment Weight; STW: Student Capacity Weight; SCW: Seating Capacity 
Weight
The combination rule for the equations: A U B = (A+B) -  (AxB)
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4. Measure Post-Disaster Security Fuzzy Index (PDSFI)
Measurement o f Input Variables
a. Scaling Constant per each Criterion is assigned by the Subject Matter Expert 
team employed by the Police Department (see Table 60).
Table 60 Scaling Constants per each Criterion
C riterion
Scaling C o n s ta n t 
(0-1)
Physical Security s c l 0 .8
Num ber o f Inhabitants/Visitors sc2 0 .8
Size/Area sc3 1
Traffic Access/M obility sc4 0 .9
b. Vulnerability Indexes of the Critical Assets per each Criterion are measured in 
Table 61 with the weights generated randomly.


























Fenestration Index 8 3 5
V(C2) Approximate number of inhabitants/visitors 6 7.5 5.5




(Vr+Va+Vb+Vt) /  4
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c. Vulnerability Index Modifiers of the Critical Assets per each Possible System 
State are listed in Table 62 with the weights generated randomly.





Delta Q ty  
Hospital
G ty  o f  Delta 
D ep artm en t
M(S1) Offences Against Property 0.8 0.4 0.2
M(S2) Offences Against Persons 0.6 0.3 0.1
M(S3)
Terrorist Attacks/ Conventional 
W arfare Threats
0.7 0.4 0.6
d. Generalizability Grades o f Membership per each Criterion is measured in 
Table 63 with the weights generated randomly.
Table 63 Generalizability Grades of Membership per each Criterion






























G(C2) Generalizability Grades of Membership for 
Number of Inhabitants/Visitors
0.45 0.45 0.45









(Ri+Ti+Bi) /  3





0.44Ti Transportation Lines 
Index
0.34 0.34 0.34
Bi Bridges Index 0.25 0.25 0.25
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e. Generalizability Grades of Membership per each Possible System State is 
listed in Table 64 with the weights generated randomly.
Table 64 Generalizability Grades o f Membership per each Possible System State
Generalizability Grades of Membership 






City of Delta 
Department
G(S1) Offences Against Property 0.35 0.35 0.35
G(S2) Offences Against Persons 0.20 0.20 0.20
G(S3) Terrorist Attacks/ Conventional 
Warfare Threats
0.05 0.05 0.05
Measurement of Fuzzy Matrix Variables
a. The PDSFI Matrix o f Blue Shopping Center (BSC) is shown in Table 65 
with the variables measured according to equations discussed in Chapter 4.5.5.
Table 65 PDSFI Matrix o f BSC
Post-Disaster Security Fuzzy Index (PDSFI) Matrix

























V(C1) V(C2) V(C3) V(C4)
SI: Offences against Property
S2: Offences against Persons
S3: Terrorist Attacks/Conventional 
Warfare Threats
6.87 6 6.25 5.25
Generalizability Grades of Membership
G(C1) CHC2) G(C3) G(C4)
0.62 0.4S 0.58 0.44
Fuzzy Matrix








































(0.696,33) (0.560,238) (0.664,3.75) (0.5S2, 234) 0.20 G(S2) 0 .6 M(S2)
(0.639,3.85) (0378,336) (0.601,438) (0368,331) 0.05 G(S3) 0 .7 M(S3)
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b. The PDSFI Matrix of Delta City Hospital (DHC) is shown in Table 66 with 
the variables measured according to equations discussed in Chapter 4.5.5.
Table 66 PDSFI Matrix o f DHC
Post-Disaster Security Fu?zy Index (PDSFI) Matrix




















a :  Physical Security
C2: Number of Inhabitants/ 
Visitors 
Q :  Size/Area
C4: Traffic Access/Mobaty
V ia) via) V (0) V|C4)
51: Offences against Property
52: Offences against Persons
S3: Terrorist Attacks/Conventionai 
Warfare Threats
3.87 7 5 6.75 4.5
Generalizability Grades of M em bership
6 ( 0 ) 6 ( 0 ) 6 ( 0 ) 6(C4)
0.62 0.45 0.58 0.44
Fuzzy Matrix





































(0.696,0.93) (0.560,14) (0.664,2.03) (0.552,1.22) 0.20 6(S2) 0.30 M(S2)
(0.639,1-24) (0.478,2.4) (0.601,2.7) (0468,1.62) 0.05 6(S3) 0.40 M(S3)
c. The PDSFI Matrix of City of Delta Department (CDD) is shown in Table 67 
with the variables measured according to equations discussed in Chapter 4.5.5.
Table 67 PDSFI Matrix o f CDD
Post-Disaster Security Fuzzy Index (PDSFI) Matrix
























via) via) via) V|C4)
SI: Offences against Property
S2: Offences against Persons
S3: Terrorist Attacks/Conventional 
Warfare Threats
3.6 s.s 4 5 4.75
Generalizability G rades of M em bership
6(a) 6(a) 6(0) 6(C4)
0.62 0.45 0.58 0.44
Fuzzy Matrix





































(0.696,0.29) (0460,0.44) (0.664,0.45} (0.552,0.43) 0.20 6(S2) 0.10 M(S2)
(0.639,1.73) (0.478,2.64) (0.601,2.7) (0.468,2.57) 0.05 6(S3) 0.6 M(S3)
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Aggregation
In this step, PDSFI for each critical asset is obtained through the aggregation of 
the variables provided in the fuzzy matrix (of each asset) using the Equation 2.
a. Blue Shopping Center (BSC)
PDSFI (BSC) = 2.334
b. Delta City Hospital (DCH)
PDSFI (DCH) = 1.121
c. City o f Delta Department (CDD)
PDSFI (CDD) = 0.699
5. Measure Post-Disaster Security Index (PDSI)
PDSI for each critical asset is obtained through Equation 3 as listed in Table 68.
Table 68 PDSI of the Critical Assets
Critical Asset BCV PDSFI PDSI
Blue Shopping Center (BSC) 0.548 2.334 1279
Delta City Hospital (DCH) 0.792 1.121 887
City of Delta Department (CDD) 0.950 0.699 664
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1 2 3 4 5
1 Overall framework of the PDSI Model is congruent 
with the notion of the urban security operations.
2
Measurement process roadmap proposed by the 
PDSI Model provides indexes in higher precision 
since its algorithm incorporates both multiple 
criterions and different system states.
3
Embedded Criteria of Merit incorporated in the 
PDSFI Matrix are relevant to the expected outcomes 
of the model.
4
Possible System States incorporated in the PDSFI 
Matrix represent the relevant threat spectrum and 
crime classifications to most extent.
5
Generalizability Grades o f Membership 
incorporated in the PDSFI Matrix enhance the 
applicability of the model in higher scales.
6
Measurement matrix for each PDSI Model variables 
includes sufficient numbers o f sub-criterions that 
enhance the reliability o f the outputs.
7
PDSI provides realistic scores for the security 
planning process in terms of force tailoring, unit 
positioning and identification of the security 
operations techniques to be executed in the area o f 
operations.
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APPENDIX H - BASIC REALITY FACE-OFF DECISION TREE
The 'Basic Reality Face-off Decision Tree,' illustrated in Figure 41, was 
developed to validate the incorporation of'A m bient Criteria o f Merit' in the PDSFI 
Matrix. The design of the decision tree is based on the following scenario:
Scenario: A special firefighter team named Bravo under the command of Fire 
Captain Brown has been tasked to deploy to Compound Charlie as soon as 
possible by the immediate release of a fragmentary order (FRAGO). However, the 
only information provided to Captain Brown are the coordinates o f the compound 
and a note, which says “There are three critical facility buildings (A, B and C). 
They are the only structures in the compound, and they are densely populated. 
Furthermore, all the personnel in the compound are stuck and vulnerable to 
upcoming emergent threats.”
Mission: The mission of the team is to secure the critical buildings from an 
imminent collateral fire threat and evacuate/rescue people as necessary. Time is 
very critical and decisions should be made quickly and revised later after the 
initial action. Captain Brown has a single responsibility with an important caveat 
notified by the superior command.
Responsibility: Once the team arrives in the compound, Captain Brown will 
tailor the force structure, dividing the team into separate groups, and deploy 
(position) each group to vulnerable assets, and reassess his force tailoring and unit
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positioning decisions, as the feedback report regarding the situation is sent to him 
by the troops deployed to first assignment positions.
Caveat: For any course of action, Captain Brown cannot reserve any inert units. 

























Control A and 
Support B&C
Control A and 
Support B
Control A and 
Support C
Q  OR gate 
| | Decision gate
Figure 41 Basic Reality Face-off Decision Tree
225
From the simple tactical perspective o f military security operations, the following 
assumptions have been generated to visualize the response continuum of the team Bravo:
Having received the FRAGO, Captain Brown's initial decision should be to start 
his team's movement towards the compound as a prompt action since he has the 
coordinates. However, he would need more information to decide the best route to ensure 
his team arrives in the compound quickly and safely. The requirement for this decision 
point is depicted with the square numbered ' 1' in the decision tree (Figure 39).
Once the team reaches the compound, the Captain faces another decision point, 
depicted with the square numbered '2 ' in the decision tree (Figure 39). As a matter o f his 
responsibility, Captain Brown has to make decision on the force tailoring and unit 
positioning to deploy his troops. However, he only knows that all the three assets are 
critical and populated with personnel. While he has no idea about the criticality weights 
o f the assets, he has to take action very quickly. So, he should make a decision to tailor 
his team into groups considering the sizes/areas of the assets, since he can only see the 
assets and their sizes/areas in that time.
When the troops are initially deployed to their first positions, regarding the 
causality principle, the three potential results could be:
• Troops may fail.
•  Troops may accomplish.
• Troops may need to support other groups while they continue to perform their
initial task.
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Once the groups are deployed to critical assets, they would first report the number 
o f the people trapped in the assets. Then the Captain would likely revise his previous 
decision to adjust the number o f the assigned troops in accordance with the number o f the 
people trapped in the assets. This decision point is depicted with the square numbered '3' 
in the decision tree (Figure 39).
While personnel are evacuated and preemptive actions are being taken to protect 
assets from imminent threat of fire, the troops could provide further information 
regarding the physical security characteristics o f the assets (e.g. the features that make the 
assets more or less vulnerable to fire), and the Captain would think to revise his previous 
decision to optimize the force tailoring as appropriate. This decision point is depicted 
with the square numbered '4 ' in the decision tree (Figure 39).
In summary, although the decision tree could be extended further to the more 
specific branches in similar approach, the criteria that the Captain must consider in the 
first four decision points - best route selection (Traffic Access/Mobility), tailoring the 
team into groups considering the sizes/areas o f the assets (Size/Area), adjusting the 
number of the assigned troops in accordance with the number of the people stuck in the 
assets (Number o f Inhabitants/Visitors), and revising the previous decision to optimize 
the force tailoring according to the information about the physical security characteristics 
of the assets (Physical Security) - constitute the basic criteria set to complete the 
criticality and vulnerability assessments during the implementation o f the PDSI Model.
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APPENDIX I - A ROADMAP FOR COMPLETE COMPLEX 
ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEM ANALYSIS
1. Establishment of Core Analysis Team (CAT)
The CAT to be established (which is isolated from any potential structural, 
organizational and hierarchical pressure) should directly report to highest level decision 
makers.46 It should initially be manned by enough number o f qualified subject matter 
experts who have already had a holistic perspective for the organization with necessary 
content knowledge and experience. Following the establishment of the CAT, the mission 
and desired end state is delivered with a brief direction and guidance.
2. Development of the CAT Terms of Reference (ToR)
The CAT is allowed for an ample incubation period to discuss the way ahead and 
draft a flexible ToR for its own operation principles, and the ToR is approved by the 
decision making committee.
3. Establishment of Analysis Working Group (AWG)
At the end of the incubation period, due to information to be provided by the CAT, 
the CAT is reinforced with necessary staff to ensure all major organizational system 
components are represented at least by one subject matter expert. Pursuant to 
participation of other representatives, the AWG is established to be governed by CAT
46 A decision making committee, which is to include the optimal mix of decision makers who fairly represent the 
relevant system stakeholders/entities at the highest level, should be assigned to oversee the whole analysis process and 
navigate the CAT.
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and the CAT ToR is modified to cover the AWG, and the changes approved by the 
decision making committee.
4. Development of the Analysis Methodology
Since every organization has unique characteristics, its analysis methodology 
should be an optimal blend of the available methods. In this sense, AWG is allowed to 
develop a draft analysis methodology (which could be as outlined in the next bullet - #5), 
and the analysis methodology approved by the decision making committee.
5. Conducting Analysis
a. Major problem domains in the system are identified by AWG, and
approved by the decision making committee.
b. Main problem areas in each major problem domain are identified by AWG, 
and approved by the decision making committee.
c. Sub-problems in each main problem area are identified, and approved by 
the decision making committee (Sub-problem identification continues until the AWG 
agrees that required granularity has been obtained to make each specified problem 
handled by any subject matter expert sub-committee that would be assigned afterwards).
d. The major problem domains, main problem areas and sub-problems are 
analyzed in a sequential order or in a non-linear approach as necessary, and the courses of 
action are developed for possible solutions, to be approved by the decision making 
committee.
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e. The personnel and logistic plans that will support the courses o f action
identified are developed and the coordination requirements completed.
6. Implementation
a. The implementation plan including the detailed timeline is developed and 
approved.
b. Execution.
c. Feedback mechanism is facilitated and course corrections are applied as 
required until the systems reaches full operational capability.
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APPENDIX J - RESPONSIBLE CONDUCT OF RESEARCH FOR ENGINEERS 
CURRICULUM COMPLETION REPORT
CITI Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative (CITI)
Learner: Mehmet Secilmis 
Institution: Old Dominion University 
Responsible Conduct of Research for Engineers
Stage 1. Basic Coarse Passed on 03/28/11 (Ref ? 5487038)
Date
Elective Modules Completed Score
Introduction to RCR for Engineers 02 13 11 no quiz
Research Misconduct 02 13 11 5 5 (100%)
Whistleblowing and the Obligation to Protect the PubKc 02 16 11 11  (100%)
Responsible Authorship in Engineering 03 07 11 3 4 (75%)
Ethical Issues in Peer Resiew and Publication in Engineering 
Research
03 15 11 3 4(75%)
Conflicts of Interest in Engineering Research : 03 15 11 4 5 (80%)
Ensironmental Ethics 03 16 11 34 (75%)
The Ethics of Mentoring 03 16 11 7 7(100%)
Human Subjects Research in Engineering Fields. 03 16 11 5 5 (100%)
The Use of Live Animals in Research 03 28 11 5 8 (63%)
Ethical Issues in the Management of Data in Engineering Research 03 28 11 9 9 (100%)
Collaborative Research in Engineering Fields ; 03 28 11 4 7 (57%)
Completing the RCR for Engineers Course 03 28 11 no quiz
For this Completion Report to be valid, the learner listed above mnst be affiliated with 
a CITI participating institution. Falsified information and unauthorized use of the CITI 
coarse site is anethical, and may be considered scientific misconduct by yonr institution
Paul Braunschweiger Ph.D.
Professor, University of Miami 
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